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Abstract
Money is a scarce resource for most people. For that reason, the decision whether to
spend more today and less in the future or vice versa is a recurrent question to many of us.
Pension systems provide incentives for saving for future consumption and mortgage markets
allow us to increase consumption immediately by giving up future spending opportunities
accordingly. For this reason, pension and mortgage systems play a key role to individual
savings decisions. This dissertation is comprised by three self-contained chapters concerned
with how individual savings behavior depends on the design of certain pension and mortgage
features.
Chapter one, "Do Tax Incentives for Saving in Pension Accounts Cause Debt Accumu-
lation?", applies a quasi-experimental research design on a Danish 2010 policy that reduced
tax incentives for saving in annuity pension schemes to show significant substitution of sav-
ings from retirement accounts to gross debt repayments. We find that for every 1 Danish
krone reduction in retirement savings 31 cents goes to debt repayments. Taking into ac-
count all types of savings, we find full crowding out. Consistent with previous findings, we
document that the effect is driven by a minority, about 23 percent, who actively rebalance
their savings.
Chapter two, "Housing Wealth Effects and Mortgage Borrowing", examines whether
home price changes drive mortgage based equity extraction. To do this we use longitudinal
survey data with subjective information about current and expected future house prices to
calculate unanticipated house price changes. We link this information at the person level
to high quality administrative records with information about mortgage borrowing as well
as savings in various financial instruments. We find a marginal propensity to extract out
of unanticipated housing wealth gains to be 3-5 percent. We find no adjustment to other
components of the portfolio, and we find that mortgage extraction leads to an increase in
spending. We find no evidence that the effect is driven by collateral constraints. Instead, the
effect is driven by about 11 percent of the observations where the respondent is recorded
having actively taken out a new mortgage. Three out of four among these refinance an
existing fixed rate mortgage loan and exploit that the old loan can be prepaid and a new
loan established to lock in a lower market rate. The propensity to extract equity is higher
for the group that has an incentive to refinance following a drop in the market interest rate
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and at the same time experience an unanticipated housing wealth gain. These results point
to the existence of a housing wealth effect that is intimately connected to the functioning
of the mortgage market, and this suggests that monetary policy plays an important role in
transforming unanticipated housing wealth gains into spending by affecting interest rates
on mortgage loans.
Chapter three, "The Effects of Tax Penalties on Early Withdrawals from Pension Ac-
counts", use variation from a natural experiment that is plausibly exogenous to other savings
decisions to show that reducing the tax penalty rate by 1 percent increases the propensity
to withdraw pension assets early by 0.1 percentage points on average. Access to detailed
administrative records allows us to show that the effect is two to three times larger for
consumers who are likely to be affected by liquidity constraints and individuals who lose
their job or divorce. This is consistent with the idea that consumers finance spending with
pension assets only when other less costly ways to access liquidity have been exhausted.
Conditional on withdrawing pension assets early the amount withdrawn increases by about
3 percent for each one percent reduction in the tax penalty. Only 1/3 of the withdrawals
are rolled over to non-retirement savings accounts or used to repay debt. We find that those
who cash out pension wealth in the year of a job loss reduce overall savings rates for at
least six years after the withdrawal. Ultimately, our evidence suggests that tax penalties
are efficient to increase long-term savings.
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Resumé (in Danish)
For de fleste er penge en knap ressource. Derfor er det en tilbagevendende overvejelse for
mange, om de ønsker at øge forbruget i dag på bekostning af forbrug i fremtiden – eller
omvendt. Pensionssystemer giver forbrugerne et incitament til at spare mere op, mens re-
alkreditinstitutter stiller kredit til rådighed, så folk kan øge forbruget med det samme og
dermed sænke forbrugsmulighederne i fremtiden. Pensionsselskaberne og realkreditinstitut-
terne spiller derfor en central rolle for den enkeltes opsparings- og forbrugsadfærd. Denne
afhandling består af tre selvstændige artikler, der handler om, hvordan individual opspa-
ringsadfærd påvirkes af særlige elementer i pensionssystemet og markedet for realkreditlån.
Kapitel et, "Do Tax Incentives for Saving in Pension Accounts Cause Debt Accumula-
tion?", anvender et kvasi-eksperimentielt undersøgelsesdesign på en dansk politikændring i
2010, som reducerede skatteincitamentet ved at spare op i ratepensionskonti. Resultaterne
viser en signifikant substitutionseffekt mellem opsparing i pensionskonti og en reduktion af
bruttogæld. Vi finder, at for hver 1 dansk krones reduktion i pensionsopsparingen går 31
øre til afdrag på gæld. Når alle opsparingskomponenter medregnes, finder vi fuld fortræng-
ning. I lighed med tidligere resultater i litteraturen dokumenterer vi, at effekten er drevet
af omkring 23 procent af opsparerne, som aktivt re-allokerer deres opsparede midler.
Kapitel to, "Housing Wealth Effects and Mortgage Borrowing", undersøger. om ændrin-
ger i huspriserne kan forklare udtræk af friværdi i boligen. Til dette anvender vi survey med
subjektive informationer om nuværende og forventede fremtidige huspriser til at beregne
uventede stød til boligprisen. Denne information kombineres med administrative registre på
individniveau, som indeholder informationer om realkreditlån samt opsparing i en række
andre finansielle instrumenter. Vi finder en marginal tilbøjelighed til at udtrække friværdi
på 3–5 procent ud af den uventede boligprisstigning. Der er ingen justeringer på de øvrige
opsparingskomponenter, og vi finder, at den øgede realkreditgæld fører til øget forbrug. Der
er ingen tegn på, at effekten er drevet af kreditbegrænsninger. Den samlede effekt er drevet
af de omkring 11 procent af observationerne, hvor respondenten aktivt optager et nyt lån.
3/4 af disse refinansierer deres eksisterende, fastforrentede realkreditlån og udnytter, at det
eksisterende lån kan blive indfriet ved optag af et ny lån med lavere effektiv rente. Tilbøjelig-
heden til at udtrække friværdien er større for gruppen af respondenter, der har et incitament
til at omlægge deres eksisterende lån, og som samtidig oplever en uventet stigning i boligpri-
v
sen. Disse resultater indikerer, at formueeffekten på boligmarkedet er tæt forbundet til den
måde, som markedet for realkreditlån fungerer på. Det antyder, at monetær politik, der på-
virker renten på realkreditlån, kan spille en vigtig rolle for transformationen af boligformue
til forbrug.
Kapitel tre, "The Effects of Tax Penalties on Early Withdrawals from Pension Acco-
unts", anvender potentielt eksogen variation fra et naturligt eksperiment til at vise, at
tilbøjeligheden til at udtrække pensionsmidler i utide øges med 0,1 procentpoint for hver
1 procent reduktion i strafskatten, der pålægges førtidige udtræk. Adgang til detaljerede
administrative data gør det muligt at vise, at effekten er to til tre gange større for indivi-
der, der er likviditetsbegrænsede eller oplever jobtab eller skilsmisse. Det er konsistent med
ideen om, at folk finansierer deres forbrug med pensionsmidler, hvis de har udtømt øvrige
finansieringsmuligheder forinden, fx likvid opsparing, kredit og friværdi. Eksistensen af en
genkøbsklausul i pensionsordningen tillader dermed opsparerne i højere grad at håndtere
negative indkomst- eller efterspørgselsstød via adgang til likviditet. Vi finder, at opsparings-
raten forbliver lav i en årrække efter, at opsparerne udtrækker pensionsmidler i forbindelse
med et jobtab – også selvom de hurtigt kommer i beskæftigelse igen.
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Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters about how individual savings
decisions are affected by pension taxation, house price changes and mortgage markets. Each
chapter can be read independently but the topics of the papers are indeed overlapping.
Chapter one is concerned with the effect of tax incentives for saving in retirement ac-
counts. There is a large literature in public economics that attempts to sort out whether
such tax incentives increase overall individual savings or whether the tax benefits cause
savers to shift savings from non-retirement accounts to tax-deferred pension accounts. For
example, Bernheim (2002) provides a thorough review of this matter. Theoretically, it is im-
possible to determine whether the substitution effect or income effect dominate. The former
implies that savers substitute savings from non-retirement accounts to tax-favored pension
accounts in order to reap the tax benefit, while their overall savings rates are unchanged.
The income effect implies that the tax subsidy enables savers to consume more both today
and in the future. This would cause them to reduce overall savings rates. In addition,
there is a third channel—an intertemporal substitution effect. This implies that savers con-
sider present spending to be more expensive relative to future consumption because the tax
subsidy obtained through saving in retirement accounts generates future spending oppor-
tunities only. This would cause savers to increase savings rates. Ultimately, whether tax
incentives for saving in pension accounts increase total individual savings or whether savings
in non-retirement accounts are crowded out by savings in pension accounts is an empirical
question. A range of studies have attempted to answer this question using various identi-
fication strategies and data sources (see, e.g., Engen et al. , 1996; Poterba et al. , 1996).
Recently, Chetty et al. (2014) used population-wide data records and quasi-experimental
variation from Denmark to show that tax incentives are ineffective in boosting individual
savings rates. Chapter one in this dissertation breaks new ground by decomposing this
crowding out effect. The chapter’s contribution to the literature is the finding that about
1/3 of the change in pension contributions that was caused by variation in the associated
tax benefits is used to repay debt. This implies that tax rules within the pension system
might affect accumulation of debt at the individual level.
Chapter two examines the well-known correlation between house prices and consump-
tion. The sizable literature on this topic can be boiled down to three main hypotheses. The
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housing wealth hypothesis, stating that unanticipated shocks to house prices cause home
owners to increase spending. This explanation is based on the notion that consumers seek
to smooth consumption over their life time and only reconsider their spending plan when
new information arrives, e.g., an unanticipated increase in the price of their home (Camp-
bell & Cocco, 2007; Skinner, 1996; Muellbauer et al. , 1990). There is also the collateral
channel hypothesis, stating that house price increases do not affect spending directly, but
improved access to mortgage borrowing relaxes otherwise binding credit constraints that
consumers might face (Aladangady, 2017; Browning & Leth-Petersen, 2003; Cooper, 2013;
Leth-Petersen, 2010). Finally, there is a common factor hypothesis, stating that house prices
and consumption are driven by some third factor, e.g. expected income changes (Windsor
et al. , 2015; Attanasio & Weber, 1994; Attanasio et al. , 2009). Using a novel combin-
ation of survey data on subjective expectations and public administrative records about
individual savings outcomes, chapter two tests the three competing hypotheses against each
other. The results show that unanticipated house price increases lead home owners to take
up more mortgage debt and increase spending corresponding to 3–5 percent of the gain in
the value of the home. The unique features of the data allow us to control for expected
income changes. Indicators of binding credit constraints are found not to predict this spend-
ing response. However, the findings imply that house price gains translate into increased
private spending when the necessary mortgage market conditions are in place. Specifically,
when house prices increase unexpectedly, home owners can extract equity by exploiting that
market interest rates are lower than when they took out their existing loan. This suggests
that monetary policy might affect private spending through the mortgage markets when
house prices increase unexpectedly. The contribution to the literature of the chapter is the
detailed information about how the wealth effects interact with financial market conditions.
Our findings are related to that of Bhutta & Keys (2016), but to the best of our knowledge,
this chapter provides a more direct test of the housing wealth and spending relationship
unprecedented in the literature.
Chapter three is concerned with disincentives to withdraw pension assets prior to retire-
ment age. A range of papers have sought to clarify the extent to which early withdrawals
take place Poterba et al. (1998); Poterba & Venti (2001); Engelhardt (2002), while others
have shown that pre-retirement withdrawals correlate with liquidity constraint indicators
and adverse demographic and labor market shocks (Hurd & Panis, 2006; Amromin & Smith,
2003). Another branch of studies within this topic examines the effects of tax penalties on
early withdrawal behavior (Burman et al. , 2012, 1999; Chang, 1996), showing that increased
tax rates on early withdrawals reduce the propensity to cash out. Chapter three attempts
to embrace the predictions made by all these papers. Specifically, we examine whether indi-
viduals who suffer from liquidity constraints or adverse life events, e.g., job loss or divorce,
respond more strongly to changes in the tax penalties. To test this prediction we utilize
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public administrative records and quasi-experimental variation in the tax penalty rate. The
empirical design allows us to show that those in financial hardship are more likely to cash
out pension assets early when the tax penalty rate is reduced unexpectedly. Moreover, the
chapter shows that, conditional on cashing out, withdrawn amounts are significantly larger
when the tax price of doing so is reduced. Disregarding the change in tax penalties, 2/3 of
the withdrawals were used for immediate consumption. The chapter contributes to our un-
derstanding of whether pension systems should include buy back clauses that allow pension
owners to cope with unanticipated income or demands shocks.
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Chapter 1
Do Tax Incentives for Saving in Pension
Accounts Cause Debt Accumulation?
A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in European Economic Review.
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Do Tax Incentives for Saving in Pension Accounts
Cause Debt Accumulation?
Evidence from Danish Register Data
Henrik Yde Andersen∗
Abstract
This paper applies a quasi-experimental research design on a Danish 2010 policy
that reduced tax incentives for saving in annuity pension schemes to show significant
substitution of savings from retirement accounts to gross debt repayments. We find
that for every 1 Danish krone reduction in retirement savings 31 cents goes to debt
repayments. Taking into account all types of savings, we find full crowding out. Con-
sistent with previous findings, we document that the effect is driven by a minority,
about 23 percent, who actively rebalance their savings.
∗Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 16, DK-2000 Frederiksberg (hya.eco@cbs.dk) and Dan-
marks Nationalbank, Havnegade 5, DK-1093 Copenhagen K. Thanks for valuable comments from Steffen
Andersen, Nicholas Barr, Roel Beetsma, Ayse İmrohoroğlu, Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen, Amalie Sofie
Jensen, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Søren Leth-Petersen, Alexander Mas, Magne Mogstad, James Poterba, Jes-
per Rangvid, Morten O. Ravn, colleagues at Danmarks Nationalbank and participants at Danish Economic
Society, DGPE, PeRCent, Copenhagen Business School and two anonymous referees. Viewpoints and con-
clusions stated are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent those of Danmarks
Nationalbank. The author alone is responsible for any remaining errors.
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1 Introduction
Tax-favoured pension accounts have attracted attention over the years because of their
importance to individual savings behaviour. Many developed countries use tax subsidies
to affect individual saving rates and economists strive to determine the outcomes of such
policies. Recent empirical work suggests that savings in tax-favoured retirement accounts
are fully crowded out (Chetty et al., 2014). It is less clear, however, whether savings in
pension accounts are crowded out by savings in non-retirement accounts or debt repayments.
Imagine that tax incentives for saving in pension schemes are reduced from one day to
the next and taxpayers respond by shifting savings from retirement accounts to the now-
highest after-tax-return account. Given that debt usually carries higer interests than savings,
outstanding debt should be repaid before saving in non-retirement accounts. A growing
interest in the development of household debt calls for evidence-based insights into the link
between retirement savings and gross debt accumulation. Studies based on household-level
data have shown that highly leveraged households tend to cut spending more than their
less leveraged peers during economic downturns (Mian and Sufi, 2010; Mian et al., 2013).
Also, economic growth and macroeconomic stability seem to be negatively correlated with
household debt (Cecchetti et al., 2011; Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Jorda et al., 2013).
Bank debt and mortgages in the household sector might play an important role both in
macroeconomic outcomes and when estimating crowd-out in retirement savings.
This paper revisits crowd-out in tax-favoured retirement savings but uses novel population-
wide data to split the crowd-out effects between individual savings and debt accounts. Access
to longitudinal information from Danish tax authorities and mortgage institutions makes it
possible to cover the full financial balance sheet at the individual level. Mortgages comprise
the largest financial liability in households and, to our knowledge, this is the first contribu-
tion to the crowd-out literature to include all household debt accounts in a panel dimension.
Combined with public administration registers, the data have the advantage of providing
many observations and objective information about individual wealth and personal char-
acteristics. A Danish 2010 tax reform provides exogenous variation to the tax incentive
for saving in pension schemes as it introduced a deductions threshold for contributions to
annuity pension schemes. Using the introduced tax deduction threshold as the cutoff, a
difference-in-differences estimator is applied in a quasi-experimental research design.
Increased availability of longitudinal information on individual saving accounts have
made it possible to show that total net savings at the individual level are likely to be un-
affected when reducing tax incentives for saving in pension accounts. This is demonstrated
in Chetty et al. (2014) who use a large panel with third-party reported information to show
that individuals simply shift savings from tax deductible retirement accounts to taxable
saving accounts. The importance of the panel dimension is addressed in Gelber (2011) as
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individuals might have unobserved preferences for saving, which is possibly confounded by
the savings response that the econometrician wants to identify. Individuals with higher un-
observed tastes for saving might more often choose tax-favoured, illiquid retirement accounts
simply because of their strong preferences for saving and not due to the tax incentive itself.
The two aforementioned studies have contributed to a large literature in public economics
that for decades has sought to determine the effects of tax subsidies on savings. Bernheim
(2002) thoroughly reviews the ambiguous findings in this literature, e.g. Skinner and Feen-
berg (1990); Venti and Wise (1990) who use consumer and expenditure surveys to show that
savings in tax-favoured pension accounts represent new savings. This implies that individ-
uals reduce consumption and increase savings because of the tax incentive. Similar results
are supported by Hubbard (1984); Poterba et al. (1995, 1996); Hubbard and Skinner (1996);
İmrohoroğlu et al. (1998). Contrary to this, Gale and Scholz (1994) use a different set of
econometric assumptions to show that increased savings in retirement accounts are crowded
out by decreased savings in non-retirement accounts. Their findings are supported by Engen
et al. (1996); Gale (1998); Attanasio and DeLeire (2002); Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003);
Benjamin (2003); Engelhardt and Kumar (2007). Most recently, Chetty et al. (2014) at-
tempt to explain the ambiguities in the literature by identifying two very different types
of economic agents, namely active and passive savers. Active savers respond to changes in
taxation rules and re-optimise consumption and saving decisions according to the lifecycle
model. Passive savers do not respond to incentives but tend to make consumption choices
based only on their disposable income. The distinction between active and passive savers
becomes essential when measuring outcomes of retirement policies. Tax credits for saving
in pension schemes would have no effect on passive savers because they require individuals
to make active decisions and adjust their savings. Unlike this, automatic enrolment policies
would increase retirement savings for passive savers, while active savers might manually opt
out (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2009). All the studies mentioned have made
important contributions to our understanding of tax incentives and their effect on individ-
ual savings. However, it is well-known that our knowledge is limited when it comes to the
interplay between crowd-out in retirement savings and debt accumulation.
Standard lifecycle models predict that reduced tax incentives for saving in pension ac-
counts affect pension contributions through both a price and a wealth channel. The price
channel implies that retirement savings decrease when reducing tax incentives for saving in
pension schemes because returns on pension savings decrease relative to returns on savings
in non-retirement accounts. Also, individuals prefer to substitute consumption intertempo-
rally, i.e. people prefer to consume more today than tomorrow. The wealth channel works
in the opposite direction. Individuals perceive themselves less wealthy when tax incentives
for saving are reduced. In order to smooth consumption over their lifetime they increase
retirement savings. It is broadly acknowledged that the price channel dominates the wealth
11
channel (Duflo et al., 2006; Engelhardt and Kumar, 2007). This means that the price
channel—the substitution effect—can be estimated by comparing two types of individuals
with similar saving preferences but only one of them is affected by reduced tax incentives
for saving. This paper does exactly this by identifying reduced pension contributions as
tax incentives for saving in retirement schemes are reduced by the government. The main
outcomes of interest are whether the reform increased other types of savings and in partic-
ular whether the reform increased debt repayments. Debt carries a higher interest rate that
savings, which implies that any outstanding debt should be repaid before non-retirement
savings are accumulated. Moreover, the most expensive debt should be repaid first. The
availability of debt repayment information makes this analysis particularly valuable as we
can test these predictions.
This study stands out for two reasons. First, it documents that, when reducing tax
incentives for saving in retirement accounts, gross debt is reduced by 31 cents for every 1 unit
of Danish currency, Danish Krone (DKK), that retirement savings decrease. This represents
by far repayments of expensive debt in banks and to a lesser extent repayment of debt in
mortgage institutions. Knowing that taxpayers actually do manipulate their debt when tax
incentives for saving in pension schemes are changed is essential when assessing the overall
outcomes of such policies. The second contribution is to confirm the results of the recent
empirical literature by utilising exogenous variation from a new tax policy on comprehensive
individual level data. By using a Danish 2010 tax reform this paper documents full crowd-
out in retirement savings and find that only 23 percent of individuals respond actively to
tax incentives. Chetty et al. (2014) use a Danish 1999 tax reform in a very different quasi-
experimental setting to show almost identical results. The fact that similar results can
be produced by two different research designs, using two very different tax reforms that
were implemented more than a decade apart, underlines the robustness of the empirical
evidence. Analysing a policy change, which targeted only a part of the population—those
relatively high in the income distribution, implies that our findings cannot necessarily be
extrapolated directly to the broader population, a limitation applicable to any empirical
paper estimating causal impacts using quasi-experimental methods. Mean gross income
for the Danish population is about DKK 300,000. We find full crowd-out for a subgroup
of individuals with mean gross income of about DKK 670,000. Chetty et. al (2014) find
similar results for a different policy targeting people at a lower level of income (around DKK
308,000). This is suggestive evidence that savings in pension schemes are fully crowded out
for individuals in the upper half of the income distribution. Our analysis on heterogeneity
indicates that those who responded actively to the reform are well educated and less exposed
to unemployment compared to those who did not react to the rule change.
The next section introduces the Danish institutional setting and carefully explains the
policy reform and data. Section 3 presents the empirical identification strategy, estimated
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substitution effects and the robustness of the empirical results. In section 4, the share of
active savers is estimated, showing heterogeneity on both observables and policy responses,
while section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Setting and Policy Reform
This section provides an overview of the Danish pension and mortgage system followed by
an explanation of the policy reform that provides exogenous variation to savings behaviour
in the research setup.
The Danish pension system is comparable to most retirement systems in developed
countries. It has three pillars consisting of a state-provided defined benefit scheme (DB),
occupational defined contribution schemes (DC) and voluntary pension savings accounts
(DC). This setup is analogous to the US retirement savings system, reflecting Social Se-
curity, 401(k)s and IRAs, respectively. Within the second and third pillar, the Danish
retirement system offers three types of DC pension schemes: annuity, capital and life-long
schemes. Contributions for all schemes are tax deductible, but they differ in pay-out profile
and taxation. The annuity scheme is paid out in annuities during a final time span of 10-25
years and payments are taxed as regular income. The capital scheme is paid out as a lump-
sum and taxed at 40 percent. The life-long scheme is paid out in annuities and taxed as
regular income, but pay-out continues until the owner dies. Second pillar contributions are
generally set through collective bargaining agreements between employers’ associations and
workers’ unions. Employers contribute to all three types of schemes, constituting more than
90 percent of total pension contributions in 2009. Second pillar contributions are manda-
tory but the employees do, however, have some decision power over the exact amount. This
implies that the employees can ask the employer to increase or decrease occupational contri-
butions to a certain extent. Third pillar contributions are completely voluntary. The sum of
employer-paid and individual contributions to capital pension schemes is tax deductible up
to a certain limit. This limit increases over time and amounted to DKK 46,000 (US $7,000)
in 2009. At that time, which is prior to the reform investigated in this paper, no subsidy
thresholds existed for annuity and life-long schemes.
The dotted line in Figure 1 plots total pension contributions in nominal terms across
years. Clearly, overall contributions in the economy declined in 2010—the year of the policy
change that this paper examines. Before that, contributions had increased by a constant rate
apart from a smaller reduction around the outbreak of the financial crisis. The 2010 decline
is likely to be caused by the reform but other factors could also play a part, e.g. economic
cycles and heterogenous responses to the post-recession recovery. One takeaway from Figure
1 is that the majority of taxpayers are likely to have reduced pension contributions. This
paper attempts to identify the effects of one particular element of the reform, namely an
introduction of a contribution limit up until tax deductions are granted, effectively reducing
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tax-incentives for saving in pension accounts. This is explained in detail in the next section.
Figure 1: Total Household Debt and Pension Contributions
Note: Outstanding debt in households covers all debt in banks and mortgage institutions. Pension contributions are aggregate
contributions recorded in each year.
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank and Danish Insurance Association.
The Danish mortgage system is funded using covered bonds like in most continental
European countries. However, similar to the US system, Danish mortgages offer long-
term fixed-rate mortgages without prepayment penalties. This ensures a flexible market for
borrowers, who can always exit their loan by buying back the underlying bonds at face or
market value, depending on which price is lower. Andersen et al. (2015) provide a detailed
description of the Danish mortgage market and point out that borrowers have minimal
barriers to refinance existing loans, even if they have negative home equity. Refinancing the
loan is preferable if borrowers wish to adjust annual repayments or maturities or benefit from
a decline in market yields. Most importantly in the context of this paper, such refinancing
does not require a review of the borrower’s credit quality. Once the mortgage loan is granted
the borrower has room to adjust the loan characteristics. Collateralized mortgage loans carry
a lower interest rate than credit in banks, but interest payments on both debt types are tax
deductible by approximately one-third of the payments. The solid line in Figure 1 plots an
index of total household debt across years. Up until 2008 household debt had increased by a
constant rate, which was reduced dramatically around the years of the 2008 recession. The
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interesting question is to what extent debt accumulation was affected by the sharp change
in pension contributions. Had household debt increased more than was the case if pension
contributions had not declined in 2010?
2.1 Pension Tax Reform
A Danish 2010 tax reform introduced a tax subsidy limit on contributions to annuity pension
schemes. This reform implied that the sum of employer-paid and individual contributions
to annuity pension schemes was tax-deductible only up to DKK 100,000 (US $15,000). This
sharp change in taxation rules on pension savings provides exogenous variation to annuity
pension contributions and is ideal for a quasi-experimental research design. Individuals who
intended to save more than DKK 100,000 in annuity pension accounts in 2010 experienced
a reduction in tax incentives for saving in retirement accounts. Given that they paid more
than this amount in the years up to the reform and given that they had no intention of
changing their contribution rates, they experienced a reduced tax deduction from 2010 and
onwards. Conditional on this fact and conditional on year and individual fixed effects,
variation in annuity pension contributions is considered exogenous.
Measuring the reform effect relies on the fact that the public was aware of the rule change.
We provide two sources of evidence that attention to pension-related information increased
after the announcement of the reform. First, web searches of the word "pension" increased
three to four times in the reform announcement year, 2009, compared to previous years—
particularly in March, which is when the majority of the members of parliament agreed
to the reform, and May, which is when the bill was proposed formally. Second, nation-
wide newspapers published more than three times more articles on pension matters in the
announcement year compared to preceding years. Figures on web searches and newspaper
articles can be found in the appendix. The change in tax incentives was passed by parliament
as a permanent rule change and the public had no reason to believe otherwise.
Using the introduced subsidy threshold, a subsample for further analysis is drawn. This
subsample includes individuals who contributed close to DKK 100,000 in annuity pension
accounts in 2008—that is two years prior to implementation of the reform and one year prior
to the announcement of the reform. Individuals with DKK 80,000-150,000 are included in the
sample and the robustness section shows that variations to this assignment window does not
change the results significantly. Individuals above the DKK 100,000-threshold are assigned
for treatment, while those below are assigned as non-treated. Figure 2 is a histogram of
annuity pension contributions close to the DKK 100,000-threshold for two different years.
The darker bars show the distribution in the year right before implementation of the reform,
while the lighter bars illustrate that of 2010. The darker bars have a smooth distribution
around the DKK 100,000-threshold in the pre-reform period, while bunching close to the
threshold is clearly observed after the reform was implemented. This suggests that the
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sample did not anticipate the reform and paid no particular attention to contributions of
DKK 100,000 prior to the reform. In the empirical part of the paper we show that other
changes to taxation in the reform did not seem to drive our findings.
Figure 2: Histogram of Annuity Pension Contributions
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Note: Individuals are grouped in equal sized bins by annuity pension contributions. The darker bars represent the distribution
immediately before the reform was implemented, while the lighter bars represent the distribution of pension contributions in
2010.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
Standard lifecycle models predict that individuals allocate savings wherever the after-tax
return is higher. The theory predicts that taxpayers respond to changes to the after-tax
return by re-allocating their saving portfolio. We test this proposition directly by measuring
substitution between available saving accounts when the after-tax return on pension savings
declines. Assuming that debt carries a higher after-tax interest than savings, debt should
be repaid before taxpayers accumulated non-retirement savings. We lack information on
the exact after-tax return on every asset and liability but we do have information on how
much each account type is changed. The saver would not avoid the contribution subsidy
ceiling by substituting savings between second and third pillar pension schemes because the
ceiling applies to the sum of contributions to employer and private accounts. Substitution
between scheme types would, on the other hand, allow the saver to avoid the tax ceiling.
The following section provides more details on the data available.
2.2 Data
Panel data from Statistics Denmark and the Danish mortgage institutions are merged using
anonymised personal identifiers that cover everyone residing in Denmark. The time period
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is 2003–2013 for the majority of the variables. Data on mortgage information covers 2009–
2013 only. The estimation sample consists of individuals with annuity pension contributions
of DKK 80,000–150,000 in 2008 as described in the previous section. The self-employed
including spouse are excluded because they were not fully subject to the changed tax rules
that this paper investigates. As we show in the appendix, however, including pre-reform
self-employed individuals does not change our results significantly. Individuals aged 60 or
above are excluded because they are eligible for early retirement schemes. Finally, people
not fully liable to taxation in Denmark are excluded. Changes in non-retirement saving
and debt accounts are censored at the 1st and 99th percentile in order to reduce noise from
extreme observations.
The estimation sample is not representative for the full Danish population. We include
individuals in the estimation sample who contribute about DKK 100,000 to annuity pen-
sion schemes each year (see Table 6). The full sample pension contribution average is about
DKK 30,000. Similarly, income also differs between the two samples, implying that our
results confine to savers in the upper part of the income distribution as noted in the intro-
duction. Further details on characteristics within the estimation sample can be found in
the appendix Table 7. The sample used in our estimations covers 56,372 individuals over
the period 2003–2013, providing an unbalanced panel of 599,744 observations. The Danish
tax authorities provide information on saving accounts, pension contributions and income.
This information is based on annual reports from financial intermediaries, which ensures a
low risk of measurement error and no risk of self-report bias. Individual saving and debt
information are reported each year by third parties, i.e. banks and mortgage institutions,
to the Danish tax authorities. This reporting is made compulsory by Danish financial reg-
ulation law, leaving no space for selection into or out of the data sample. Mortgage loan
information is provided directly from mortgage institutions. Noise in the data can still arise
given that flow variables are calculated as year-on-year changes in stock variables. By using
this approach annual variations in price and quantity measures cannot be separated. This
paper attempts to identify quantity changes because these reflect actual saving decisions
made actively by individuals, i.e. shifts of savings from one account to another. Price
changes—e.g. returns from financial assets—constitute the noise that is filtered out in the
empirical model. This challenge is, however, evident to any researcher that analyses sav-
ings behaviour empirically. Normalised by last year’s income, the mean savings rate in the
estimation sample is 8.5 percent in 2009 with a standard deviation of 39.6 percent. When
including only individuals with zero stock of financial assets one year earlier, the standard
deviation is reduced to 35 percent. This indicates that the price channel accounts for only
a minor part of the between-person variation in savings rates and should not be a major
concern in this study. However, this is addressed further in the following section on quanti-
fying the effects. It is essential to the analysis that the treated and non-treated groups had
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common savings behaviour prior to the reform. This matter is addressed thoroughly in the
following section.
3 Measuring Substitution Effects
The empirical challenge is to quantify the reform impact on individual saving outcomes.
Using the shock to saving decisions caused by the policy reform, a difference-in-differences
estimator is set up to capture substitution of savings between saving and debt accounts.
Saving cashflows of the treatment group who were expected to change behaviour because
of the pension tax reform are compared to cashflow of individuals in the assigned control
group who were not expected to change behaviour. The treated and the non-treated groups
are assigned one year prior to the reform announcement, which ensures no self-selection
bias. The crucial assumption is that the treated and non-treated groups exhibited common
trends in annuity pension contributions prior to the reform being implemented. Figure 3
Figure 3: Annuity Pension Contributions
Note: Average contributions for annuity schemes are calculated within each year for the treated and non-treated groups. For
each group, contributions are then indexed to 100 in 2009. Treatment individuals contributed DKK 100,001–150,000 to annuity
schemes two years prior to the 2010 tax reform, while the non-treated individuals contributed DKK 80,000–100,000.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
illustrates that annuity pension contributions were almost identical for the two groups in
the pre-reform period. Therefore, by graphical inspection, we argue that the identifying
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assumption is not violated. Specifically, the two groups are comparable and differ only in
annual contributions for annuity pensions, while other saving preferences are alike. The
sufficient identifying assumption is parallel pre-trends in the outcome variables, implying
that changes in savings outcomes are similar for the treatment and control groups had
they not been treated. We do not assume complete quasi-random assignment into the
groups, which would be a stronger assumption than necessary in our design. For the same
reasons we emphasize the importance of common pre-trends. The reform was implemented
in 2010 and both the treated and non-treated groups reduced annuity pension contributions
instantly. This observation is consistent with an overall decline in pension contributions
that was observed for the whole population (see Figure 1). However, the treated group
reduced contributions for annuity schemes much more than the non-treated group, indicating
that the empirical design does in fact capture the reform effects. There exist no natural
allocation of individuals into treatment and control groups. Our allocation could very well
generate the decline in annuity pension contributions by the control group after reform
implementation. We elaborate on this and test the implications for our results in the
robustness section. Similar graphical inspection of pre-trends is performed in all saving
and debt accounts that are examined. Life-long pension contributions in Figure 4a show
Figure 4: Alternative Saving Accounts
(a) Life-long Pensions (b) Bank Debt Repayments (net)
Note: See Figure 3.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
very similar trends prior to the reform, while the treated group increased savings in this
account more than the non-treated group after the reform was implemented. The same
applies to bank debt repayments (net of bank deposits) in Figure 4b despite being much
more volatile than changes in retirement accounts. Graphical inspection of developments
in capital pension schemes and financial assets is omitted because of very low savings and
almost no substitution effects in these accounts. Mortgage institutions provide information
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on annual repayments from 2009 only. With only one pre-reform year, inspection of pre-
trends cannot be performed in this variable. However, interest payments on mortgages are
collected by the tax authorities for the full pre-reform period. Figure 10b shows that the
treated and non-treated had almost identical trends in mortgage interest payments prior to
the reform, which is a good indication that their use of mortgage loans was also identical.
A standard difference-in-differences setup is developed to estimate shifts between saving
accounts. The estimation is performed in two steps. The first step identifies the reform
impact on annuity pension contributions. The second step measures substitution from
annuity pension accounts to alternative saving and debt accounts.
Pi,t = αi + Ωt + Treati + δTreati × Posti,t +Xi,t−2 + εi,t (1)
In this first step, Pi,t is annual contributions for annuity pension schemes. On the
right-hand side αi captures individual time-invariant effects. This includes individual tastes
for savings as explained in Gelber (2011). Year fixed effects are captured by Ωt, which
include macroeconomic developments that are common to all individuals in the sample,
e.g. returns from financial markets. Xi,t−2 is a vector of lagged values of control variables.
The vector includes income, age, work tenure, marital status, a dummy for being divorced
within 1 year, a dummy for being divorced within 2 years and years since individual i last
changed address. Finally, housing wealth is controlled for. Lagged housing wealth could
be correlated with the borrower’s future mortgage payment profile, which would lead to
housing wealth being endogenous. Omitting lagged housing wealth from the equation does
not, however, change our results (see appendix Table 4). Treati is an indicator of individual
i being in the treatment group, while Posti,t is an indicator that takes the value 1 in all
years after implementation of the reform. This allows the policy response to be measured
over all post-reform years. In the robustness section, it is shown, however, that individuals
tend to respond immediately in 2010. The parameter of interest is δ as it measures the
nominal change in annuity pension contributions for the treated relative to the non-treated
group in the post-reform period. The identifying assumption is that Treati × Posti,t is not
correlated with the idiosyncratic error term, εi,t. It follows from the graphical inspection of
pre-reform annuity pension contributions that this assumption is not violated as the treated
and non-treated groups showed common pre-reform trends. Following Bertrand et al. (2004),
standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Serial correlation is a potential threat
in our specification because savings outcomes are unlikely to be independent across time
for each person. Clustering the observations reduces the risk of inconsistent standard errors
following from autocorrelated errors. Further, as a robustness check, we collapse the pre
and post reform years. The estimates do not change significantly. This is reported in the
appendix Table 4. The point estimate of δ is presented in Table 2 column 1 and shown to
20
be statistically significant with p < .001. In the second stage a regression almost identical
to the one just presented is set up.
Zi,t = αi + Ωt + Treati + γPˆi,t +Xi,t−2 + ri,t (2)
The dependent variable, Zi,t, is either life-long or capital pension contributions, while
the explanatory variable, Pˆi,t, is annuity pension contributions. Other specifications are
similar to equation (1). The obvious endogeneity problem in equation (2) is that the size
of annuity, life-long and capital pension contributions are decided simultaneously by in-
dividual i, meaning that γ cannot be estimated consistently. To overcome this problem,
Treati×Posti,t is used as an instrument for Pi,t. The first stage showed that his instrument
is strongly correlated with the regressor and the graphical inspections of pre-trends showed
that the instrument is not correlated with some common third factor. Based on this, substi-
tutions from annuity pension schemes to life-long or capital pension schemes are estimated
consistently in γ. Estimates are retrieved using a 2SLS-approach in order to obtain correct
standard errors that take account of the generated regressors problem. This allows us to do
inference. Retirement savings are measured before taxes, while non-retirement savings are
measured after taxes are paid. To take account for this a mean tax rate τi is calculated for
each individual i. Provided with information on total taxes paid and taxable income from
the tax authorities we proxy τi by dividing these two numbers. The after-tax measure of
pension contributions is simply Pi,t(1 − τi), where τi is fixed to the 2008-level.
Si,t = αi + Ωt + Treati + γPˆi,t(1 − τi) +Xi,t−2 + ri,t (3)
Shifts of savings from annuity pension schemes to savings in non-retirement accounts,
including debt repayments, are estimated in equation (3). Si,t is either mortgage debt
repayments, bank debt repayments, bank deposits or savings in financial assets. Pˆi,t(1 −
τi) is annuity pension contributions measured after taxes and γ is estimated consistently
with Treati × Posti,t as an instrument in a 2SLS model. Other specifications follow those
explained above.
All substitution estimates captured by γ are reported in Table 1. For a 1 unit reduction
in annuity pension contributions—the units being DKK—the table shows changes in alter-
native saving accounts caused by the pension tax reform. When reducing annuity pension
contributions by DKK 1 almost 57 cents is shifted to life-long pension accounts, while less
than 1 cent is substituted for the capital pension scheme. This implies that the life-long
scheme was considered the closest substitute for the annuity scheme, while 1− (57+1) = 42
cents exited the pension system completely. Of these 42 cents, just above 2 cents went to
repayment of mortgage debt, while 29 cents was used to repay gross debt in banks. Based
on these two estimates, 2 + 29 = 31 cents of each DKK 1 reduction in annuity pension
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contributions was used for gross debt reduction. Finally, 15 cents was shifted to bank de-
posits and 4 cents was shifted to financial assets. Of all these estimates, only the latter is
statistically insignificant. The sum of all substitution estimates is DKK 1.08, reflecting the
total increase in alternative financial accounts for each DKK 1 reduction in annuity pension
contributions. By omitting substitution for financial assets, which is estimated imprecisely,
the total crowd-out effect is DKK 1, i.e. full crowd-out. This evidence suggests that re-
ducing tax incentives for saving in retirement accounts made the affected individuals shift
savings from pension accounts to non-retirement accounts and debt repayments. The sub-
stitution pattern does not change significantly when normalising outcome variables using
lagged income (see appendix Table 4). This is supported by the fact that income develops
similarly for the treatment and control groups across the reform period, which is also shown
in the appendix.
To be certain that other factors do not drive the estimates, the power of the panel data is
used to control for observable differences between the treated and non-treated groups. First,
geographical region of residence is interacted with year indicators. This allows for different
time trends in the five Danish geographical regions, capturing potential diverging housing
market or labour market developments. Table 1 column 2 shows only marginal changes in
the main findings. Second, changes in the progressive nature of the Danish income taxation
that were introduced at the same point in time as the DKK 100,000-threshold, that we
analyse, is addressed. Prior to the reform, two progressive tax brackets existed, namely the
middle tax bracket and the top tax bracket. The middle tax bracket was removed and the
top tax bracket was increased in 2010, which potentially could affect our measurements.
Income tax brackets can be relevant for incentives to save in tax-favoured pension accounts
because taxable income is reduced when pension contributions are increased. This reform
element is expected to be less important in our setup because this paper analyses individuals
high in the income distribution. To test whether the change in income tax brackets affects
the results, a set of indicator variables is included. An indicator that takes the value 1 for
individuals who, prior to the reform, had income just below the middle income tax brackets
is generated. Next, this indicator is interacted with year dummies. This allows individuals
with less than middle bracket income to have their own trend in the outcome that we
attempt to measure after implementation of the reform. A similar indicator-interaction
term is included for the top tax bracket. Also, educational level indicators are included
as proxies for financial literacy. The educational level measures divide individuals into 6
groups based on their maximum level of completed educational training, including primary
school, secondary school, vocational training and finally, 2-3, 3-41/2 or 5-6 years of tertiary
education. This observable characteristic is expected to correlate with financial literacy,
implying that individuals with more educational training are more likely to optimise their
financial situation (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014; Lusardi and Tufano, 2015), i.e. to respond
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to changes in income tax brackets. Educational indicators are also interacted with year
dummies. Table 1 columns 3-4 report our main results including indicator-interaction terms,
showing almost identical results. We have also estimated equations (1)–(3) by OLS. The
results (not reported) were very similar, and this suggests that the policy quasi-randomises
in the vicinity of the cut-off. This claim hinges on the assumption that inherent savings
propensities are approximately constant over the observation period.
Table 1: Crowd-out when Reducing Annuity Pensions by 1 Unit
Expl. var.: Annuity Pensions
Dep. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Life-long Pensions .567∗∗∗ .566∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .559∗∗∗
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016)
Capital Pensions .007∗∗ .007∗∗ .006∗ .006∗
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Mortgage Repayments .024∗∗∗ .023∗∗∗ .021∗∗∗ .020∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Bank Debt Repayments .294∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗ .302∗∗∗
(.058) (.058) (.058) (.058)
Bank Deposits .150∗∗∗ .146∗∗∗ .137∗∗∗ .137∗∗∗
(.050) (.050) (.050) (.050)
Financial Assets .042 .041 .031 .030
(.036) (.036) (.036) (.036)
Total Crowd-out 1.084 1.074 1.058 1.054
Geographical Region × Year - Yes Yes Yes
Educational Level × Year - - Yes Yes
Medium Tax Bracket × Year - - - Yes
Top Tax Bracket × Year - - - Yes
Note: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% are reported as ***, ** and *, respectively. All columns include
lagged control variables, individual fixed effects and year fixed effects for 599,744 observations. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered on the individual level. Total Crowd-out is the sum of point estimates
in each column. Educational Level captures individual i’s educational level prior to reform announce-
ment as discrete values 1-6 for primary and secondary school, vocational training, short, medium and
higher education, respectively. Educational Level is interacted with year dummies, allowing for different
post-reform trends for each educational type. Medium Tax Bracket and Top Tax Bracket are dummies
taking value 1 for individuals who had taxable income prior to the reform corresponding to not paying
medium and top taxes, respectively. Each dummy is interacted with year dummies, allowing for different
post-reform trends.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
Gale (1998) provides a review of empirical evidence and places prior results in three
groups; (1) no offset at all (Cagan, 1965; Katona, 1966; Kotlikoff, 1979; Venti and Wise,
1990), (2) offsets of 20 percent (Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Hubbard, 1986) and (3)
substantial offsets of 50–60 percent (Munnell, 1976; Dicks-Mireaux and King, 1984). Gale
(1998) finds that pension savings offset 77 percent of savings in non-retirement accounts—an
estimate not significantly different from 100 percent, however. Together with our study this
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is supported by a more recent paper by Chetty et al. (2014), who provide empirical evidence
of 99 percent offset. The administrative data that we use has a number of benefits. First,
they hold many more observations compared to recent studies where surveys constitute the
data source. Second, our data are third-party reported as opposed to surveys in which the
information is self-reported. Third, we exploit the panel dimension, whereas earlier studies
mainly rely on cross-sections, and finally, we have information on the full financial portfolio
(except for cash and luxury items, e.g. art and yachts) and are able to split net wealth into
bank credit, mortgage debt, savings and pension accounts. The research design developed
for this paper is based on measuring the effects of introducing a tax subsidy ceiling on
pension contributions. This implies that our findings are specific to this type on policy
change. The results do not necessarily provide information on how savers respond to the
removal of such a tax subsidy ceiling or an increase in tax incentives.
3.1 Robustness
This section provides a series of robustness tests, covering potential mean reversion, sample
selection, housing wealth and income developments. Historic contributions to annuity pen-
sion accounts are used when forming the treatment and control groups. This raises a central
concern in the empirical strategy—that contributions across years could be mean reverting.
Mean reversion implies that individuals who increase contributions exceptionally in one spe-
cific year could have smaller contributions in later years. In this setup the findings could
reflect a mechanical effect of individuals who reduce annuity pension contributions in the
reform year because they contributed exceptionally large amounts in the year in which they
are assigned into treatment. In this case, the estimated reform effects would have nothing
to do with the reform itself. It is tested whether mean reversion is a problem in this paper
by applying a well-known test in the empirical literature, namely the placebo test approach.
Specifically, the empirical model is estimated in years with no reform, i.e. placebo reforms.
Should any of these placebo reforms show significant substitution it is likely that the mea-
sured effects in our true model are not uniquely identifying the policy effect. Recall that
individuals are assigned into treatment or control in 2008, while their reform response is
measured after implementation of the reform—that is in 2010 and onwards. In the placebo
test this setup is shifted backwards in time such that saving responses are measured in
2008, 2007, 2006 and 2005, i.e. years completely unaffected by the reform. The model in
equation (1) is run for all these placebo-reform years and the results are presented in Table
2. Column 1 shows an estimated reduction in annuity pension contributions of DKK 21,038
in the actual reform year. In columns 2-5, we show estimates of placebo-reforms in 2008,
2007, 2006 and 2005, respectively. Estimates of the placebo reforms are close to zero except
for the 2005 parameter, which is significant with DKK 1,280. However, these estimates are
strong evidence that mean reversion is not driving our findings as the reduction in annuity
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scheme contributions is unique to the reform year. The 2005 parameter could be statistically
significant only because some individuals by coincidence are on the wrong side of the cutoff
in the assignment year compared to their usual contribution level. By applying the so-called
donut-hole around the DKK 100,000-threshold, meaning that we exclude individuals in the
very vicinity of the threshold in 2008, we obtain the estimates in the second row of Table 2.
Specifically, individuals with annuity pension contributions of DKK 90,000-110,000 in 2008
are excluded. This robustness test makes it possible to abstract from the fact that some
individuals usually are very close to the threshold, and by coincidence could be just above or
just below the threshold. This latter test makes the significant estimate in 2005 disappear,
indicating that individuals very close to the threshold accounted for the measured effect in
that year. The take-away from the placebo test is that the reduction in annuity pension
contributions is large and statistically significant in 2010 only, implying that the empirical
setup captures the effects from the policy change rather than mean reversion effects.
Table 2: Placebo Reform Impact on Annuity Pension Contributions
Expl. var.: Treat× Post
2010 2008 2007 2006 2005
Dep. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Annuity Pensions -21,038∗∗∗ 49 103 -474 1,280∗∗∗
(Baseline) (394) (295) (349) (387) (463)
Annuity Pensions -28,657∗∗∗ 419 135 -710 884
(Donut-hole) (493) (378) (444) (494) (589)
Note: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% are reported as ***, ** and *, respectively. All
columns include lagged control variables, individual fixed effects, year fixed effects, educa-
tion level fixed effects and geographical region fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered on the individual level. The first row shows estimates of equation 1 applying
different reform years. 2010 was the year of the actual reform and column 1, row 1 corre-
sponds to the first stage in our empirical strategy. Columns 2-5 report placebo estimates of
non-reform years. The second row excludes individuals very close to the introduced DKK
100,000-threshold, namely individuals within DKK 10,000 on each side of the threshold.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
Robustness for changes in window size around the DKK 100,000-threshold is tested in
the following. By varying the interval above the threshold when assigning individuals into
treatment, while keeping the interval for assignment of non-treated individuals constant,
sensitivity to the sample selection can be tested. The figures 5a and 5b show the esti-
mated substitution from annuity pension accounts to alternative retirement accounts and
non-retirement accounts, respectively, for different choices of window size above the DKK
100,000-threshold. Retirement accounts include substitution to life-long and capital pension
schemes, while non-retirement accounts include repayments of debt in mortgage institutions
and banks, bank deposits and financial assets. The dots reflect point estimates and the bars
are two standard errors clustered on the individual level, indicating the 95%-confidence
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band. Point estimates are based on equations (2) and (3). On the vertical axis, the value
1 indicates full crowd-out, while 0 reflects zero crowd-out when reducing annuity pension
contributions by 1 unit. Figure 5a shows that for all windows, a little more than 0.5 units
are shifted to alternative pension accounts and figure 5b shows that a little less than 0.5
units are shifted to non-retirement saving and debt accounts when reducing annuity pension
contributions by 1 unit. These estimates are consistent with the main findings reported in
table 1. The figure clearly shows that the full crowd-out result is robust to changes in the
applied quasi-experimental design. Robust standard errors do, however, increase for more
narrow windows than for wider windows. This is simply a consequence of having fewer
observations in the former compared to the latter. Based on this, selection of individuals
into treatment and control groups do not seem to be a determinant of the findings.
Figure 5: Treatment Window around DKK 100,000-threshold
(a) Retirement Accounts (b) Non-retirement Accounts
Note: The estimated substitution effect is the estimates from equations (2) and (3), showing how many cents were shifted
for a 1 unit reduction in annuity pension contributions. The effects are estimated for increasing window size when assigning
individuals into treatment. For instance, the value 110 implies that individuals who had annuity pension contributions in 2008
of DKK 100,000-110,000 are assigned as treated. The bars are two standard errors clustered on the individual level, indicating
the 95%-confidence band.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
Our allocation of individuals into treatment and control groups could generate the ob-
served post-reform decline in annuity pension contributions by the control group. No natural
allocation exist and such misallocation is likely to happen if some individual with true treat-
ment behaviour is allocated into the control group. Imagine a saver who usually contributes
more than DKK 100,000 to annuity pension schemes, but for random reasons contributes
less (and below the cut-off) in the assignment year. This person would be placed in the
control group but her behaviour reflects that of an individual in the treatment group as
she reduces annuity pension contributions in the reform year. To test this explanation we
return to the assignment process. Mean annuity pension contributions declined 11 percent
for the control group from the assignment year 2008 to the reform year 2010, but when
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conditioning on having control-group size annuity pension contributions two consecutive
years (2007–2008) the decline in contributions is reduced to 7 percent from 2008 to 2010.
Imposing more conditions, i.e. three consecutive years (2006–2008), four consecutive years
(2005–2008), five consecutive years (2004–2008) and six consecutive years (2003–2008), the
control group’s decline in annuity pension contributions is reduced to 6, 5, 4 and 3 percent,
respectively. The numbers are shown in Table 5, which also includes similar calculations for
the treatment group. Annuity pension contributions in the treatment group declined from
30 to 28 percent when conditioning on one pre-reform year (2008) to six consecutive years
(2003–2008). Conditioning on having six consecutive years of either treatment or control
behaviour reduces the analysis sample considerably (by more than 96 percent), providing
us with very large standard errors. However, when estimating equation (3), the substitu-
tion effects are not significantly different from our baseline results where life-long pension
schemes and debt repayments are the closest substitutes to annuity pension schemes (see
appendix).
To check that the results are not driven by individuals who are forced to move out of
their homes, e.g. as a consequence of the financial turmoil in the years that followed the
global recession, the empirical model is run on a subsample in which individuals are excluded
if they changed their address after 2010. This ensures that estimated debt repayments are
not reflecting second-order effects of buying or selling property. The results are almost
identical to the findings in the main sample as shown in Table 8. To further ensure that
housing wealth is not interfering with the identification of the reform effect, housing wealth
developments are plotted across time for both the treated and non-treated groups. Figure
11a shows almost identical trends for the two groups, both pre- and post-reform. This is a
strong indication that real assets—the stock of housing—were not affected differently in the
treatment and control groups in the reform year. Similarly, graphical inspection of income
developments over the sample period in Figure 11b shows that income trends for the treated
and non-treated groups were identical both before and after implementation of the reform.
This is suggestive evidence that the two following concerns in our setup can be rejected.
First, neither of the two groups seemed to be more exposed to unemployment. Second, the
treated group did not seem to change labour supply relative to the non-treated group as
a consequence of the reform. By comparing developments in unemployment benefits and
unemployment rates between the treatment and control groups, we find evidence supporting
that the individuals’ exposures to unemployment were not significantly different. Appendix
Figures 12a and 12b show the differences between the treatment and control groups in the
two outcomes across the sample period. Robust standard errors show that the differences
are statistically insignificant. Lastly, it is shown that individuals respond immediately to
the policy change in 2010. Table 8 shows the main findings estimated in 2010 (column 2),
2010-2011 (column 3) and 2010-2012 (column 4). All these estimates are comparable in size
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and statistical significance, indicating that individuals mainly responded in the reform year.
4 Active Saving Decisions
Recent findings in the empirical literature suggest that only a minor share of the population
respond to tax incentives (Chetty et al., 2014). In the following it is analysed how large is
the share of individuals that substitute savings when tax incentives for saving in pension
schemes are reduced.
4.1 Estimating the share of active savers
According to findings presented above, life-long pension contributions were increased by
56 cents for each unit reduction in annuity pension contributions because of the reform,
indicating that life-long schemes tend to be the closest substitute for annuity schemes. An
indicator, Complyi,t, is constructed, which takes the value 1 in years where individuals
reduce annuity scheme contributions and increase life-long scheme contributions. This is an
indicator that captures a shift in savings between these two scheme types within the same
year. By regressing Complyi,t on a difference-in-differences specification, the share of active
savers is estimated in a linear probability model.
Complyi,t = αi + Ωt + Treati + βtTreati × Y eart +Xi,t−2 + εi,t (4)
Using the specification in equation (4), coefficients βt capture the policy effect on com-
pliance in each year t. Other specifications are equal to that of equation (1). Table 3 shows
no significant response in the years prior to the reform but a significant increase by 23 per-
centage points in 2010 with p < .000. This suggests that the tax reform explains 23 percent
of the shift of savings from annuity to life-long pension schemes. Our estimate is close to
that of Chetty et al. (2014), who find that about 15 percent of savers shift to the closest
substitute. Smaller adjustments were made in the year 2011 and 2012, but these effects
tend to cancel out in size. This is consistent with the findings in Table 8, which showed
that the estimated substitution occurred mainly in the reform year.
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Table 3: Share of Individuals who Increase Annuity and Decrease Life-long Pensions
Coef. Std.Err. p-value
2004 .001 .003 .661
2005 −.001 .003 .806
2006 .001 .003 .880
2007 .000 .003 .943
2008 .002 .003 .499
2009 .002 .003 .614
2010 .231∗∗∗ .003 .000
2011 .028∗∗∗ .003 .000
2012 −.021∗∗∗ .003 .000
2013 −.004 .003 .215
Note: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% are reported as ***, ** and
*, respectively. 599,774 observations were used for estimating δ in col-
umn 4, covering the treated and non-treated groups for the time pe-
riod 2004-20013. Values in column 4 are δ estimates using the specifi-
cation in equation (1) with an indicator as dependent variable, taking
the value 1 for individuals who decrease annuity pension contributions
and increase life-long pension contributions in the same year.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statis-
tics Denmark.
4.2 Observable Heterogeneity
The estimated crowd-out in retirement savings seems to be conducted by 23 percent of all
individuals. In order to sort out whether these individuals differ from passive savers, who
did not respond to the tax reform, the compliance indicator is regressed on a set of personal
characteristics. Included on the right-hand side is a range of personal information such as
gender, age, educational attainment and dummies of labour market status, i.e. employed in
a top management position or whether individuals have been unemployed more than three
months within the last year. Also, a set of mortgage information dummies is included. These
cover whether the individuals had interest only loans, adjustable rate mortgages, fixed rate
mortgages or whether they had any loan at all prior to the reform. Finally, logs of income and
financial assets and geographical region dummies are included to account for differences in
the housing and labour markets across the country. The dependent variable is the indicator
described earlier in this section, which takes the value 1 for individuals who shift savings
from annuity pension accounts to life-long pension accounts in 2010. The regression is run
on a cross section of 2008 values. Only treated individuals are included in the regression
and the coefficients are presented in Table 10. Regressing the compliance indicator on a set
of pre-reform observables gives us consistent parameter estimates that can be interpreted
as the partial effect on the probability of being an active saver. Column 1 in Table 10
presents heterogeneity by a range of personal characteristics. Heterogeneity by mortgage
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loan characteristics is presented in column 2. In column 3, financial variables are added
and column 4 includes all available observables in the regression, including dummies for
geographical region of residence. Column 5 presents marginal effects in a probit model, using
the same specification as column 4. The probit model estimates very similar results as the
linear probability model except for the unemployment indicator. However, in the following,
heterogeneity based on column 4 is described, which includes all available information.
The likelihood of complying with the change in taxation increases with age and edu-
cational attainment. For each one year increase in age, individuals were 2.8 percentage
points more likely to respond. By completing a college degree of more than 31/2 years,
the likelihood of an active response increased by 3.5 percentage points. This increases to
6.3 percentage points if the degree covers more than 5 years of study. The estimates are,
however, not statistically different from each other but both are statistically different from
primary school, which is the baseline. Individuals with vocational training as their highest
level of educational attainment were, on the contrary, 1.9 percentage points less likely to
respond to the changed tax incentives.
Labour market status seems to play a significant role on tax compliance. Compared to
the average wage earner, top managers in private or public institutions were 3.4 percent-
age points more responsive to the changed taxation rules. Contrary to this and even more
striking is the result that individuals who had experienced more than three months of un-
employment within the last year were 26.9 percentage points less responsive to the changed
tax subsidy. The marginal effect is even larger in a probit model. Here, the effect of being
unemployed on compliance is -38.3 percentage points.
Mortgage and financial characteristics also play a significant role. Individuals with mort-
gages were 4.4 percentage points more responsive to the change in tax incentives for saving
in pension schemes. Whether the mortgage loan interest rate was adjustable or fixed does
not seem to play a significant role. Individuals with interest-only mortgages were, however,
4.9 percentage points less responsive. Finally, log of annual income and log of financial assets
are both significantly correlated with the compliance indicator. Compared to the average,
individuals with a 1 percent increase in gross income were 14.6 percentage points more likely
to respond to the change in tax incentives for saving in pension schemes. Regarding the
stock of financial assets, the correlation is 0.4 percentage points.
Correlations between pre-reform observable characteristics and the compliance indica-
tor provide a picture of the active saver who actually responded when the tax deduction
threshold was introduced. However, the correlations do not provide information on the pol-
icy response itself. The following section attempts to measure policy responses for credit
constrained individuals, specifically.
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4.3 Policy Response and Credit Constraints
The final part of the empirical analysis tests the hypothesis that more credit constrained
individuals utilise the policy change to reduce gross debt relatively more than their less
leveraged peers. This hypothesis relies on the permanent income hypothesis, meaning that
consumers prefer to smooth consumption over their lifetime and possibly need to borrow
and save financial assets during different phases of their lives. Highly indebted or younger
individuals might find it more difficult to obtain credit in banks. Empirical studies have
found that debt levels and age tend to play significant roles in credit constraints (Attanasio
and Weber, 1994; Leth-Petersen, 2010) and this section explores the policy response of these
two groups.
On average individuals repay gross debt by 31 cents for each 1 DKK that annuity pension
accounts were reduced. It is expected, however, that substitution is stronger for more
liquidity constrained individuals. To test this hypothesis, substitution effects are estimated
for groups with different loan-to-value ratios and over different age intervals. The idea is
that individuals with higher loan-to-value ratios and younger individuals use a larger share
for deleveraging, conditional on responding to the tax reform.
Equation (3) is used to test whether more leveraged individuals reduced debt more
intensively than individuals with less debt relative to their real assets when the reform was
introduced. First, individuals are divided into quantiles based on the pre-reform loan-to-
value ratio. The ratio is total outstanding mortgage debt as a share of the property value
and the property value is assessed by the mortgage institution. Substitution to mortgage
debt repayments and bank debt repayments are estimated separately for each of the four
groups. The results are illustrated in Figures 6a and 6b, both showing that debt reduction
estimates are stronger for highly leveraged individuals. Standard errors are clustered on the
individual level and illustrated by vertical bars. Substitution of savings between annuity
pension schemes and mortgage debt repayments are statistically significant for individuals
with loan-to-value ratios of 55 or above. The point estimates increase for larger ratios but
are not statistically different from each other. Bank debt repayments are statistically larger
than zero for individuals with ratios of 72 or above. The lowest quantile—a loan-to-value of
32—also return a significant response. This is probably because bank debt is more volatile
than mortgage debt, which is also supported by the larger standard errors on bank debt
estimates. The overall picture shows, however, that more indebted individuals account
for the measured deleveraging. To test the robustness of these results, we construct similar
figures but use loan-to-income ratios instead. Figures 13a and 13b illustrate almost identical
patterns, namely that substitution of savings from pension accounts to debt repayments are
prevalent for more credit constrained individuals. Here the credit constraints are proxied
by outstanding debt as a share of annual income.
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Figure 6: Debt Repayments across Loan-to-Value
(a) Mortgage Debt (b) Bank Debt
Note: Loan-to-value is outstanding mortgage debt divided by the mortgage institutions’ assessment of property values. The
estimated substitution effect is the estimates from equations (2) and (3), showing how many cents were shifted for a 1 unit
reduction in annuity pension contributions. The effects are estimated on subgroups that represent loan-to-value quantiles. The
bars are two standard errors clustered on the individual level.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
Figure 7: Debt Repayments across 5-year Age Groups
(a) Mortgage Debt (b) Bank Debt
Note: The estimated substitution effect is the estimates from equations (2) and (3), showing how many cents were shifted for a
1 unit reduction in annuity pension contributions. The effects are estimated on subgroups that represent 5-year age intervals.
The bars are two standard errors clustered on the individual level.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
Credit constrained individuals are presumably younger than unconstrained individu-
als. By estimating mortgage debt repayments across age intervals a clear picture prevails,
namely that younger individuals tend to substitute pension savings for debt reductions in
the reform year, while older ones did not. Figure 7a shows that 30–44 year-old individu-
als reduced mortgage debt by around 6 cents for each DKK reduction in annuity pension
contributions. Significant substitution to mortgage debt repayments for the 45–59 year-olds
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is not detected. This finding supports the hypothesis that the reform was used by credit
constrained individuals—or individuals who expect to be constrained in the near future—to
bring down debt accounts. Figure 7b shows repayments in bank debt accounts across age
intervals. This figure illustrates a hump shaped pattern, where the very young and the
oldest did not substitute pension savings for bank debt reductions. However, individuals in
the middle of their lifecycle—the 40–54 year-olds—did substitute 30-45 cents to bank debt
repayments for each DKK reduction in annuity pension accounts. In our sample, 71 percent
of younger individuals (below 35) are mortgage borrowers. For the middle-aged (35–45)
and older individuals (above 45) the numbers are 82 percent and 76 percent, respectively.
Estimating equation (1)-(3) on each subgroup shows that substitution to life-long pension
schemes is similar for the three age groups, while substitution to mortgage debt repayments
is driven by the middle-aged and bank debt repayments are driven by both middle-aged and
older borrowers (see appendix).
5 Conclusion
Recent studies show that tax-favoured pension accounts have no effect on overall individ-
ual savings because taxpayers simply shift savings between accounts when tax incentives
change. This paper offers a decomposition of this effect to test whether debt repayments
account for a substantial part of the crowd-out. The basic story tested here is whether a
reduction in the tax incentive for saving in retirement accounts prompts people to substitute
savings to alternative accounts with the now-highest after-tax return. Debt usually carries
a higher interest than savings, implying that repayment of debt should be warranted before
accumulating non-retirement savings.
We show that savings are shifted from tax-favoured retirement accounts to gross debt
repayments when tax incentives for saving in pension schemes are reduced. For each unit
of DKK that retirement savings are reduced about 31 cents is used for deleveraging. The
remaining 69 cents is shifted to alternative saving accounts, implying full crowd-out. These
effects are identified by exploiting variation from a policy change that exactly did reduce
tax incentives for saving in retirement accounts. Moreover, the paper documents that only
23 percent of individuals rebalance their saving accounts when tax rules change. Observable
heterogeneity is documented on a range of personal characteristics when comparing active
and passive savers.
A key feature in this paper is the comprehensive panel data coverage of financial balances
on the individual level. Unlike former studies in the crowd-out literature, this paper benefits
from access to data on both bank and mortgage debt. Mortgages comprise a major share
of financial liabilities in the household sector and the ability to include mortgages in the
analysis is an important innovation compared to recent studies. Without knowing whether
taxpayers manipulate the liability side, one would simply not be able to assess the overall
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consumption and savings response to tax incentive policies.
The findings suggest that pension savings and debt accumulation is positively correlated.
Gross debt seem to change by almost a one-third of the change in pension savings, implying
that gross debt accumulation could increase because of policies that induce people to save
in pension schemes.
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Table 4: Changes in Savings when Reducing Annuity Pensions by 1 Unit
Expl. var.: Annuity Pensions
Collapse Incl. Normalised Excl. Housing
Years Self-emp using Income Wealth
Dep. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Life-long Pensions .567∗∗∗ .550∗∗∗ .441∗∗∗ .561∗∗∗
(.016) (.018) (.017) (.016)
Capital Pensions .007∗∗ .004 .022∗∗∗ .006∗
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.003)
Mortgage Repayments .024∗∗∗ .025∗∗∗ .011 .021∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.006)
Bank Debt Repayments .294∗∗∗ .419∗∗∗ .277∗∗∗ .304∗∗∗
(.058) (.072) (.069) (.058)
Bank Deposits .155∗∗∗ .123∗∗ .112∗∗ .141∗∗∗
(.050) (.058) (.057) (.050)
Financial Assets .051 .065 .022 .031
(.036) (.042) (.046) (.036)
Observations 599,774 701,299 599,774 599,774
Note: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% are reported as ***, ** and *, respectively. All columns include
lagged control variables, individual fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the individual
level. Total Crowd-out is the sum of point estimates in each column.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
39
Table 5: Annuity pension contribution decline (%) in 2010 from various pre-reform periods
Treatment group Control group Observations
2008 29.9 11.0 599,774
2007–2008 27.9 7.4 271,842
2006–2008 27.5 5.8 136,318
2005–2008 27.6 5.2 68,943
2004–2008 27.5 4.3 35,078
2003–2008 28.2 3.4 18,380
Note: The percent decline in annuity pension contributions is calculated for each group
from the given time period to 2010.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics
Full sample Estimation sample
Mean SD Mean SD
– (DKK 1,000) –
Gross Income 305.2 174.2 668.5 279.3
Pension Contributions 27.2 66.0 96.5 89.9
Interest payments 14.5 20.3 33.2 30.0
Bank Debt 115.4 176.9 187.1 328.2
Bank Deposits 55.0 110.2 137.7 226.7
Financial Assets 22.7 119.4 89.1 261.5
Housing Wealth 530.6 957.8 1, 328.2 1, 289.4
Housing Equity 69.0 498.9 206.7 689.8
Age 37.5 10.7 43.3 7.5
Work Tenure 13.2 10.2 20.4 8.7
Years on Address 7.4 7.9 9.2 7.8
Female (%) 51.6 50.0 25.0 43.4
Married (%) 44.8 49.7 69.4 46.1
Secondary Education (%) 7.8 26.7 7.7 26.7
Vocational Training (%) 28.2 45.0 28.2 45.0
Short Tertiary (%) 8.6 28.1 8.7 28.1
Middle-long Tertiary (%) 23.8 42.6 23.8 42.6
Long Tertiary (%) 25.3 43.5 25.4 43.5
– Quantities –
Mortgage Loans .60 .81 1.17 .98
–Fixed Rate .30 .58 .53 .72
–Adjustable Rate .30 .61 .65 .85
Interest Only Loans .22 .50 .43 .70
Individuals 2,377,988 56,372
Note: The statistics are based on all pre-reform years, i.e. from 2003 to 2009. The full
sample excludes self-employed and their spouse and individuals older than 59 years of
age. Gross income includes all pension contributions. The estimation sample includes the
treated and control group individual, who contributed DKK 100,000-150,000 and DKK
80,000-100,000, respectively, for annuity pension schemes in 2008.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics
Treated Non-treated
Mean SD Mean SD Diff. t-value
– (DKK 1,000) –
Gross Income 710.5 307.0 627.5 242.4 83.0 93.9
Pension Contributions 109.2 106.1 84.2 68.3 25.0 87.8
Interest payments 33.9 31.1 32.5 29.1 1.4 14.8
Bank Debt 195.5 347.9 179.0 307.6 16.4 15.7
Bank Deposits 149.5 238.4 126.2 213.9 23.3 32.2
Financial Assets 102.8 287.3 75.8 232.8 27.0 32.3
Housing Wealth 1, 377.1 1, 271.3 1, 280.5 1, 305.1 96.6 8.9
Housing Equity 221.5 594.4 192.2 771.2 29.3 5.0
Age 43.8 7.4 42.7 7.6 1.1 46.8
Work Tenure 20.8 8.7 19.9 8.7 0.9 31.0
Years on Address 9.5 7.9 8.9 8.7 0.7 26.7
Female (%) 23.7 42.5 26.4 44.1 2.7 19.2
Married (%) 70.9 45.4 68.9 46.7 2.9 19.9
Secondary Education (%) 7.8 26.8 7.7 26.6 0.1 −1.2
Vocational Training (%) 27.2 44.5 29.1 45.4 −1.9 13.3
Short Tertiary (%) 8.2 27.4 9.1 28.8 −0.9 10.6
Middle-long Tertiary (%) 24.2 42.9 23.5 42.4 0.7 −4.6
Long Tertiary (%) 26.6 44.2 24.2 42.8 2.4 −17.4
– Quantities –
Mortgage Loans 1.19 1.00 1.16 .95 .02 2.7
–Fixed Rate .52 .73 .53 .72 .01 1.3
–Adjustable Rate .66 .87 .63 .83 .03 4.3
Interest Only Loans .46 .72 .41 .68 .05 7.8
Individuals 27,591 28,781
Note: The statistics are based on all pre-reform years, i.e. from 2003 to 2009. The population means exclude
self-employed and their spouse and individuals older than 59 years of age. Gross income includes all pen-
sion contributions. The treated contributed DKK 100,000-150,000 for annuity pension schemes in 2008, while
the non-treated contributed DKK 80,000-100,000. The column of t-values measures significance of different
means for each variable in the years prior to 2008.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
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Table 8: Changes in Savings when Reducing Annuity Pensions by 1 Unit
Expl. var.: Annuity Pensions
Non-movers 2010 2010-2011 2010-2012
Dep. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Life-long Pensions .567∗∗∗ .579∗∗∗ .580∗∗∗ .571∗∗∗
(.016) (.019) (.018) (.016)
Capital Pensions .007∗∗ .023∗∗∗ .018∗∗∗ .013∗∗
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Mortgage Repayments .024∗∗∗ .012∗∗ .017∗∗∗ .020∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Bank Debt Repayments .294∗∗∗ .372∗∗∗ .300∗∗∗ .300∗∗∗
(.058) (.129) (.083) (.066)
Bank Deposits .150∗∗∗ .292∗∗ .197∗∗∗ .174∗∗∗
(.050) (.122) (.075) (.058)
Financial Assets .042 .356∗∗∗ .010 .094∗∗
(.036) (.073) (.049) (.045)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes - Yes Yes
Year FE Yes - Yes Yes
Note: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% are reported as ***, ** and *, respectively. All columns include
lagged control variables, individual fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered on the individual level. Total Crowd-out is the sum of point estimates in each column.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
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Table 9: Changes in Savings when Reducing Annuity Pensions by 1 Unit
Expl. var.: Annuity Pensions
Six pre-
reform years Age 18–34 Age 35–45 Age 46–59
Dep. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Life-long Pensions .594∗∗∗ .471∗∗∗ .513∗∗∗ .523∗∗∗
(.051) (.115) (.027) (.021)
Capital Pensions .015 .018 .012∗∗∗ .004
(.011) (.030) (.005) (.004)
Mortgage Repayments .024∗∗∗ .032 .045∗∗∗ .017∗∗
(.025) (.046) (.011) (.008)
Bank Debt Repayments .595∗∗∗ .996 .260∗∗∗ .213∗∗∗
(.208) (.795) (.119) (.073)
Bank Deposits .178 .196 .168∗ .099
(.221) (.625) (.100) (.067)
Financial Assets .097 .119 .065 .062
(.0185) (.340) (.062) (.051)
Observations 18,380 60,101 247,681 291,963
Note: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% are reported as ***, ** and *, respectively. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered on the individual level. Column (1) presents crowd-out estimates on a subsample,
including savers with six consecutive years of either treatment- or control-type annuity pension contributions.
Columns (2)–(4) are subsamples, dividing savers in age groups.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
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Table 10: Observable Heterogeneity in Active vs. Passive Savers
Dep. var.: Complyi
Expl. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female −.010 .019∗∗∗ .009 .010
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Age .049∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗ .028∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Top Management .061∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗ .034∗∗∗ .031∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Unemp. within last year −.275∗∗∗ −.272∗∗∗ −.269∗∗∗ −.383∗∗∗
(.100) (.100) (.100) (.140)
Vocational Training −.032∗∗∗ −.026∗∗∗ −.019∗∗ −.018∗∗
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Short Tertiary −.013 −.008 −.002 −.004
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.013)
Medium-long Tertiary .047∗∗∗ .032∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Long Tertiary .118∗∗∗ .032∗∗∗ .063∗∗∗ .061∗∗∗
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Mortgage Borrower .040∗∗∗ .040∗∗∗ .044∗∗∗ .045∗∗∗
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.013)
Interest Only −.047∗∗∗ −.042∗∗∗ −.049∗∗∗ −.047∗∗∗
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Adjustable Rate .016 −.006 −.006 −.008
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Fixed Rate .042∗∗∗ .016∗ .011 .010
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
log(Income) .165∗∗∗ .146∗∗∗ .153∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.009)
log(Financial Assets) .004∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001)
log(Pension Contr.) - - Yes Yes Yes
Geo. Region Dummies - - - Yes Yes
N 27,591 27,591 27,591 27,591 27,591
R2 0.021 0.005 0.056 0.062 0.050
Note: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% are reported as ***, ** and *, respectively. Explanatory variables
are 2008-numbers. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if individuals reduce annuity pension contribu-
tions and increase life-long pension contributions from 2009 to 2010. Age squared is included in every column.
Columns 1-4 are linear probability model estimates and column 5 is marginal effects of a probit model evalu-
ated at sample averages.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
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B Figures
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Figure 8: Pension-related web searches in Denmark (Google Trends)
Note: The numbers represent the search interest in relation to the highest point in the chart for that area and the time. A
value of 100 is the greatest popularity of the term, a value of 50 means that the term is half as popular, and a result of 0 means
that the term was less than 1% as popular as the result of 100. The search term used was "pension".
Source: Google Trends
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Figure 9: Pension-related newspaper articles in Denmark
Note: The number of articles is based on a search of nation-wide newspapers in Denmark using the phrases "ratepension",
which is the Danish word for annuity pension and "fradrag", which is Danish for tax-deduction.
Source: Infomedia
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Figure 10: Mortgage Debt
(a) Mortgage Debt Repayments (b) Mortgage Interest Payments
Note: See Figure 3.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
Figure 11: Housing Wealth and Income
(a) Housing Wealth (b) Gross Income
Note: See Figure 3.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
49
Figure 12: Labour markets outcomes
(a) Unemployment benefits (b) Unemployment rate
Note: Figure 12a indicates the difference in unemployment benefits between the treatment and control groups. The difference
is measured in DKK and the error bars are two standard errors clustered on the individual level. Figure 12b indicates the
difference in the unemployment rate between the treatment and control groups. The difference is measured in percent and the
error bars are two standard errors clustered on the individual level.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
Figure 13: Debt Repayments across Loan-to-Income
(a) Mortgage Debt (b) Bank Debt
Note: The estimated substitution effect is the estimates from equations (2) and (3), showing how many cents that were shifted
for 1 unit reduction in annuity pension contributions. The effects are estimated on subgroups that represent loan-to-income
quantiles. The bars are two standard errors clustered on the individual level.
Source: Own calculations based on administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
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Chapter 2
Housing Wealth Effects and Mortgage
Borrowing
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Housing Wealth Effects and Mortgage Borrowing
The Effect of Subjective Unanticipated Home Price Changes on
Home Equity Extraction∗
Henrik Yde Andersen† and Søren Leth-Petersen‡
Abstract
In this paper we examine whether home price changes drive mortgage based equity
extraction. To do this we use longitudinal survey data with subjective information about
current and expected future house prices to calculate unanticipated house price changes.
We link this information at the person level to high quality administrative records with
information about mortgage borrowing as well as savings in various financial instruments.
We find a marginal propensity to extract out of unanticipated housing wealth gains to be
3-5 percent. We find no adjustment to other components of the portfolio, and we find that
mortgage extraction leads to an increase in spending. We find no evidence that the effect
is driven by collateral constraints. Instead, the effect is driven by about 11 percent of the
observations where the respondent is recorded having actively taken out a new mortgage.
Three out of four among these refinance an existing fixed rate mortgage loan and exploit
that the old loan can be prepaid and a new loan established to lock in a lower market
rate. The propensity to extract equity is higher for the group who have an incentive to
refinance following a drop in the market interest rate and at the same time experience
an unanticipated housing wealth gain. These results point to the existence of a housing
wealth effect that is intimately connected to the functioning of the mortgage market, and
this suggests that monetary policy plays an important role in transforming unanticipated
housing wealth gains into spending by affecting interest rates on mortgage loans.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis made it clear that the mortgage market and home equity extraction
plays a critical role in creating a link between housing wealth and spending. However, the
evidence about the mechanism through which house prices drive equity extraction and spending
is limited. In this paper we examine whether there is a housing wealth effect, i.e. whether
unanticipated housing wealth changes are associated with spending adjustments, and what role
the mortgage market plays in facilitating such a link.
The starting point for our investigation is a sizable literature that has debated over the
relevance of three different explanations for the association between house prices and spending.
One explanation for the correlation is the housing wealth hypothesis, which is motivated by
the life cycle framework and is based on the notion that agents smooth spending (marginal
utility) and adjust spending only when new information about the value of housing wealth
arrives. The housing wealth hypothesis is supported by Cambell and Cocco (2007), Muelbauer
(1990), Skinner (1996), among many others, but these studies do not consider the role of the
mortgage market.1 An alternative hypothesis is that house prices generate additional collateral
which households can borrow against. This channel would potentially allow people to smooth
spending when current income (or cash-on-hand) is below the long term level. According to the
collateral channel hypothesis innovations to house prices do not cause spending adjustments
directly but the effect operates through the improved access to mortgage borrowing and we
therefore denote this channel the collateral effect. Aron and Muellbauer (2013), Aladangady
(2017), Browning et al. (2013), Cooper (2013), Disney and Gathergood (2011), and Leth-
Petersen (2010) find evidence in support of this hypothesis. A third hypothesis, the common
factor hypothesis, postulates that both house prices and spending are driven by a third variable
1The evidence is mixed, however. Engelhardt (1996), using the PSID, does not find any effect of capital
gains on consumption. Hoynes and McFadden (1997) are not able to find any link between saving and capital
gains on housing. Juster et al. (2006) find no evidence that capital gains in housing influence savings decisions.
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causing both house prices and spending. According to this idea, expected income changes or a
general easening of credit availability could drive demand which then drive both house prices
and spending. This idea was proposed by King (1990) and Paganao (1990) as a response to
the findings of Muellbauer (1990). Attansio and Weber (1994), Attanasio et al (2009), and
Windsor et al. (2015) find evidence in support of this hypothesis.2
Recently, this debate has gained new momentum in the context of trying to understand
the causes and consequences of the US housing collapse and mortgage crisis. Mian and Sufi
(2011) and Bhutta and Keys (2016) document how home values drive home equity extraction
among younger house owners and is associated with a subsequent increase in loan defaults
indicating that home equity was extracted for spending rather than kept for bad times. Mian,
Rao, Sufi (2013) argue that the wealth loss associated with the housing collapse following
the recent financial crisis is responsible for the significant coinciding spending decline, and
that credit conditions play a critical role because the house price fall has limited the access
to collateral for people who were already highly leveraged. These findings do, however, not
stand uncontested. Davidoff (2016) argues that local demand factors are responsible for the
house price cycle severity. Adelino et al. (2016) show that mortgage originations increased
for borrowers across all income and FICO score levels and that the relation between mortgage
growth and income growth at the individual level remained positive during the boom consistent
with a general expansion of mortgage credit rather than an expansion driven by people who
are likely to be constrained. Foote et al. (2016) show that mortgage debt growth in the early
2000s and subsequent defaults happened throughout the income distribution. They conclude
that this is not consistent with borrowing constraints but rather with the wealth hypothesis
where the causality runs from house prices, or house-price expectations, to the accumulation of
mortgage debt. In other words, the US crisis literature effectively debates over the importance
2There is a literature estimating propensities to spend out of housing wealth based on aggregate data,
e.g. Slacalek (2009), Caroll et al (2011) Case et al. (2005). However, discriminating between the underlying
hypotheses requires micro level data that can accurately describe the hetergeneity of expectations and credit
access and other consumer characteristics.
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of the same three hypotheses.
The objective of this study is to provide a clean test of the housing wealth hypothesis,
i.e. testing whether individual agents respond to subjective unanticipated home value changes
by adjusting spending in the same direction, and to learn about the importance of mortgage
borrowing in transforming housing wealth adjustments into spending adjustments. To do this
we use Danish longitudinal data with subjective information about current and expected future
house prices and income using the probabilistic survey questions as proposed by Manski (2004).
Using this information it is possible to calculate unanticipated house price and income changes
which do not rely on parametric assumptions about the formation of expectations. In this sense
our data documents exactly what home owners believe about their wealth and not what the
econometrician believes. At the same time subjective assessments are able to capture very local
housing markets dynamics which is arguably an important type of variation. The subjective
information about house prices is linked to high quality third party reported administrative
records with information about savings in bank accounts, savings in financial assets such as
stocks and bonds as well as information about bank and credit card debt. Finally, we link up
to data obtained directly from mortgage banks with very detailed information about mortgage
debt and the timing of refinancing decisions. These data makes it possible to regress spending
as well as savings in diffent types of assets and liabilities on direct measures of anticipated
and unanticipated innovations to house prices while controling for the importance of credit
constraints as well as anticipated and unanticipated income changes. This setup enables us to
design a test of the housing wealth hypothesis which is close in spirit to the notion of a wealth
effect as it derives from the life cycle framework in a setting where we can explicitly control
for the two main competing alternative hypotheses while learning about the importance of the
mortgage market in facilitating the link between changes in housing wealth and adjustments
to spending.
We find that an unanticipated gain in housing wealth leads people to take up more mortgage
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debt and we find no effect on other components of the portfolio. Overall, an unanticipated
increase in housing wealth leads to an increase in mortgage extraction and spending of 3-5
percent of the unanticipated home value gain. We find no effect of negative shocks, i.e. the
effect is assymetrically related to positive and negative shocks. We test for the importance
of credit constraints by splitting the sample according to the level of ex ante loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio as well as by splitting the sample into groups with ex ante high and low levels of
liquid assets, and we find that none of these indicators predict the spending response. We find
that it is important to control for anticipated income losses implying that the common factor
hypothesis is a potentially important confounder. The overall response to unanticipated gains
in housing wealth is driven by about 11 percent of the observations where the respondent is
recorded to have actively taken out a new mortgage. When we zoom in on this group we find
that the majority are refinancers. As in the US, fixed rate mortgages (FRM) are important
in Denmark and the mortgage system enable borrowers to refinance to lock in lower market
rates. 3 out of 4 refinancers in the data take advantage of this opportunity and those who
experience unanticipated price gains extract equity at the same time. These findings suggest
that the unanticipated house price increases are translated into spending and that this effect
is amplified by borrowers being able to lock in lower market interest rates at the same time.
The findings resonate with the findings of Bhutta and Keys (2016), but we are, to the best
of our knowledge, the first to show in detail how the mortgage market plays together with
unanticipated house price gains in causing spending adjustments even for house owners who
are not likely to be affected by servere credit market constraints. This result suggests that
monetary policy can affect private spending when the mortgage system make it possible for
FRM borrowers to actively lock in lower market interest rates and extract equity when housing
wealth increases unexpectedly.
The contribution is facilitated by several unique features of our data. First, our new data
allows us to consider both mortgage extraction as well as adjustments to the balance sheet and
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spending. In particular, we exploit detailed longitudinal mortgage records to document the
key role of the mortgage market, and because the data cover the entire budget constraint, it
is also possible to measure the effect of unanticipated shocks on other parts of the portfolio
as well as on total spending. This is in contrast to most studies who typically only observe
mortgage debt (e.g. Bhutta and Keys, 2016) or spending (e.g. Campbell and Cocco, 2007).
Second, the availability of subjective expectations data about house prices and income make
it possible to perform a clean test of the housing wealth hypothesis while controling for the
productivity hypotesis without making parametric assumptions about how expectations are
formed. In this way we provide a test that is close to the spirit of the theory. A few other
papers have attempted to separate anticipated and unanticipated gains in housing wealth, but
these studies typically have to make strong assumptions about the formation of expectations.
Some studies estimate statistical models for house prices as in Campbell and Cocco (2007), Dis-
ney et al. (2010), and Browning, Gørtz and Leth-Petersen (2013), but identification in these
models essentially hinges on the the parametric assumptions in the specification of the price
proces, and these are typically strong.3 One exception is Paiella and Pistaferri (2017) who use
subjective asset price expectations, including house price expectations, to derive unanticipated
asset price innovations for a sample of households in the Italian SHIW. However, the focus of
their study is on measuring the effect of shocks to different asset prices and not on the role of
the mortagge based home equity extraction. Further, an important feature of our data is that
it holds well-measured indicators of credit constraints, including the loan-to-house value ratio
and the holdings of liquid assets, and this allows us to provide different tests for the importance
of credit/liquidity constraints. We are thus able to provide a strong test of the housing wealth
hypothesis while controlling for the two leading alternative explanations, the collateral hypoth-
esis and the common factor hypothesis, as an explanation for the existence of the correlation
3That parametric specifications have important implications for the outcome is emphasized in an important
paper Cristini and Sevilla Sanz (2014). They replicate the studies by Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Attanasio
et al. (2009), who use the same data but reach different conclusions, and find that the two studies reach different
conclusions because they use different specifications.
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between house prices, mortgage extraction, and spending while imposing minimal parametric
assumptions. Another advantage of combining data from survey and administrative sources
is that it ensures that idiosyncratic response biases are not systematically driving both the
information about shocks and about savings behaviour. Finally, the combined data set is lon-
gitudinal in nature, i.e. it includes repeated unanticipated house price and income changes as
well as savings and spending data for the individuals in our sample. This allows us to examine
the dynamic response to unanticipated home value gains and losses, and we exploit this to
show that the spending effect is likely concentrated on durable spending. Furthermore, the
longitudinal dimension permits us to examine whether unanticipated changes and the associ-
ated responses are tied to particular types of individuals. This turns out not to be the case
suggesting that personal traits, such as preferences, personality, or other stable characteristics,
are not driving the response to the unanticipated house wealth gains. A final advantage is that
our data set is relatively large compared to other data sets that include subjective information.
This allows us to document the effects nonparametrically and to illustrate graphically how
unanticipated price changes factor into spending and savings decisions thus documenting the
responses with a high level of transparency.
The next section presents the institutional context. After that the empirical model is
outlined and the data presented. In section 5 results are presented. We start out presenting
graphical bivariate evidence that unanticipated house price shocks drive debt accumulation and
spending. We then move on to the multivariate analysis and estimate the housing wealth effect
while controlling for competing explanations. Finally, we explore the importance of mortgage
refinancing to lock in lower interest rates. The final section sums up and concludes.
2 Institutional context
As in many developed economies house owners in Denmark experienced dramatic changes in
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house prices in the 2000s. Prices increased by more than 60% on average during the run-up from
2003-2007 and then plummeted in 2008-2010 after which the overall price level has remained
stable. This pattern is shown in Figure 1, left panel, which also pictures aggregate spending
from the national account statistics. The figure documents the well established fact that house
prices and aggregate spending move together. Figure 1, right panel, displays indices for prices
for six selected regions in Denmark and it shows that prices developed very differently across
the country over the period. In this study we are going to analyze data collected over the
period 2011-2014 and even in this period, where the overall price level has been quite stable,
prices have developed quite differently across the regions shown in the graph illustrating that
there is in fact a lot of heterogeneity in how prices have developed across the country. Later,
we shall make use of individual level assessments of home values which allows for very local
price dynamics, increasing the potential for heterogenous price dynamics even further.
More than half of the adult population in Denmark are home owners at a given point in
time, and many more are house owners at some point during their life time. Only a relatively
small fraction hold financial assets such as bonds and stocks, and even for owners of such finan-
cial assets, the value of these assets constitutes a relatively small fraction of total assets. For
most home owners the housing asset and the mortgage make up the two dominant portfolio
components. Housing is financed primarily through mortgage banks, which are financial inter-
mediaries specialized in the provision of mortgage loans. When granting a mortgage loan for a
home in Denmark, the mortgage bank issues bonds that directly match the repayment profile
and maturity of the loan granted. The bonds are sold on the stock exchange to investors and
the proceeds from the sale is paid out to the borrower. A basic principle underlying the design
of the Danish mortgage market is the balance-principle whereby total payments from the bor-
rower and total payments from mortgage banks to mortgage bond holders must be in balance.
This principle ensures that the mortgage banks face no funding risk and it also prevents them
from charging any risk premium. Once the bank has screened potential borrowers based on the
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Figure 1: House Prices and Spending
Notes: The left panel shows the evolution of house prices and household sector spending. The right panel shows
the evolution of house prices in selected regions in Denmark. All series are indexed (2010=100). Sources: The
Association of Danish Mortgage Banks and Statistics Denmark.
valuation of their property at the time of the loan origination and on their ability to service the
loan, i.e. their income, all borrowers who are granted a loan of a given type at a given point in
time face the same interest rate which is determined by the market.
Mortgage banks offer both fixed rate and adjustable rate loans. Loans can be of different
maturity up to 30 years, and they can be issued up to a legally defined threshold of 80% of
the house value at loan origination. A significant fraction of mortgage loans are fixed rate,
and this also the case in the sample analyzed here. Fixed rate loans can be prepaid without
penalties at face value at any time prior to maturity. In this sense the Danish mortgage market
is similar to the US market, where long term fixed rate loans are also common and refinancing
is also possible (Andersen et al., 2015). The possibility to prepay the loan at face value enables
FRM borrowers to exploit changes in the market rate of interest in order to reduce the costs
of funding. If the interest rate falls, an FRM borrower may prepay his loan and raise a new
mortgage loan at the lower coupon rate and this is possible to do also for borrowers who have
a LTV ratio that exceeds 80% if the balance is not increased as a result of refinancing. This
implies that refinancing activity can be quite high when the market interest rate is declining.
Refinancing with cash-out, i.e. where the principal is increased, is also possible as long as the
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new loan is within 80% of the house value. For more details about the Danish mortgage system,
we refer til Andersen et al. (2015) and Campbell (2012).
3 The empirical model
In order to test for the existence of a housing wealth effect we estimate a reduced form equation
linking spending growth to unanticipated gains in home values while controlling for variables
related to the alternative hypotheses. This approach is inspired by the life cycle framework
positing that agents smooth marginal utility and make consumption and savings decisions
to achieve this. Inherent to this framework is that agents distribute their known life time
ressources consisting of human, financial and housing wealth over time to smooth the marginal
utility of consumption. In reality there is uncertainty about future ressources. The individual
forms subjective expectations about these and revise the spending and savings plan when new
information about the level of future ressources arrive, i.e. when wealth or income changes
unexpectedly relative to his subjective expecations. For example, if at some point in time
an agent learns that his wealth has increased more than he expected then that would lead
him to increase consumption going forward. When credit markets are frictionless anticipated
changes should have no impact on spending growth. The key is that the agent responds when
the information about the windfall arrives rather than when the windfall it self arrives. For
example, if the agent learns that house prices have increased more than he thought then this
unanticipated gain yields an increase in life time ressources that can be translated into increased
spending. This is what we term the wealth effect. Critically for the wealth effect hypothesis
is that the spending decision is not necesarily linked to the time at which the gain is realized
which, in the case of housing, is when the house is sold. Of course, the ability to transform new
information about a gain in wealth into consumption before the gain has actually materialized
hinges critically on an assumption that asset markets work without frictions. In practice people
62
are likely to face many such frictions. For example borrowing rates may differ from lending rates,
and households may even face hard borrowing limits such as in the Danish mortgage market,
where it is only possible to mortgage up to 80% of the house value, and this is the collateral
constraint. In this way an increase in the home value will make the collateral constraint less
binding, and if this is the case then we would expect the spending response to be starkest
among agents who are closer to the collateral constraint. In practice, house price increases and
house price falls have asymmetric effects on the collateral constraint. What matters for the
collateral constraint is the home value at the time where the loan is originated. Consequently,
a house price increase adds collateral value whereas a house price drop does not entail that the
lender requires the loan to be paid back at a higher pace than was originally planned. This
could give rise to an asymmetric response to house price increases and falls. The common
factor hypothesis claims that there is a factor driving both spending and house prices. One
leading example is when (local) demand, and hence income, increases and causes both house
prices and spending to increase. If this mechanism is at play then house price innovations
could appear to be driving spending growth even if this is not a causal relationship. A general
credit easening could also represent a common factor driving both spending and house prices.
This effect is common to all households, but potentially operating with different intensity at
different locations.
To capture these three effects we consider an empirical model relating the change in spending
to expected and unexpected changes in house prices and incomes
∆cit = pi0 + pi1θ
p
it + pi2Eit−1[∆pit] + pi3θ
y
it + pi4Eit−1[∆yit] + µi + λt + νit (1)
pi1, .., pi4 are parameters to estimate. Eit−1[ ] is the expectation operator indicating individual
i’s expectation as of period t − 1. pit is the house value and yit the income of individual i at
time t. θpit = ∆pit − Eit−1[∆pit] is the unanticipated change in the home value and Eit−1[∆pit]
63
is the anticipated change. Similarly, θyit = ∆yit − Eit−1[∆yit] is the unanticipated income
change and Eit−1[∆yit] is the anticipated income change. Since the expectation is measured
as of t − 1 the expected value of the change in house prices and income can be re-stated as
Eit−1[∆pit] = Eit−1[pit] − pit−1 and Eit−1[∆yit] = Eit−1[yit] − yit. µi is an individual level fixed
effect, which is potentially correlated with the observed regressors. This allows fixed unobserved
factors, such as preference parameters, to be determinants of the spending response to a house
price change, even if we do not observe these factors. λt is a year fixed effect, which can be
common across the sample or be specific to the municipality where the house owner live. νit is
a random error term.
Equation (1) splits price changes into expected price changes and unexpected price changes.
Dividing innovations into expected and unexpected innovations increases the focus on the the-
ory consistent notion that household consumption should respond only to unanticipated inno-
vations. Hence if there is a housing wealth effect we would expect to see that pi1 is significant.
If consumers are not affected by constraints in the credit market and able to plan freely then
we would expect that anticipated changes to house prices would have no impact on spending,
i.e. pi2 = 0. However, if they are affected by constraints then anticipated increases in housing
wealth could potentially be driving spending. However, this may not be a very powerful test
for collateral constraints. For lifting the collateral constraint it is not important whether the
increase in home value is anticipated or unanticipated. In order to provide a more powerful test
of the collateral hypothesis we will also characterize the individuals in our sample in terms of ex
ante LTV and availability of financial assets and estimate equation (1) for different subgroups
defined according to these indicators of availability of credit and liquidity. Finally, equation (1)
includes anticipated and unanticipated income growth. If (local) demand factors drive income
which in turn drive both spending and house prices, then (un)anticiapted income gains would
be potential confounding factors which could bias the estimated effect of the unanticipated
house price change. The income terms potentially also capture mortgage extraction that is re-
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lated to using housing equity as insurance against adverse income shocks (Leth-Petersen, 2010;
Hurst and Stafford, 2004). Including year fixed effects, which may be specific to the munici-
pal level, also helps to control for common factors to the extent that these summarise shocks
and revisions to expectations that are common to households in a particular municipality in a
particular year.
The primary outcome is mortgage debt growth, but we will also apply (1) to learn about
wealth accumulation through other portfolio components. This enables us to pinpoint what
types of assets and liabilities are adjusted and thereby to learn how households manage their
balance sheet following the arrival of unanticipated changes to their housing wealth. We will
also take advantage of the fact that our data includes information about both income and total
wealth to impute total spending as proposed by Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003). Finally, we
will consider administrative records from the tax authorites which documents tangible spending
related to house maintenance as well as the purchase of cars. More details about these outcome
variables are presented in section 4.
In order to be able to identify the causal effect of unanticipated house price changes on spend-
ing it is required that unobserved components, µi and νit are uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables in Equation (1). µi could, for example, be correlated with θpit if the magnitude of the
unanticipated home value gain is systematically related to unobserved characteristics, say, pref-
erence parameters. In a robustness check we estimate the equation by standard fixed effects
methods and verify that this does not appear to be the case. Consequently, the effective identi-
fying assumption is that νit is uncorrelated with the observed variables. This assumption could,
for example, be violated if θpit is driven by sentiments such that individuals who are generally
confident in the overall development of the economy tend to have more optimistic expectations
about the development of the value of their home and consequently have a lower unanticipated
gain. In the survey we ask respondents about such sentiments and we will include these the
the regressions.
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4 Data
The data used for estimating equation (1) are constructed by combining data from many
different sources. The core is a longitudinal survey data set where respondents are asked about
subjective expectations concerning their home value and income. The survey data are combined
at the individual level with third-party reported administrative register data from mortgage
banks and from the Danish Tax Agency (SKAT) with information about all assets and liabilities
for the interviewed person, as well as a host of other administrative data providing background
information about the respondent. Combining such high quality data sources, made possible by
our ability to link individuals across modes of data collection using the Central Person Registry
number, is, to our knowledge, unique and offers several advantages.
4.1 The Survey Data
To collect the subjective data about price and income expectations we commisioned the survey
agency Epinion A/S to conduct a telephone survey in week 4-7 in the years 2011-2015. Each
interview lasted 10-12 minutes and covered about 40 questions including the questions about
subjective expectations to home values, income, and a range of other topics. The questions
about expectations were placed in the beginning of the questionaire following questions about
the respondents’ financial situation. We asked about expectations to the home value using
probabilitics questions inspired by the work of Manski (2004). Specifically, we asked:
• What is the maximum price you could get for your house one year from now?
• What is the minimum price you could get for your house one year from now?
We denote the answer to the first question Eit−1 [pmaxit ] and the answer to the second question
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Eit−1 [pminit ]. Based on the answers we calculated the midpoint pmidit =
(Eit−1[pmaxit ]−Eit−1[pminit ])
2
and then asked
• What is the chance that your house will be worth less than pmidit ?
The answer to this question is denoted pmidit .
In order to quantify the subjective probability distribution over the home value 12 months
ahead we interpret pminit , pmidit , pmaxit as points on the support of a normal distribution and as-
sume that F 1it = Φ (pminit ) = 0.01, F 2it = Φ
(
pmidit
)
= Fmidit , and F 3it = Φ (pmaxit ) = 0.99.4 Following
Dominitz (1997) and Manski (2004), for each observation we then estimate the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the subjective probability distribution by solving the least squares problem
min
µpit,σ
p
it
∑3
k=1
[
F kit − Φ
(
pkit−µit
σit
)]2
. The expected price one year ahead is then Eit−1 [pit] = µit .
In the same survey we also ask
• How much could you sell your house for today?
Denoting the answer to this question pit−1 we can now calculate the expected price change
Eit−1[4pit] = Eit−1[pit] − pit−1, which is one of the terms in equation (1). In the survey wave
issued in the following year we then return to the same respondent and ask the same questions
including pit. With this information we can calculate the unanticipated change in the home
value, θpit = ∆pit − Eit−1[∆pit]. We also ask corresponding questions about the respondents
annual income, and equipped with this information we are able to construct all the terms
pertaining to anticipated and unanticipated changes in housing wealth and income on the right
hand side of equation (1).
4We also exprimented with alternative assumptions (Φ
(
pminit
)
= 0.005,Φ (pmaxit ) = 0.995), and (Φ
(
pminit
)
=
0.05,Φ (pmaxit ) = 0.95) but that did not change the results in any important way.
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The survey population is based on a random sample from the population of Danes who
are active in the labor market. In this analysis we use survey data collected each January
in the period 2011-2015.5 Each year respondents who participated in the previous year were
contacted and reinterviewed. The reinterview rate is about 75%, and in each round the sample
is refreshed with new randomly selected subjects.
4.2 The Administrative Data
We use register data made available by Statistics Denmark from three different sources. First,
we use a standard battery of merged administrative register data compiled by Statistics Den-
mark. These data include standard demographic information such as age, sex, eduction,
household composition, address and moving date, and data about income and wealth collected
through income-tax returns. The latter gives information about disposable income during the
year and about wealth, which can be broken into a number of subcategories. This information
allows us to construct asset classes such as net bank asssets, including deposits as well as bank
loans and any other type of loan not secured with real estate, and financial assets including the
market value of bonds and stocks. Information is provided only about the market value of these
financial assets, and we are therefore not able to trace whether movements in the total value
of financial assets are related to active trading or passive movements related to capital gains.
The wealth data are measured by their market value at the last day of the year. Becuase these
data are collected annually for the entire Danish population they are longitudinal by nature;
for this study we make use of data covering the period 2008-2014. The tax return data are
known to be of high quality (Kleven et al, 2011) and have been used extensively in previous
5The survey waves used in this paper are a continuation of a survey that was originally issued in January
2010 and based on random sample from the the Danish population of people active in the labor market. The
first round of the survey did, however, not include questions about expectations to the home value. See Kreiner
et al. (2016) for details about the original survey.
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studies of savings behavior, see for example Browning et al. (2013), Leth-Petersen (2010) and
Chetty et al. (2014).
The second type of register data includes detailed information about mortage loans. These
data cover the period 2009-2014 and include information about the terms of the mortgage, ie.
the principal, the size of the outstanding debt, the coupon rate and the issue date. The data
are collected by the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks (Realkreditrådet) and the Danish
Mortgage Banks’ Federation (Realkreditforeningen). They cover the five largest mortgage banks
representing a total market share of 94.2% (Andersen et al., 2015). In combination with the
income-tax return data we then have an almost complete picture of the balance sheet for all
individuals in the Danish population.6
Spending is not recorded in administrative data, but we construct a measure of total spend-
ing, cit, by subtracting from disposable income, yit, the value of net savings and pension contri-
butions, i.e. cit = yit−Sit−4Wit, where Sit are pension contributions and 4Wit is the change
in net wealth from period t− 1 to t. The main challenge is that the imputation counts capital
gains on stocks and bonds as savings and this can potentially misrepresent actual spending
decisions. We document in a robustness check that this is not important in the current analy-
sis. The imputation was proposed by Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003) who showed that it,
while noisy, performs well in terms of matching the individual level expenditures in the Danish
Expenditure Survey7, and it has been applied by Browning et al. (2013) and Leth-Petersen
(2010) among others.
Besides the data described above, we have obtained data about two subcomponents of
6We do not have information about informal borrowing and transfers outside the formal banking system,
and we do not have information about high value items such as paintings and boats.
7Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003) examine the quality of the imputation using data drawn from the
Danish Family Expenditure Survey (DES) for the years 1994–6. The DES gives diary and interview-based
information on expenditure on all goods and services, which can then be aggregated to give total expenditure
in a subperiod within the calendar year for each household in the survey. The households in the DES can
be linked to their administrative income/wealth tax records for the years around their survey year, making it
possible to directly check the reliability of the imputation against the self-reported total expenditure measure
at the household level.
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spending, and in both cases the data are collected from the tax authorites. One includes
information about tax deductions for home maintenance and improvements. Since 2011 it has
been possible to deduct expenditures related to home maintenance and improvements as well as
expenditures for cleaning and housing services. The scheme only covers expenditure related to
the labor input (not materials), and it is possible to deduct up to 15,000 DKK (1USD'7DKK)
per year. To get the deduction, receipts with information about the identity of the provider
should be uploaded to the tax authorites through a dedicated home page, and it is the data
collected here that we have gained access to directly from the tax authorities. Because these
data provide the basis for actual tax subsidies they are audited and therefore very reliable.
We will use these data to document spending on home improvements. The other documents
the purchase of cars, and it is based on the official car register, which is used for collecting
car taxes. Together these data complement the data with information about total spending by
documenting two specific types of tangible spending.
4.3 The Combined Data
Estimation of (1) relies critically on data where the timing of the measurement is accurate. The
administrative register data are summarized by the end of the year and the survey data are col-
lected in January. The survey period was chosen to match the timing of the measurement in the
administrative data as closely as possible. For example, the unanticipated change in the home
value recorded for a given respondent in 2012 is θpi2012 = pi2012− pi2011− (Ei2011[pi2012]− pi2011).
pi2012 is collected in the survey in January 2013, pi2011 in January 2012, and Ei2011[pi2012] in
January 2011. θpi2012 thus pertains to the end of 2012 which corresponds almost exactly to the
timing of 4ci2012 = ci2012 − ci2011 where ci2012 is summarized by the end of 2012. Since the
survey has been issued in 2011-2015 we are able to construct at most four consecutive terms
summarizing the unanticipated home value change for an individual who participated in all
survey rounds.
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An advantage of the combined administrative and survey data is that they do not suffer
from the same types of measurement error. We use the subjective data to construct the terms
on the right hand side of equation (1) and the objective third party reported data to construct
the outcomes, i.e. the left hand side of equation (1). In this way we are sure that idiosyncratic
measurement errors related to the survey are not systematically driving both the left and the
right hand side of the equation, a point formalized by Kreiner et al. (2015).
For doing the analyses we make a few sample selections. First, we include only observations
for which we can identify the right hand side variables in equation (1), i.e. cases where we
have answers from at least two consecutive survey waves. Second, we use only observations
for house owners. This is because we only have subjective information about home values for
home owners. Third, we drop people who are self employed. This is because the administrative
wealth information does not separate business wealth and private wealth. Fourth, we drop
observations for 216 individuals who move during the sample period. We do this because the
change in the home value now includes adjustment to the home value that is the result of an
active choice thus obstructing the identification of passive movements in the home value. As a
result we are left with 12,788 observations for 5,207 individuals.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample. The sample includes people aged 21 to
73 and on average the respondent is middle aged. The respondents are all home owners and the
level of pre-tax income is about 400k DKK, which is above the average of the population at large,
but matches the average among home owners in the population.8 The average respondent holds
a simple portfolio, which is dominated by the house and the associated mortgage. Typically,
the respondent holds a very small amount of money in deposit accounts, and a limited amount
in financial assets. In fact 27 percent has liquid wealth corresponding to less than one months
8We also know the identity of the the non-respondents. In the Appendix we compare the characteristics of
the respondents and the non-respondents based on information avilable in the administrative records. Non-
respondents tend to be slightly younger, have slightly more expensive houses and more mortgage debt. However,
in terms of demographics and income the differences are small, and overall, the respondents look quite similar
to the non-respondents.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD
Female 47.9 50.0
Age 51.9 10.8
Single 10.2 30.2
Gross Income 393.1 183.1
Bank Deposits (net) 5.2 309.0
Has Low Liquid Wealth (%) 27.2 44.5
Financial Wealth 69.1 204.3
Has No Financial Wealth (%) 60.5 48.9
Housing Wealth 1,046.9 962.2
Mortgage Loan to House value, LTV (%) 38.2 36.6
Have mortgage 73.1 44.4
Have FRM (if have mortgage) (%) 36.6 44.4
Number of observations 12,788
Notes: Monetary variables are reported in 1,000 DKK. ’Low liquid wealth’ is a dummy variable taking the value
1 when the respondent starts the period with liquid wealth worth less than one month’s worth of disposable
income. ’No financial wealth’ is a dummy variable taking the value one if the respondent does not hold stocks
or bonds.
disposable income. 60 percent holds no financial wealth, i.e. stocks and bonds, at all, and
conditional on having financial wealth about half hold financial wealth worth less than 10
percent of annual income. 73 percent has a mortgage, and average LTV is about 40 percent,
and among mortgage holders 36 percent has a FRM.
Respondents have different income and wealth levels. In order to get measures that are
relative to the scale of each individuals’ economy we normalize variables on both the left
and the right hand-side of (1) by the average of the individuals income as measured in the
administrative data over the period 2008-2010. To reduce the influence of outliers we censor all
non-categorial variables at the 2nd and the 98th percentile of their distributions year-by-year.
In our reference setup we analyze how individual level outcomes are related to unanticipated
shocks. We do this because the survey is administered to individuals and the survey questions
literally asks the respondent to state his home value and income. However, many of the decision
arguably relate to household level decisions, and we will therefore return to this and present
robustness analyses that consider outcomes calculated at the household level.
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5 Results
In this section we present results from estimating the response to unanticipated changes in home
values on mortgage extraction, savings and spending decisions. We start out by presenting
graphical evidence characterizing the anticipated and unanticipated home value changes and
how they are correlated with the main outcome variables. After that, the multivariate analyses
are presented.
5.1 Descriptive analysis
Individual expectations to future home values are very heterogenous. This could reflect that
prices develop very differently across locations or that respondents have little sense of how
house prices in their area will develop. In order to examine whether respondents’ expectations
to their future home value has any relation to how prices have actually developed when we ask
them about this one year later, we present in the left panel of Figure 2 a binned scatterplot
of stated actual home value changes, pit, against expected home value changes, Et−1[pit]. The
picture shows that respondents expectations accurately capture actual home values realized
one year later. The right panel of Figure 2 presents a histogram of the unanticipated house
price change, θPit = pit − Et−1[pit], and it show that at the individual level prices expectations
stated in t − 1 do not align perfectly with actual prices as perceived one year later. In terms
of testing the wealth effect hypothesis the theory posits that individuals make spending and
savings decisions according to their subjective expectations and the associated unanticipated
home value changes.
We now turn to describe how unanticipated changes in home values are related to mortgage
borrowing as well as other savings and spending decisions. In Figure 3 we investigate how
unanticipated house price changes is related to the accumulation of mortgage debt. The figure
has unanticipated home value growth on the horisontal axis, and mortgage debt growth on
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Figure 2: The Relationship between Expected and Actual Home Value, and the Distribution
of Unanticipated Price Changes.
Notes: The left hand side panel shows the relationship between stated actual home value in period t, pit and
expected home value changes as of t−1, Eit−1[pit]. Before constructing the graph pit and Eit−1[pit] are regressed
on year dummies, and it is the residuals from these regressions that enter the plot. The panel shows a binned
scatterplot (blue dots) where the bins are defined over equal intervals of Eit−1[pit]. A regression lines (red) is
overlayed. The righ hand side panel shows a histogram of unanticipated house price changes. All variables are
normalized on average income during 2008-2010 and censored at the 2nd and 98th percentile of their distribtuion
in each calendar year.
the vertical axis. The relationship is shown as a binned scatterplot with a regression lines
fitted separately for positive and negative values of the unanticipated home value growth, θpit.
The panel shows a compelling relationship between the unanticipated home value growth and
the growth of mortgage debt where positive values of the unanticipated home value growth
are associated with mortgage debt growth whereas there is no systematic relationship with
mortgage debt growth for negative values of θpit .
In Figure 4 we investigate how other components of the balance sheet are adjusted. Again,
the unanticipated home value growth is on the horisontal axis, and on the vertical axis is net
bank asset growth (left), and the growth in financial assets (right). Negative unanticipated
gains in the home value, θpit < 0, appear to stimulate bank asset accumulation, but for positive
values of, θpit > 0, the relationship is not systematically increasing with the size of θ
p
it . The right
panel of Figure 4 shows no evidence that unanticipated home value growth is systematically
related to the growth in the value of the stock of financial assets.
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Figure 3: Unanticipated Home Value Growth and Mortgage Debt Growth
Notes: on the horisontal axis is unanticipated home value growth, θpit. On the vertical axis is mortgage debt
growth The dependent variable first regressed on year dummies and it is the residual from this regression that
is used for constructing the panel. Mortgage debt growth is derived directly from records reported by mortgage
banks. The panel shows a binned scatterplots (blue dots) where the bins are defined over equal intervals of θpit.
Regression lines estimated separately for θpit ≶ 0 (red) are overlayed. All variables are normalized on average
income during 2008-2010 and censored at the 2nd and 98th percentile of their distribtuion in each calendar
year.
In Figure 5 we consider how two spending outcomes relate to unanticipated home value
changes. The binned scatterplot illustrates that the spending growth variable is quite noisy,
but the regression lines suggest that there is a positive association between of the unanticipated
home value change and spending growth. Based on the slope of regression line the marginal
propensity to spend out of an unanticipated home value gains is about 2-3 percent. The spend-
ing increase for positive values of θpit is consistent with the pattern of extraction of mortgage
debt, and the spending drop for negative values of θpit can potentially be reconciled with the
fact that negative values of θpit are also associated with accumulation of deposits. In the mid-
dle panel the outcome is the amount that has been reported to the tax authorites for home
improvements. The scale is different (about 1/10) here than in the other panel, and this re-
flects the fact that the tax deduction only concerns a specific sub-component of total spending.
There appears to be a positive association between unanticipated home value increases and
the reporting of tax deductions for maintenance.9 In the right panel another subcomponent of
9
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Figure 4: Unanticipated Home Value Growth and the Accumulation of Deposits and Financial
Wealth
Notes: Both panels have on the horisontal axis unanticipated home value growth, θpit. On the vertical axis is
net bank asset growth (left panel), and financial asset growth (right panel). In both cases is the dependent
variable first regressed on year dummies and it is the residual from this regression that is used for constructing
the panel. Net bank assets include all assets held in banks less any type of non-mortgage debt, Financial assets
include the market value if stocks and bonds. Both panels show binned scatterplots (blue dots) where the bins
are defined over equal intervals of θpit. Regression lines estimated separately for θ
p
it ≶ 0 (red) are overlayed. All
variables are normalized on average income during 2008-2010 and censored at the 2nd and 98th percentile of
their distribtuion in each calendar year.
spending, car purhase, is considered. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the
value one if the household has bought a new car. Also here, the bivariate relationship suggest
that positive unanticipated home value increases are associated with car purchase.
Overall, Figures 3-5 show evidence that unanticipated home value gains drive the accumu-
lation of mortgage debt and to a lesser extend deposits, but there is no evidence that house
price gains drive the accumulation of financial assets. The graphical analysis also suggest that
unanticipated house price changes drive spending. The bivariate graphical analysis does, how-
ever, not take into account all the potential confounding explanations that we listed in the
introduction, including expected future adjustments to income. To address this we now turn to
One potential caveat associated with the association shown in the middle panel is that respondents who have
undertaken maintenance or improvements of their home may subsequently report a higher value of their home,
pt, and this will reverse the causality. In the robustness section we will perform a check that this is not the
driving force behind the results.
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Figure 5: Unanticipated Home Value Growth and Spending, Tax deduction, and Car Purchase
Notes: Both panels have on the horisontal axis unanticipated home value growth, θpit. On the vertical axis is
total spending growth (left), tax deduction for home renovation (middle), and dummy for car purchase in the
household (right). In all cases the dependent variable is first regressed on year dummies and it is the residual
from this regression that is used for constructing the panel. Total spending is imputed from income and wealth
data as described in section 4.2. The value of tax deductions are obtained from the Danish tax auhtorities. Both
panels show binned scatterplots (blue dots) where the bins are defined over equal intervals of θpit. Regression
lines estimated separately for θpit ≶ 0 (red) are overlayed. Spending and the tax deduction are normalized
on average income during 2008-2010 and censored at the 2nd and 98th percentile of their distribtuion in each
calendar year.
the mulitvariate analysis where we can simultaneously take all the three channels into account.
5.2 Multivariate analysis and test of hypotheses
The multivaritate analysis is based on estimating equation (1). Because the descriptive analysis
clearly suggested that responses to positive and negative unanticipated changes in home values
are asymmetric we allow for this in the multivariate analysis by estimating separate parameters
for postive and negative values of θpit, E[∆pit], θ
y
it, and Eit−1[∆yit].
The baseline estimates of equation (1) estimated by OLS are presented in Table 2. Each
column in Table 2 shows estimation results from estimating independent OLS regressions with
different dependent variables. In all regresions we control for year fixed effects as well as
municipality fixed effects, variances of the subjective home value and income distributions.
As discusssed in section 4 one threat to identification could be that sentiments are correlated
with subjective projections. To address this we include two dummy variables for positive and
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negative sentiments.10 Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.11 The first three
columns focus on balance sheet adjustments and columns 4-6 consider spending outcomes.
The dependent variable in column 1 is mortgage debt growth. The estimated parameters for
unanticipated home value increases and losses, which are the parameters of main interest, are
presented in rows (a) and (b).12 Rows (c)-(d) contain parameter estimates for expected price
increases and drops. Rows (e)-(h) present the estimated parameters for unanticipated as well
as anticipated income changes that are postive and negative in direction. Concentrating on the
effect of unanticipated home value changes we find that an unanticipated price increase leads
to accelerated mortgage debt growth and the effect is about 3 percent. The fact that there
appears to be a significant effect only for positive unanticipated house price changes is consistent
with the graphical evidence and the magnitude is also similar to the unconditional graphical
analysis. Expected house price increases, row (c), are borderline significant. Interestingly, the
results show that expected income declines, row (h), lead to deleveraging. This suggest that
it is important to control for the expected income growth, cf. the common factor hypothesis.
The variance of the subjective price and income distribution enter significantly. We have also
estimated the model without including these variables (not reported), and the parameters
of interest are not affected in any important way by their inclusion. Finally, the sentiment
dummies are generally not significant and thus do not appear to have any important impact on
the estimated price dummies. In column 2 and 3 we look into the balance sheet and consider
adjustments of net bank assets, i.e. bank deposits less all non-mortgage debt, and financial
10In each round of the survey we ask respondents: Thinking about the Danish economy, how do you think
it will develop this year? Respondents are given the option to answer: improve, no change, deteriorate. The
dummy variable for negative sentiments take the value 1 if the respondent answer deteriorate and the dummy
variable for positive sentiments takes the value one if the respondent answers improve.
11House prices arguably vary at some local level. Our analyses suggest that this level is more local than the
level of the municipality. Clustering standard errors at the municipal level is therefore conservative in terms of
rejecting the null-hypothesis of no wealth effects.
12
Negative home value changes are coded as positive values, such that a positive parameter estimate is to be
interpreted as an increase.
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assets. The results indicate no adjustments related to unanctipated home value gains or losses.
The dependent variable in column 4 is spending growth. There is a significant effect of
unanticipated house price increases, and it is of the same magnitude as the effect estimated
for mortgage debt growth. None of the other parameters are clearly significant, except the
parameter for anticipated income losses indicating that spending is reduced when an expected
adverse income change arrives. In column 5 the outcome is the spending adjustment in the
following year. Here, the parameter on positive unanticipated house price gains is significant.
The estimated parameter is negative indicating that spending spikes up in the year where the
unanticipated home value increase arrives but then reverts back in the following year. This
points to that unanticipated housing wealth gains are transformed into spending on goods
that are only purchased infrequently, such as durable goods. In column 6, the outcome is the
amount spent on housing maintenance that is reported to the tax authorites in order to get
a the tax subsidy. This is significant only for unanticipated house value gains. The effect is
much smaller than for total spending, but this is natural as home improvements constitutes
only one component of total spending. In column 7 the dependent variable is a dummy variable
for car purhcase. Here the results indicate that an unanticipated house price gains is related
to car purchase, although the estimated parameter is only significant at the 10 percent level.
The findings in column 6 and 7 confirm that some of the unanticipated home value gain is
spent on durable goods. Overall, the findings for total spending mimics those of mortgage
debt accumulation suggesting that spending increases are financed through housing equity
extraction.
5.2.1 Robustness
The results presented are potentially sensitive to some aspects of the design of the analysis.
To confirm that the effects found are robust, a number of consistency checks are carried out.
First, imputed spending is potentially sensitive to capital gains on bonds and stocks, and this
could have influenced the results if house price increases are correlated with capital gains on
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these assets. Second, we have used anticipated and unanticipated income growth as proxies
for demand factors in order to control for the common factor channel. However, these may
not capture all relevant demand factors, and we examine whether our results are sensitive to
including municipal specific year dummies. Third, since home equity in some cases have been
extracted to improve the value of the home this may have led respondents to report higher
actual home values after the home improvement has been carred out. If this happens then
the causality does not go from measured unanticipated home value increases to spending, but
rather the other way. We will perform a test for whether this drives the results. Fourth, in
the analysis we have used individual measurements. However, spending decisions may have
been taken at the household level, and we will investigate whether this influences the results.
In Table 3 we present the results from a series of robustness checks attempting at addressing
these issues. For each of the robustness checks only the estimated parameters pertaining to the
unanticipated changes in the home value are included, but the results are based on estimations
including the full set of covariates also included the estimations reported in Table 2.
We start out by considering the importance of controlling for individual fixed effects. An
interesting and unique feature of the data is the longitudinal dimension which makes it possible
to control for fixed unobserved factors. Fixed unobserved factors could, for example, include
preference parameters or other fixed factors. If such factors are determinants of the propensity
to spend out of unanticipated home value gains, then they could bias the estimated effects. The
results are presented in Table 3, row (a), They show that controlling for fixed unobserved effects
does not change the paramter estimates pertaining to the unanticipated housing wealth gain
significantly, although in some cases the significance level changes. The results suggests that
the response to such unanticipated housing wealth gains is not biased by fixed idiosyncratic
factors.
One important potential confounding factor is that movements in the value of housing assets
might be correlated with movements in the prices of bonds and stocks. Also, the imputation
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may count capital gains on bonds and stocks as savings when it is in reality merely passive
movements in asset prices. In order to assess whether this drives our results, we have reproduced
the result from Table 2 for a subsample that does not hold bonds or stocks, and the results are
reported in Table 3, row (b). The omission of bonds/stock holders does not change the result,
although the parameter estimate for car purchases become insigifincant due to larger standard
errors.
One of the hypotheses states that there may be a third factor driving both spending and
house prices. The previous analysis found that anticipated as well as unanticipated income
growth did not confound the estimated effect of unanticipated home value growth on mortgage
and spending growth. However, an alternative third factor could be a general local expansion
of credit that stimulates local demand. This is difficult to measure directly, but we try to add
municipality times year fixed effects. This will pick up municipality specific time varying factors
including such local aggregate effects. The results are reported in Table 3, row (c). The results
from this analysis are for all practical purposes identical to the original analysis confirming
that the common factor hypothesis is unlikely to play an important role in our data set and it
also points out that much of the identifying variation in the analysis comes from an even more
local level, either because there are indeed very local markets within municipalities, or because
the expectations of the respondents really reflect subjective expectation about how prices will
develop.
The analysis is based on the assumption that the difference between actual and antic-
ipated price changes identify a truly unanticipated price change, i.e. θpit = pit − pit−1 −
(Eit−1[pit]− pit−1), and that this surprise is uncorrelated with the decision to spend in pe-
riod t. However, we have found that there is significant mortgage based extraction of housing
equity and that at least some people use this to renovate or maintain their house. A potential
threat to our approach to identifying the effect of unanticipated home value gains is that house
owners may improve their home and subsequently report a higher value of pit because improve-
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ments have been made during the year. For this to bias the results, the decision to make home
improvements must not have been taken before Eit−1[pit] was reported, because the value of
the improvements would then have already been included in the expectation. To check for the
the possibility that the reporting of pit is endogenous, we make a robustness check where we
re-estimate the basic specification but omit observations who have claimed deductions for home
improvements. This reduces the sample size by some 20 percent, arguably also removing some
relevant variation. These results are shown in Table 3, row (d), and they show that there is still
a significantly postive effect of an unanticipated increase in the home value on mortgage debt
growth and on spending. The point estimates are slightly smaller than the reference estimates
in Table 2, but they are not significantly different. This confirms that our main estimates are
not purely the result of endogenous home value reporting. This analysis does not take into
account that people may have improved their home without having claimed the tax deduction.
In order to address that concern with also take another approach where the model is estimated
by two stage least squares and unanticipated price gain is instrumented with the aggregate
municipal level growth in the prices of traded houses. This is based on a municipal level house
price index published by the association of Danish mortgage banks, Finance Denmark. This
approach effectively exploits variation that is not collected at the individual level and hence
cannot be the result of endogenous reporting. The findings are reported in Table 3, row (e).
Two stage least squares is notoriously inefficient and the standard errors more than double
in size compare to the standard errors reported in Table 213, and this generally reduces the
level of significance. However, mortgage debt growth is still significant and of the same order of
magnitude as the baseline estimates, and all the remaining point estimates are generally similar
to and lie within two standard errors from the estimates reported in Table 2. These findings
suggests that endogenous reporting did not cause the estimated parameters to be biased.
The analysis has so far been based on individual level information, but some of the spending
13The t-statistics in the first stage regression of θpit on the instrument is 35 for the regresion of positive
unanticipated and 39 for the regression of unanticipated negative changes
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decisions could have obviously have been made at the household level. In Table 3, row (f) we
have implemented the analysis where all outcome variables are measured at the household level.
This analysis confirms the previous findings that unanticiapted increases in home values drive
mortgage debt accumulation and expenditure growth.
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 confirms that mortgage debt accumulation result
is robust to a list of potentially important confounding factors. All the alternative specification
tested are more data demanding than the specification used in Table 1 and are therefore gener-
ally associated with larger standard errors. However, mortgage debt growth remain significantly
related to unanticipated home value increases, and the point estimates for the other outcomes
remain similar even if they are not estimated as precisely as in the references specification
presented in Table 2.
5.2.2 Credit constraints
One of the main hypotheses for the underlying correlation between house prices and mortgage
extraction is the collateral or credit channel. In order to better understand whether the spending
response is in fact related to collateral constraints we split the sample at the median value in
the LTV distribution, where LTV is summarized at the beginning of the period, ie. before
potential wealth gain is realized, and estimate the model separately on the two sub-samples.
Results from doing this are reported in Table 4, rows (a) and (b). We only include the estimated
parameters pertaining to the unanticipated changes in the home value in Table 4 and report
the full set of estimates in the Appendix. Comparing the estimates in row (a) with those in
rows (b) the propensity to spend and the propensity to extract housing equity appears to be
similar across the two groups.14 In rows (c) and (d) we attempt an alternative indicator for
constraints and split the sample according to whether the respondent starts out period t with
14We also attempted at splitting the sample into thre LTV groups, LTV=0, 0<LTV<50 and LTV>50, in
order to separate out those who are closer to the borrowing limit more accurately. However this split asks even
more of the data, and differences were not statistically significantly different. These results are not reported.
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liquid assets woth less and more than two months disposable income, a measure of constraints
often used in previous studies (e.g. Zeldes, 1989, Leth-Petersen, 2010). The results show no
significant difference between the two groups and they also suggests that the response is not
driven by constraints. Nonetheless, the results strongly indicate that unanticipated home value
increases generate extraction of housing equity and associated spending increases. In the next
section we will look into the pattern of equity extraction in more detail.
5.2.3 Refinancing
The results presented so far relate unanticipated home value gains to home equity extraction.
In order to establish this more precisely we identify observations where an active mortgage
transaction is recorded. By an active mortgage transaction we mean that a new mortgage
loan has been taken out. 1,474 observations fall into this category. Figure 6 presents a binned
scatter plot of the propensity to actively take out a new mortgage against the unanticipated
home value growth. The picture shows very clearly that the propensity to actively take out a
new mortgage is increasing with the size of the unanticipated home value growth when this is
positive. For negative values of the unanticipated home value growth there is no systematic
relationship. This confirms the suspicion that the spending effect documented above is driven
by people who actively take our a new mortgage. This claim is further backed by the fact
that the spending response documented in the previous section disappears (not reported) when
holding these observations out of the data set.
24 percent of those who actively take out a new mortgage do so without closing another, but
76 percent take out a new mortgage while at the same time ending another mortgage loan, i.e.
they are refinancing. In the latter group 86 percent terminate a fixed rate mortgage (FRM).
People holding FRMs can potentially gain from refinancing when the market rate has changed
sufficiently since the loan was established. In the period considered, the market interest rate has
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Figure 6: Propensity to actively take out new mortgage
Notes: The panel has unanticipated home value growth, θpit, on the horisontal axis and a dummy variable
indicating whether a loan has been refinanced on the vertical axis. The graph shows a binned scatterplot (blue
dots) where the bins are defined over equal intervals of θpit. Regression lines estimated separately for θ
p
it ≶ 0
(red) are overlayed. The unanticipated home value growth is normalized on average income during 2008-2010
and censored at the 2nd and 98th percentile of their distribtuion in each calendar year.
declined and refinancing is relevant in order to lock in a lower market rate. It is advantageous
the refinance a FRM when the market rate has dropped significantly and when the loan has
a certain volume and when there is sufficient time until maturity. Agarwal et al (2013) have
developed a formula describing when it is optimal to refinance. According to this, optimal
refinancing depends, among other things, on the size of the mortgage, transaction costs and
the mortgage interest gain from refinancing. Andersen et al. (2015) show that few borrowers
refinance optimally. Mortgage banks and financial advisors apply rules-of-thumb when advising
their costumers about the potential profitability of refinancing FRMs. The exact rules-of-thumb
vary slightly across mortgage banks and financial advisors, but a typical rule is that it would
potentially be profitable to refinance if the volume of the loan is at least 500k DKK, time until
maturity is at least 10 years, and if the market interest rate is 1.5 percentage points lower than
the coupon rate on the existing loan.15 Based on the mortgage data we are able to apply this
rule-of-thumb in order to identify whether it is potentially profitable to refinance an existing
15see for example, https://www.rd.dk/da-dk/privat/Omlaegning-af-laan/Guides/Pages/Guides.aspx and
https://www.brf.dk/omlaeg-laan/vaerd-at-vide/hvornaar-skal-du-omlaegge.
88
Table 5: Rule-of-Thumb Refinancing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NewLoan, NoRefinance Refinance 4Mortgage 4Debt Service
θp > 0 0.017** 0.022** 0.022* -0.014
(0.07) (0.007) (0.09) (0.019)
θp < 0 -0.004 -0.003 0.006 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
[θp > 0]×D -0.024 0.056 0.067** 0.049
(0.012) (0.040) (0.033) (0.033)
[θp < 0]×D -0.009 -0.043 -0.006 -0.030
(0.007) (0.044) (0.035) (0.027)
D -0.008* 0.313*** -0.032* -0.420***
(0.005) (0.030) (0.018) (0.025)
Notes: The table reports results from regressions corresponding to regression (1), except that D is added as
a regressor as well as its interactions with θp ≶ 0. The regressions reported in the table are based on a
subset consisting of 8,664 observations selected from the original sample by including only observations where
the respondent is recorded with a mortgage loan in the beginning of the period and where LTVt−1 < 60.
Finally, the sample is also restricting by omitting extreme values of the unaticipated price change, i.e. including
−2.5 < θp < 2.5. The dependent variable in column (1) is a summy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent
has taken out a new mortgage without closing another. in column (2) the dependent variable is a dummy variable
taking the value one if the respondent is recorded as having refinanced, ie. both established a new morgtage
and closed another. The dependent variable in column (3) is the mortgage debt growth (normalized on average
income calculated over the period 2008-2010). This is similar to the outcome modelled in column 6 in Table
1-3. The dependent variable in column (4) is the debt service growth rate from t− 1 to t. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at
the 1% level.
FRM for all the observations in our data set, and we find that in 1,227 cases the rule-of-
thumb suggest that it is potentially profitable to refinance. In order to examine whether equity
extraction takes places when it is profitable to refinance we re-estimate equation (1) adding Dit
as a regressor as well as interactions between unanticipated house price changes and Dit. To
the extent that the development in the market interest rates is unpredictable, Dit identifies the
subgroup in the sample who will potentially profit from refinancing based on plausible exogenous
variation. For the regressions we focus on a subsample consisting of 8,664 observations selected
from the original sample by including only observations where the respondent is recorded with
a mortgage loan in the beginning of the period and where LTVt−1 < 60. The latter restriction
is imposed in order consider only potential refinancers who have the capacity to extract equity.
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The results are shown in Table 5. In column 1 the dependent variable is a dummy variable
taking the value 1 if the respondent establishes a new mortgage without closing another, i.e. the
respondent extracts equity but not in connection with a refinance. The results indicate the the
propensity to extract without refinancing is positively related to unanticipated price increases,
but negatively related to having an incentive to refinance. In column 2 the dependent variable
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent has refinanced, and in column 3 the
dependent variable is mortgage debt growth (also analyzed in col. 1 in Table 2-4). Turning
to the results in column (2) the parameter estimates show that irrespective of whether the
respondent has experienced an unanticipated house price gain, Dit significantly predicts that the
respondent will refinance. This is as expected because it is profitable to refinance also without
extracting housing equity in order to lock in the lower market interest rate. The propensity to
refinance appears to also increase with unanticipated house price gains suggesting that house
owners with positive unanticipated price increases are more likely to refinance irrespective of
whether the rule-of-thumb indicates that it would be profitable for them to do so. This could
reflect that these house owners refinance even when it is not profitable or that the rule-of-
thumb is too crude to capture all the circumstances that make it advantageous for borrowers to
refinance. In column (3) the outcome is the change in size of the mortgage. Interestingly, the
mortgage debt growth is not driven by the incentive to refinance as witnessed by the fact that
the parameter on Dit is negative and borderline insignificant. Comparing with results from
column (1) this suggest that a significant fraction of refinancing takes place without extracting
additional equity. Instead, mortgage debt growth is significantly positively correlated with the
existence of positive unanticipated price innovations, and the effect is three times as big for
the subgroup who, according to the rule-of-thumb, has an incentive to refinance their mortgage
to lock in a lower market interest rate and at the same time experiences an unanticipated
price gain. In column (4) the dependent variable is the relative debt service adjustment. For
refinancers not taking any equity we would expect debt service to become smaller, and for
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refinancers who extract equity the debt service will be smaller because they now have to service
a bigger loan, albeit at a lower interest rate. The results presented in column (4) shows exactly
that. Debt service is signifcantly reduced for people who have an incentive to refinance but did
not experience an unanticipated price change. In summary, the results presented in this section
shows that home equity extraction is amplified when borrowers have an incentive to refinance
to lock in a lower market interest rate.
5.2.4 Link to previous studies
We estimate a marginal propensity to extract equity of unanticipated housing wealth of 3
percent, and the effect is higher for house owners who refinance. The effect is precisely estimated
and broadly in line with most of the existing evidence finding a marginal propensity to consume
that is no bigger than 10%. Methodologically, our study is most directly linked to the studies
by Browning et al. (2013), Campbell and Cocco (2007), Disney et al. (2010), and to Paiella and
Pistaferri (2017) who also attempt to identify the effect of unanticipated house price changes.
Using Danish data for the early 1990s Browning et al. (2013) find that an overall MPC of about
3% and document that it is driven by young liquidity constrained home owners. Campbell and
Cocco (2007) use UK household budget data and find an MPC of 10%. They find that the effect
is biggest among the most mature individuals in the sample supporting the notion of a true
wealth effect. Disney et al. (2010) use the British Household Panel Survey 1994–2003 and find
a marginal propensity to consume out of surprise innovations to housing wealth of maximally
1%. Paiella and Pistafferri (2016) use data from the Italian SHIW. They find an MPC of 3%,
and the effect is related to expected price changes suggesting that the effect is driven by home
owners who are liquidity constrained. Common to these studies is that the effects are quite
imprecisely estimated. Given this and the fact that they are based on different types of data
covering different periods it is not surprising that conclusions about the underlying driving
factors differ. Unlike any of these previous studies we are able to tie the spending decision
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to a subset of households engaging in mortgage based housing equity extraction, and to show
that the response is more intense among house owners who have an incentive to refinance an
existing FRM loan to lock in a lower market interest rate while at the same time extracting
equity. This transparently shows that the mortgage market plays a key role in understanding
the effects of unanticipated home value gains on spending even for house owners who are not
affected by severe constraints. These findings are broadly consistent with those of Bhutta and
Keys (2016).
6 Conclusion
By implication of the life cycle hypothesis unanticipated gains in home values potentially cause
spending to grow. This study investigates the empirical relationship between unanticipated
home value gains, mortgage extraction, and spending decisions by using longitudinal survey
data with subjective information about current and expected future house prices to calculate
unanticipated house price changes. The subjective information is linked at the person level
to high quality administrative records with information about savings in various financial in-
struments to provide a test of the housing wealth hypothesis that is close in spirit to the
theoretically motivated hypothesis.
We estimate the average marginal propensity to extract housing equity and to spend out of
unanticipated housing wealth gains to be 3%. This estimate conceals important heterogeneity
in the responses. Unlike any of the existing studies, our study highlights the importance of being
able to consider both spending effects and adjustments of the balance sheet. We do not find
evidence that unanticipated house price drops have any effect on the spending or any important
effects on the balance sheet. However, we show that unanticipated house price gains factor into
spending through the extraction of housing equity. The estimated effect is robust to controlling
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for expected future income changes, and we find no sign that the effect is driven by individuals
who are likely to be affected by severe collateral or liquidity constraints. Moreover, and unique
to this study, we have longitudinal data on unanticipated home value gains, balance sheets, and
spending and we use this to show that the spending increase associated with an unanticipated
house price gain is accompanied by a corresponding drop in spending in the following period.
This finding suggests that spending is concentrated on durable goods. We are thus able to
paint a very detailed and precise picture of how unanticipated housing wealth gains factor into
the household budget and spending decisions. In particular, we document that the effect is
driven by about 11% of the respondents who are recorded having actively taken out a new
mortgage loan. Among these households, we show that those who have a strong motive to lock
in lower market rates by refinancing an existing mortgage, do so, and at the same time extract
equity when they have experienced an unanticipated gain in housing wealth, and this happens
even when they are not affected by severe collateral constraints. Interest rate declines thus
boost the effect of unanticipated house price increases on mortgage extraction and spending.
Specifically, this happens when the mortgage system makes it possible for FRM borrowers to
actively lock in lower market interest rates and extract equity when housing wealth increases
unexpectedly. These results point to the existence of a housing wealth effect that is intimately
connected to the functioning of the mortgage market, suggesting that monetary policy can play
a role in amplifying the effect of housing wealth gains on spending by affecting interest rates
on mortgage loans.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics
Sample=0 Sample=1
Mean SD Mean SD Difference t-value
Female 45.6 49.8 47.9 50.0 -2.3 -3.7
Age 49.5 11.0 51.9 10.8 -2.4 -17.2
Single 13.5 34.1 10.2 30.2 3.3 8.1
LTV 47.9 36.3 38.2 36.6 9.7 21.2
Gross Income 399.8 211.2 393.0 183.1 6.8 2.7
Financial Wealth 61.1 198.8 69.1 204.3 -8.0 -3.2
Bank Deposits (net) -41.2 354.3 5.2 309.0 -46.4 -11.2
Mortgage Debt 819.0 768.3 592.7 612.6 226.2 25.8
Housing Wealth 1,389.7 1,222.6 1,046.9 962.1 342.7 24.7
N 12425 12788
Notes: Monetary variables are reported in 1,000.
Table A2: Robustness Analysis (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Spending ∆ Spending,t+1 Deductions ∆ Net Bank ∆ Financial ∆ Mortgage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
θp > 0 0.053*** -0.055*** 0.001** -0.002 0.001 0.038***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
θp < 0 0.006 -0.023 0.000 0.004 -0.004 0.014**
(0.013) (0.019) (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
E[∆ p]>0 0.022 -0.008 -0.002 -0.037* 0.009 -0.000
(0.049) (0.049) (0.001) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016)
E[∆ p]<0 -0.036 0.046 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.012
(0.031) (0.039) (0.001) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013)
θy > 0 0.085 0.029 0.003 0.027 -0.024 0.006
(0.054) (0.077) (0.002) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022)
θy < 0 0.069* -0.010 0.001 -0.028* -0.016* 0.001
(0.036) (0.047) (0.001) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015)
E[∆ y]>0 0.044 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.005
(0.049) (0.047) (0.001) (0.019) (0.014) (0.021)
E[∆ y]<0 -0.125 0.126 -0.001 -0.053* 0.011 -0.051**
(0.084) (0.105) (0.002) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025)
σp 0.001*** -0.021 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σy -0.003*** -0.009 -0.000 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DK Econ + 0.012 -0.042 -0.000 -0.009 -0.005 0.003
(0.020) (0.026) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
DK Econ − 0.027 -0.041 -0.001* -0.002 -0.003 0.008
(0.022) (0.028) (0.001) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12788 7579 12788 12788 12788 12788
Notes: The table repeats the estimations in Table 1 while controlling for individual fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipal level. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. See notes in Table 1 for
variable explanations.
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Table A3: Robustness Analysis (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Spending ∆ Spending,t+1 Deductions ∆ Net Bank ∆ Financial ∆ Mortgage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
θp > 0 0.032*** -0.046*** 0.001*** 0.003 -0.000 0.027***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.008)
θp < 0 -0.014 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.003** -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006)
E[∆ p]>0 0.004 -0.017 0.003* -0.030* -0.005 0.020
(0.038) (0.040) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.015)
E[∆ p]<0 -0.009 0.017 -0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.022
(0.029) (0.023) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) (0.014)
θy > 0 -0.046 0.083 0.003* 0.054*** -0.001 -0.005
(0.053) (0.051) (0.002) (0.020) (0.005) (0.022)
θy < 0 -0.036 -0.016 0.000 -0.005 -0.007*** -0.018
(0.028) (0.029) (0.001) (0.013) (0.002) (0.012)
E[∆ y]>0 0.048 -0.032 0.000 0.023 0.005 0.023
(0.037) (0.043) (0.001) (0.016) (0.004) (0.017)
E[∆ y]<0 -0.196** -0.039 -0.001 0.009 0.021** 0.010
(0.090) (0.084) (0.002) (0.033) (0.009) (0.032)
σp 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σy -0.001* 0.000** -0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DK Econ + -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.008 -0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006)
DK Econ − 0.021 -0.011 -0.001** -0.007 -0.000 -0.002
(0.016) (0.018) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7754 4522 7754 7754 7754 7754
Notes: The table repeats the estimations in Table 1 but is based on a sample of observations where no stock or bond holdings is observed
at the beginning of the period. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the
5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. See notes in Table 1 for variable explanations.
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Table A4: Robustness Analysis (c)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Spending ∆ Spending,t+1 Deductions ∆ Net Bank ∆ Financial ∆ Mortgage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
θp > 0 0.034*** -0.031*** 0.001*** -0.001 0.001 0.024***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
θp < 0 -0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.004 -0.002 -0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
E[∆ p]>0 -0.020 -0.015 0.001 -0.024 -0.001 0.021*
(0.033) (0.028) (0.001) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012)
E[∆ p]<0 -0.030 0.031 -0.001 0.010 0.004 -0.018*
(0.021) (0.019) (0.001) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011)
θy > 0 -0.005 -0.010 0.004** 0.071*** -0.010 -0.013
(0.044) (0.051) (0.002) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017)
θy < 0 -0.015 -0.042 0.001 -0.008 -0.012* -0.013
(0.024) (0.026) (0.001) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
E[∆ y]>0 -0.007 -0.003 -0.000 0.035*** 0.017 -0.000
(0.033) (0.033) (0.001) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
E[∆ y]<0 -0.196*** -0.014 -0.001 0.001 0.033** -0.042*
(0.066) (0.075) (0.002) (0.023) (0.015) (0.022)
σp 0.000** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σy -0.001* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DK Econ + 0.002 -0.017 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 0.004
(0.014) (0.013) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
DK Econ − 0.014 -0.026* -0.001** 0.004 -0.002 0.004
(0.013) (0.015) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12788 7579 12788 12788 12788 12788
Notes: The table repeats the estimation reported in Table 1 but includes municipality times years fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. See notes
in Table 1 for variable explanations.
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Table A5: Robustness Analysis (d)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Spending ∆ Spending,t+1 Deductions ∆ Net Bank ∆ Financial ∆ Mortgage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
θp > 0 0.023** -0.023* 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.017***
(0.010) (0.012) (.) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
θp < 0 -0.008 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (.) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
E[∆ p]>0 -0.023 -0.039 0.000 -0.011 -0.002 0.018
(0.038) (0.031) (.) (0.017) (0.007) (0.016)
E[∆ p]<0 -0.018 0.013 0.000 0.010 -0.000 -0.014
(0.023) (0.022) (.) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010)
θy > 0 -0.003 0.013 0.000 0.076*** -0.014 -0.010
(0.052) (0.054) (.) (0.024) (0.012) (0.019)
θy < 0 -0.007 -0.047* 0.000 -0.008 -0.011* -0.008
(0.027) (0.025) (.) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010)
E[∆ y]>0 -0.014 0.033 0.000 0.027* 0.012 -0.011
(0.035) (0.032) (.) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
E[∆ y]<0 -0.176** -0.018 0.000 0.005 0.020 -0.026
(0.073) (0.072) (.) (0.022) (0.014) (0.024)
σp 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σy -0.001* -0.000** 0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DK Econ + 0.011 -0.020 0.000 -0.009 -0.000 0.000
(0.016) (0.013) (.) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
DK Econ − 0.017 -0.033** 0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.003
(0.017) (0.016) (.) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9601 5743 9601 9601 9601 9601
Notes: The table is based on a sample excluding all observations where deductions for house improvements are recorded. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipal level. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
See notes in Table 1 for variable explanations.
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Table A6: Robustness Analysis (e)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Spending ∆ Spending,t+1 Deductions ∆ Net Bank ∆ Financial ∆ Mortgage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
θp > 0 0.017 -0.024 0.002* -0.001 0.001 0.023*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.001) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012)
θp < 0 -0.026 0.005 -0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.009
(0.028) (0.027) (0.001) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
E[∆ p]>0 -0.003 -0.032 0.001 -0.021 -0.002 0.025*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.001) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015)
E[∆ p]<0 -0.019 0.023 -0.001 0.010 0.004 -0.016
(0.029) (0.028) (0.001) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013)
θy > 0 0.007 -0.003 0.004** 0.075*** -0.011 -0.010
(0.050) (0.049) (0.002) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
θy < 0 -0.005 -0.043* 0.001 -0.005 -0.012* -0.011
(0.026) (0.025) (0.001) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
E[∆ y]>0 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.036*** 0.017 0.004
(0.033) (0.032) (0.001) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
E[∆ y]<0 -0.176*** -0.032 -0.000 -0.002 0.029** -0.040*
(0.063) (0.071) (0.002) (0.022) (0.014) (0.021)
σp 0.000** 0.000** -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σy -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DK Econ + 0.003 -0.020 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
DK Econ − 0.010 -0.023* -0.001** 0.005 -0.002 0.004
(0.013) (0.014) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12788 7579 12788 12788 12788 12788
Notes: The table is based on estimation by two stage least squares where the unanticipated price increase/decrease is instrumented
with the municipal level house price growth obtained from a house price index published by the association of Danish mortgage banks,
Finance Denmark. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level,
*** significant at the 1% level. See notes in Table 1 for variable explanations.
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Table A7: Robustness Analysis (f)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Spending ∆ Spending,t+1 Deductions ∆ Net Bank ∆ Financial ∆ Mortgage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
θp > 0 0.095*** -0.088*** 0.003*** -0.003 0.004 0.070***
(0.022) (0.028) (0.001) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013)
θp < 0 -0.006 -0.011 0.001 0.007 -0.009 -0.007
(0.023) (0.032) (0.001) (0.017) (0.007) (0.011)
E[∆ p]>0 -0.048 -0.033 0.001 -0.123** -0.016 0.082**
(0.098) (0.098) (0.002) (0.060) (0.023) (0.036)
E[∆ p]<0 -0.045 0.128* -0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.039
(0.065) (0.072) (0.002) (0.046) (0.019) (0.031)
θy > 0 -0.006 -0.038 0.007** 0.183*** -0.028 -0.017
(0.127) (0.138) (0.003) (0.054) (0.031) (0.041)
θy < 0 -0.033 -0.109 0.003** -0.052 -0.035* -0.046*
(0.073) (0.076) (0.002) (0.036) (0.021) (0.026)
E[∆ y]>0 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.061 0.033 0.003
(0.099) (0.103) (0.002) (0.043) (0.032) (0.033)
E[∆ y]<0 -0.655*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.054 0.079 -0.118*
(0.189) (0.219) (0.003) (0.076) (0.049) (0.060)
σp -0.115 0.050 0.011*** 0.130 0.053 -0.041
(0.147) (0.180) (0.004) (0.090) (0.040) (0.060)
σy 0.875 -0.604 -0.036** 0.356 -0.097 0.293
(0.673) (0.692) (0.018) (0.405) (0.164) (0.304)
DK Econ + 0.005 -0.030 0.000 -0.009 -0.004 0.001
(0.021) (0.022) (0.001) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009)
DK Econ − 0.005 -0.033 -0.001* 0.015 -0.001 0.000
(0.019) (0.025) (0.001) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12788 7540 12788 12788 12788 12788
Notes: The table repeats the estimation in Table 1, but where the outcome is calcuated at the household level. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. See notes
in Table 1 for variable explanations.
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Table A8: Robustness Analysis (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Spending ∆ Spending,t+1 Deductions ∆ Net Bank ∆ Financial ∆ Mortgage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
θp > 0 0.030*** -0.190*** 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.183***
(0.006) (0.061) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.030)
θp < 0 -0.009 0.010 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.017
(0.009) (0.055) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.022)
E[∆ p]>0 0.012 -0.037 -0.000 -0.036 -0.008* 0.182**
(0.039) (0.215) (0.000) (0.023) (0.004) (0.081)
E[∆ p]<0 0.012 0.179 0.000 0.002 -0.005 -0.093
(0.021) (0.138) (0.000) (0.011) (0.003) (0.068)
θy > 0 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.058*** -0.004 -0.064
(0.031) (0.227) (0.000) (0.020) (0.005) (0.071)
θy < 0 -0.035 -0.156 -0.000 -0.001 -0.008** -0.142***
(0.024) (0.128) (0.000) (0.011) (0.004) (0.043)
E[∆ y]>0 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.006 0.080
(0.034) (0.220) (0.000) (0.018) (0.007) (0.078)
E[∆ y]<0 -0.150*** -0.107 0.001 -0.005 0.012 -0.151
(0.057) (0.394) (0.001) (0.029) (0.007) (0.148)
σp -0.135*** 0.179 -0.000 0.021 0.012* -0.100
(0.048) (0.337) (0.001) (0.026) (0.006) (0.129)
σy -0.303 -1.052 0.000 0.109 -0.032 0.777
(0.197) (1.266) (0.002) (0.108) (0.033) (0.588)
DK Econ + 0.000 -0.032 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.022) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.009)
DK Econ − 0.002 -0.032 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.025) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12788 7540 12788 12788 12788 12788
Notes: The table repeats the estimation in Table 1, but normalizes on average cash-on-hand over the period 2008-2010 instead of gross
income averaged over the period 2008-2010. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. * significant at the 10% level, **
significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. See notes in Table 1 for variable explanations.
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The Effects of Tax Penalties on Early Withdrawals from
Pension Accounts
Evidence from Danish Register Data
Henrik Yde Andersen∗
Abstract
Using variation from a natural experiment that is plausibly exogenous to other
savings decisions, we show that reducing the tax penalty rate by 1 percent increases
the propensity to withdraw pension assets early by 0.1 percentage points on average.
Access to detailed administrative records allows us to show that the effect is two to
three times larger for consumers who are likely to be affected by liquidity constraints
and individuals who lose their job or divorce. This is consistent with the idea that
consumers finance spending with pension assets only when other less costly ways to
access liquidity have been exhausted. Conditional on withdrawing pension assets early
the amount withdrawn increases by about 3 percent for each one percent reduction in
the tax penalty rate. Only 1/3 of the withdrawals are rolled over to non-retirement
savings accounts or used to repay debt. We find that those who cash out pension
wealth in the year of a job loss reduce overall savings rates for at least six years after
the withdrawal. Ultimately, our evidence suggests that tax penalties are efficient to
increase long-term savings.
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1 Introduction
In many developed countries, people have access to save in tax-favored retirement accounts.
This type of savings account has two advantages over non-retirement accounts. First, they
provide a tax benefit and second, they work as a commitment device to prevent present
biased consumers from over-spending.1 The downside is that wealth held in such accounts is
less liquid, i.e. working-aged consumers can access their retirement savings only by paying
a tax penalty. An important question is, however, whether penalizing early withdrawals
prevents consumers from smoothing consumption when facing adverse shocks, e.g., a job
loss or divorce. The access to funds in tax-favored retirement savings accounts is typically
associated with a tax penalty and this means that the consumer faces a trade-off between
current and future consumption based on the relative price dictated by the tax penalty.
The objective of this study is to examine how consumers make this tradeoff. To do this we
examine the change in the propensity to make early withdrawals from retirement accounts
when the tax penalty is reduced.
Pension savers know at the point of contributing that the pension scheme contains a buy
back clause, determining the price of which the assets can be withdrawn early. This implies
that they should only update their savings behavior when new information arrives about how
costly it is to access their pension wealth prior to retirement age. An unanticipated reduction
in the tax penalty produces two predictions. One is that consumption should increase for
individuals characterized by a high discount rate who want to front-load spending. The
second is that consumption increases for individuals who are otherwise constrained from
doing so because of adverse employment or demographic shocks. We stratify individuals on
their ex ante liquid wealth holdings and test whether savers affected by such shocks engage
more in early withdrawal behavior when the tax penalty rate is reduced relative to those
unaffected by such shocks. This would be consistent with the idea that consumers exhaust
the least expensive sources of liquidity such as bank savings, home equity and credit card
debt, to finance expenditure before turning to early withdrawals from pension plans.
We use the case of Denmark as it provides quasi-experimental variation in the tax penalty
rate as well as population-wide data about savings in both retirement and non-retirement
accounts at the individual level. The tax penalty rate on early withdrawals was fixed at 60
percent for all Danish pension schemes until 2013. From then on, balances in one particular
pension scheme could be cashed out by paying a tax penalty rate of about 50 percent,
while taxation on other schemes was left unchanged. A key feature of our paper is access
to the Danish administrative records that have the advantage that they hold objective
information—not self-reported—about a range of important characteristics. This allows
1Diamond (1977) and Poterba (2014) propose the rational for some degree of forced pre-retirement
savings to overcome the problem that a share of the population saves too little for retirement.
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us to identify the year of, e.g., a job loss or divorce. In addition, the data covers non-
retirement wealth at the individual level and unlike former studies, we are able to test the
correlation between liquid assets holdings and early withdrawals. The ability to combine
plausibly exogenous variation in the tax penalty rate and individual-level information about
non-retirement wealth and life events is, to our knowledge, unprecedented in the literature.
We construct two quasi-experimental research designs to quantify both extensive and
intensive margin responses to the policy change. To measure the extensive margin response,
we use a difference in differences setup to capture the change in early withdrawal propensities
at the time the tax penalty rate was reduced. The design exploits that only one of two types
of pension schemes was affected by the policy change, such that savers in the scheme that
was unaffected are used as counterfactual. Particularly, both groups of savers were unaware
of the tax penalty reduction at the time of contributing to the pension scheme. This allows
us to interpret the results as the causal effect of the tax penalty reduction on the propensity
to withdraw. To measure the intensive margin response we construct an event study. Here,
savings and consumption behavior of savers who withdraw pension assets in year t are
compared to that of savers who cash out pension assets early in year t+3. This allows us to
quantify the immediate effect of the withdrawal on a range of savings outcomes conditional
on withdrawing early.
Our paper offers three contributions. First, we provide quasi-experimental evidence on
how much early withdrawal propensities increases when the tax penalty rate is substantially
reduced. The average effect is in line with previous papers, but we break new ground on
the heterogeneity in the response. Savers who are affected by liquidity constraints, job loss
or divorce tend to increase probabilities up to three times the average effect—consistent
with consumption smoothing behavior. Second, we show that the amounts withdrawn
prematurely increase by about 3 percent for each one percent reduction in the tax penalty
rate. On average, 2/3 of the withdrawal is consumed immediately, while the rest is saved
in non-retirement accounts or used to repay debt. Finally, we find that those who cash out
pension assets in the same year as a job loss reduce their overall savings rates for at least
six years after the shock. This implies that reducing the price at which pension wealth can
be accessed prematurely allows consumers to smooth consumption but they do not increase
savings afterwards to compensate for the early withdrawal. Consequently, savings rates of
individuals who engage in early withdrawals decline when reducing the tax penalty rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of relevant
literature. Section 3 explains the Danish institutional setting and 2013 policy reform. In
section 4, the sampling process is explained and statistics on withdrawals across a range
of individual characteristics are shown. The empirical model and heterogeneous responses
are presented in sections 5 and 6, respectively, while overall savings effects are quantified in
section 7. Finally, section 8 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
The literature on early withdrawals is divided in two branches. The one aims for under-
standing whether tax penalties affect the decision on whether or not to cash out of a pension
account before retirement age. The other examines the purpose for which savers engage in
early withdrawal behavior. Our paper attempts to combine both strands of literature. This
provides a more complete picture of how buy back clauses in retirement accounts affect
individual savings and consumption. Variation from a policy change provides the necessary
change in the tax penalty rate allowing us to address the importance of this particular insti-
tutional feature. Detailed individual information from public administrative and income-tax
records provide information that allows us to characterize those who cash out and how they
spend or save the proceeds.
To our knowledge, only few papers use variation in the tax penalty rate caused by
a tax reform in a natural experiment setting to quantify the effect of the penalties on
early withdrawal behavior. Chang (1996); Burman et al. (1999, 2012) exploit that a 1986
US Tax Act introduced a fixed tax penalty of 10 percentage points to be paid on top
of the savers’ individual income tax rate should they decide to cash out pension savings
before 55 years of age.2 Savers above the age cut-off could extract retirement savings
by paying only their marginal income tax rate. Using this cut-off in a quasi-experimental
design both studies conclude that the group of younger taxpayers reduced early withdrawals
significantly compared to the group of older taxpayers when the tax penalty was introduced.
However, both papers leave a set of important questions unanswered because of limited data
availability and due to the type of variation caused by the policy change. First, their data
sources are the Current Population Survey and and Health and Retirement Study, which
do not include any non-retirement wealth information. This implies that they are unable to
test the liquidity constraint hypothesis directly. Second, the exact change in the tax penalty
rate at the individual level is unknown to the researchers and the quantitative effects of the
tax changes are consequently difficult to interpret. This is due to the fact that total taxes
paid on early withdrawals varies with individual marginal tax rates in the US—a measure
not provided by the survey sources. Third, using survey information entails potential self-
reporting bias, as taxpayers are asked to report their history of past years’ early withdrawals.
Finally, it is unknown if overall savings rates of consumers, who, e.g., lose their job and cash
out pension assets, are affected negatively.
A range of other studies have used the same survey sources and individual tax return
data to examine the characteristics of savers who withdraw savings from pension accounts
early. Poterba et al. (1998a) and Poterba and Venti (2001) show that individuals who cash
2Pre-retirement withdrawals were penalised by 10 percentage points up to the age of 59 12 if the early
withdrawal was unrelated to a job switch or termination.
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out large amounts tend to reinvest the proceeds in other savings accounts, while smaller
proceeds were not rolled over. Younger consumers were more likely to spend early with-
drawals immediately, while older consumers reinvested withdrawals such that their overall
savings were unchanged. This implied that liquidity constraints mattered for withdrawal
behavior. Similar findings are found in Sabelhaus and Weiner (1999) who document that
early withdrawals are prevalent among younger individuals and low-income groups. In a
more recent paper, Hurd and Panis (2006) present evidence that pre-retirement cash outs
correlate with the timing of divorce and widowhood. Other studies have documented that
early withdrawals correlate with job loss (Amromin and Smith, 2003) and economic business
cycles (Argento et al., 2015). It seems common to all these studies that liquidity constraints
and adverse life events tend to correlate with early withdrawal behavior.
3 Institutional Setting and Pension Reform
The Danish pension system constituted two account types prior to 2013, namely Annuity
Pension schemes that pay out as yearly payments and Capital Pension schemes that pay
out as a lump-sum. Contributions for both schemes could be deducted from the taxpayer’s
income before taxes, and pre-retirement withdrawals were subject to a 60 percent tax penalty
rate. Besides the tax deduction at the time of pay-in accrued capital gains in retirement
accounts are taxed at lower rates than capital gains in non-retirement accounts. In January
2013 the Capital Pension scheme was closed for further contributions. Savings in this scheme
could be transferred to annuity schemes or they could be transferred to a new pension type,
the so-called Age Pension scheme. The payout profile of the Capital Pension scheme and the
Age Pension schemes were similar, i.e. a lump-sum, but contributions to the Age Pension
scheme were not tax deductible at the time the contribution was made but subject to a 40
percent tax rate.3 In other words, the Danish lump-sum pension scheme was changed from
being back-loaded to being front-loaded regarding taxation. Most importantly, however,
early withdrawals from the new front-loaded Age Pension were subject to a 20 percent tax
penalty. Together with the front-loaded 40 percent tax rate, the change implied that existing
balances in the old lump-sum scheme could be transferred to the new scheme upon payment
of the 40 percent tax rate and subsequently become accessible to the consumer by paying the
20 percent penalty. Overall taxation on the pre-retirement withdrawal would correspond to
40+(100−40)/100×20 = 52 percent. In addition to the scheme type change, the government
offered an extra tax rebate of 2.7 percentage points when transferring the balance in 2013,
such that the 2013 tax penalty rate was 37.3+(100−37.3)/100×20 = 49.84 percent. During
2013, the government decided to extend the tax rebate period by one additional year. This
was repeated in 2014, such that the 49.84 percent rate covered 2013–2015. Table 1 presents
the statutory tax rates that are levied on pre-retirement withdrawals from balances in lump-
3Instead, no taxes are to be collected when the funds are paid out in retirement.
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sum and annuity pension schemes across years.4
Table 1: Tax Penalty Rates on Pre-retirement Withdrawals (%)
Prior to 2013 2013–2015 After 2015
Lump-sum 60 49.84 52
Annuity 60 60 60
The announcement of the reform could be important for understanding the results.
The rebate was levied on both early withdrawals and transfers of capital pension balances
to other pension accounts. In this paper we consider early withdrawals only and discard
transfers between accounts completely. The government explicitly promoted the pension
reform as an opportunity to transfer balances from the Capital Pension scheme to the Age
Pension scheme. Something that would provide a 2.7 percentage point (6.75 percent) tax
deduction to the saver and strengthen government finances immediately. The tax penalty
rate reduction on early withdrawals was more of a secord order consequence of the policy
change. Nonetheless, national newspapers wrote about the decline in the tax penalty rate
in 2012–2014, explaining in a simple fashion that pension assets could be withdrawn at a
lower tax rate and consumed immediately or saved in other accounts.5 The reform was
presented in May and adopted in August 2012. Keep in mind, however, that at the first
announcement of the reform in 2012, the 2.7 percentage point tax rebate was set to cover
2013 only. Later this rebate window was extended. Nonetheless, as we will show, most of
the response to the policy change takes place within 2013.
4 Data and Univariate Analysis
Danish administrative registers provide population-wide information on income, wealth,
pension contributions and withdrawals alongside personal characteristics such as gender,
age, employment status, marital status and educational attainment. We construct a sample
of individuals between 18 and 59 years of age over the time period 1999–2016. From age 60
pension payments are considered retirement income and taxed at individual marginal tax
rates or at a 40 percent fixed rate. The sample includes savers who contributed voluntarily
to a pension plan at least once during the period before the 2013 pension tax reform. This
4There are exceptions to the reported tax rates in Table 1. If the consumer suffers from severe illness
or is unable to work because of illness, early withdrawals are taxed at 40 percent. Also, balances earned
before 31 December 1979 are taxed at rates of 23.31 and 25 percent in 2013 and 2014, respectively. These
exceptions imply that the tax rates can vary from 23.31 to 60 percent. Individuals paying tax penalty rates
of less than 49.84% are, however, excluded in this analysis (less than 2,000 observations).
5See e.g. "Stor rabat hvis kapitalpensioner hæves i utide", Berlingske Business, 22 August 2012; "Hæv
pension i utide med skatterabat", Finans, 14 January 2013; "På trods af en solid strafafgift trækker rekord-
mange danskere deres kapitalpensioner ud til forbrug eller anden opsparing", Berlingske Business, 2 April
2014.
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ensures that savers in the sample do in fact have pension assets to cash out in the post-
reform years if they are willing to do so.6 We balance the sample such that individual
characteristics are available for all individuals, which provide a sample of almost 9.7 million
observations.
4.1 Information on Pensions
The tax penalty rate is calculated as the amount paid in tax penalties divided by the amount
withdrawn early for each taxpayer in each year. This means that the data provide the actual
tax penalty rate paid by the owner upon cashing out pension assets. This is an important
innovation compared to Chang (1996) and Burman et al. (1999, 2012) who use variation
in the statutory income-tax rates around the 1986 US Tax Act. Their studies struggle to
measure the change in actual tax penalty rates because the penalties depend on individual
income-tax rates in the US pension system. Tax penalty rates in the Danish pension system
are fixed independently of income taxation. However, the recorded penalty rate for each
person per year could reflect withdrawals from a set of different pension accounts, which are
subject to different tax penalties in 2013 and thereafter. Consider a saver who withdraws
annuity pension assets only and is taxed at a 60 percent tax penalty rate in 2013. Consider
another saver who withdraws lump-sum pension assets only and is taxed at 49.84 percent
in 2013. Now, consider a third saver who withdraws from both annuity and lump-sum
pension schemes. Depending on how large withdrawals are from each scheme, he is taxed
at a weighted average of the 60 and 49.84 percent rates. We illustrate and elaborate on this
point below.
The data records provide annual pension contributions for the full sample period. We
use this detailed information to group the savers into treatment and control groups. The
treatment group holds individuals who contributed to a Capital Pension scheme prior to
2013, while individuals in the control group did not. To obtain as much balance on co-
variates between the groups, they are both allowed to have contributed to Annuity Pension
schemes in the pre-reform years too. The only difference in the two groups is that the
treated individuals are certain to own a lump-sum pension balance, while the individuals
in the control group are likely to have annuity pension assets only. This allocation is an
approximation to the true allocation. Clearly, the treatment group could have contributed
to annuity pension schemes prior to 1999 where the data records begin and vice versa for
the control group.
Figure 1a plots mean tax penalty rates in each year for the savers in the treatment and
control groups. Clearly, the average tax penalty rate of the control group was unaffected by
6Collective agreements between workers’ unions and employers’ associations mean that many employer-
paid pension contributions cannot be withdrawn prior to retirement age. As a consequence, a large fraction
of Danish pension assets are completely illiquid. On the contrary, voluntary pension contributions are
usually not subject to such no-buy back clauses.
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the 2013 tax reform, while the savers in the treatment group paid about 54 and 54.5 percent
in 2013 and 2014, respectively, and about 56.5 and 58 percent in 2015 and 2016, respectively.
The tax penalty rates do not match the statutory rates in Table 1, because the treatment
group withdrew pension assets from both lump-sum and annuity pension plans, which were
taxed equally at a 60 percent rate before 2013 and differentially after this point. The data
allow us to show that, on average, the reform reduced the individual tax penalty rate by
60− 54 = 6 percentage points in 2013 for the treated savers in the sample considered. This
information becomes crucial when assessing the quantitative effects of this specific tax rule
change. The decline in the tax rate should be 60−49.84 ≈ 10 percentage points when savers
withdraw strictly from lump-sum pension schemes. This is illustrated in Appendix Figure
9a, which includes savers in the treatment group only if they saved strictly in lump-sum
pension plans in pre-reform years that we observe in the data.
Figure 1: Full Sample
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Note: The figures are constructed by dividing the sample into treatment and control groups. The
treatment group consists of savers who contributed to lump-sum pension schemes prior 2013 and savers
in the control group did not. Both groups could have savings in annuity pension schemes too. Figure 1a
shows the mean tax penalty rate in each year for both the treatment and control groups. Figure 1b shows
the mean propensity to withdraw pension assets early in each year for both groups. The red dotted line
represents the time of implementation of the policy change.
The propensity to withdraw pension assets early can be measured by constructing a
dummy variable, Ei,t, that takes the value 1 for individual i when she withdraws pension
assets in year t, otherwise zero. This is considered one of the main outcome variables of
interest as it captures any extensive margin response to the 2013-policy change. Figure 1b
plots the mean propensity to withdraw pension assets early in each year for the treatment
and control group savers. Prior to the 2013 policy change, the two groups show similar
trends in propensities of about 1 percent—whereas the propensities shift upwards from
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2008 to about 1.5 percent. In 2013 and 2014 the withdrawal propensities increase to about
3 and 2 percent, respectively, for the treatment group, while that of the control group
remain at the pre-reform level. In 2015 and 2016 the propensities are about 1 percent
for both groups. This nonparametric plot serves as empirical evidence that the propensity
to cash out pension assets prior to the retirement age increased substantially when the
tax penalty rate was reduced. Despite the relatively modest propensities, it is difficult to
reject that the two groups responded differentially at the time of the reform, while pre-
reform trends for the treatment and control groups follow each other closely. In 2008, the
propensity to withdraw increased more for the control group relative to the treatment group,
which is a contrast to all other pre-reform years. This might reflect effects from the global
financial crisis that escalated in Denmark that particular year. Specifically, one particular
institutional feature might cause the data to show this. Capital gains on pension accounts
are subject to a wealth tax—a fixed 15.3 percent rate—which is levied each year on the
balance and paid automatically to the government by the pension funds on behalf of the
owners. Capital losses are also taxed at this rate. This implies that, upon a capital loss,
the negative tax payment—a tax subsidy—is added to the pension balance. However, if the
pension balance is relatively small and unlikely to produce a noteworthy gain in subsequent
years, the negative tax payment is cashed out to the owner, automatically. Appendix Figure
10 illustrates this point. The figure plots propensities across years for savers, who cashed
out below or above DKK 5,000 (US $800). Consistent with the 2008 negative tax payment,
we see a large spike in the early withdrawal propensity for savers who cashed out small
amounts. These withdrawals are likely to be undertaken by the pension fund rather than
active saving decisions by the owners. We discard individuals completely from the sample if
they withdrew less than DKK 5,000 at any point in time. At this threshold, pension funds
are likely to cash out balances automatically to the owners because the balance (including
capital gains) is insufficient to pay the annual fees and the insurance premium if the plan
includes an insurance policy.
Figure 2a presents an overlay of histograms showing the distribution of early withdrawn
amounts for the treatment and control groups. Despite the tendency for savers in the
treatment group to withdraw smaller amounts than savers in the control group, both groups
show a similar withdrawal pattern in the lower part of the distribution. Note that about 80
percent of treatment group savers cashed out less than DKK 60,000. This figure is about
55 percent for the control group savers. For both groups, the top 10-percentiles are omitted
for data confidentiality reasons as the bins contained too few individuals in the tails.
Whether an early withdrawal originates from a lump-sum or annuity pension balance
is not observed in the data. Thus, to us as researchers, there exists no true allocation of
savers into those who are affected by the 2013-policy change and who are not. As explained
in the previous section we exploit information from past contributions to allocate savers
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to treatment and control groups in order to proxy for whether they are affected or not.
Aggregate numbers provided by the Danish government on annual totals of early withdrawals
from lump-sum pension schemes is used to assess the validity of our allocation process. The
government registered early withdrawals from lump-sum pension balances totaling DKK
2.9, 1.8 and 0.7 billion in 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively. We take out a subgroup of our
treatment group who contributed to lump-sum pension schemes only prior to the reform
(comparable to the lump-sum savers in Appendix Figure 9a). Total withdrawals of this
subgroup was DKK 72, 39 and 20 million in 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively. All the
numbers are shown in Figure 2b. The grey bars show the annual sums in the subsample,
while the transparent bars show the population-wide sums. Clearly, this subgroup captures
only a minor fraction of total withdrawals. However, the pattern over the years is consistent
with the aggregate numbers, which indicates that using individual past pension contributions
to allocate savers to treatment and control groups is not systematically wrong.
Figure 2: Pre-retirement Withdrawals 2013–2015
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Note: Figure 2a illustrates two overlapping histograms. One for the treatment group and one for the
control group, both showing the distribution of early withdrawn amounts during 2013–2015 for each
group. The top decile is omitted from both histograms for data confidentiality reasons. Figure 2b shows
the total amount early withdrawn strictly from lump-sum schemes within our sample (left-hand axis)
and for the full population (right-hand axis). The grey bars represent those of the treatment group who
strictly saved in lump-sum pension schemes in 2000–2012.
4.2 Individual Characteristics
The administrative records provide a set of individual characteristics. The information are
objective in the sense that they are reported by third-parties ensuring no self-reporting biases
in the data. This section provides an overview of the characteristic features of treatment
group savers who withdrew pension assets prior to retirement age. Moreover, we present
a univariate analysis on whether withdrawal propensities differ across these characteristics.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Treatment Group Savers 2000–2016
(E=1) (E=0)
Mean Mean Difference Std. Err.
Age 42.8 42.5 0.3∗∗∗ 0.1
Female (%) 33.3 41.8 −8.5∗∗∗ 0.1
Income 505.9 427.2 78.7∗∗∗ 0.7
Liquid Assets 87.2 166.9 −79.7∗∗∗ 1.0
Debt 259.1 166.3 92.7∗∗∗ 0.8
Mortgage 597.2 519.6 77.6∗∗∗ 1.8
Housing Wealth 757.4 817.2 −59.8∗∗∗ 2.8
Observations 116,724 8,324,403
Notes: The dummy, E, indicates whether individual i cashed out
pension assets during 2000–2016. The table includes the treatment
group only. Stars reflect significance level from two-sample t-tests of
equal means, where *** p < 0.01.
To learn more about which types of savers were more likely to withdraw pension assets after
the tax penalty reduction, we investigate whether certain characteristics were more active in
early pension assets withdrawal in the post-reform years compared to the pre-reform period.
First, we do a two-sample t-test of equal means between lump-sum savers who withdrew
pension assets early in the sample period and people who did not engage in early with-
drawals. Table 2 presents means for the two groups, the difference and standard errors by
age, gender and a set of monetary measures. During 2000–2016, 116,724 incidences of treat-
ment group savers cashing out pension assets were recorded. About 8.3 million observations
in the treatment group take the value zero in the early withdrawal indicator, Ei,t. Note that
the savers who withdrew pension savings (E=1) are included in the non-withdrawal group
(E=0) in years that they did not engage in early withdrawals. The two groups are about the
same age, but with about 9 percent fewer females in the withdrawal group. Also, the early
withdrawal-group earned about DKK 79,000 (about 19 percent) more each year compared
to the non-cash out group. Savers who engaged in early withdrawal behavior had DKK
80,000 less in liquid assets (about 48 percent) and DKK 93,000 more debt in banks (about
56 percent). Their mortgages were DKK 78,000 larger (about 15 percent), while their hous-
ing wealth was DKK 127,000 smaller (about 7 percent). The latter implies that the group
of pension asset withdrawers had significantly less equity than the non-withdrawers. All to-
gether the statistics draw a clear pattern that early withdrawal propensities are correlated
with low liquid asset holdings, high debt and low equity—all of which characterize liquidity
constrained consumers.
Second, we plot the early withdrawal propensity across a set of personal characteristics,
such as age groups, educational attainment, socio-economic classification and marital status.
All plots are divided into a left and right panel that split the measures into before (pre-
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Figure 3: Early Withdrawal Propensity and Individual Characteristics
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Note: Figures 3a–3d illustrate the early withdrawal propensity, measured by the dummy, Ei,t, across
age, education, socio-economic classification and marital status. All characteristics are measured by end
of year. Educational attainment is divided in three groups; Low, which covers primary schooling, Middle
covering secondary schooling and vocational training and High, which includes college, university or
PhD degrees. Socio-economics classifications are grouped in Employment, Management, Self-employed,
Unemployed, Education and Other. The latter mainly covers individuals receiving disability pension
benefits. Marital status is grouped in Single, Married, Divorced and Widow by end of year.
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2013) and after (post-2013) implementation of the 2013 tax reform. This provides an idea
on whether certain characteristic features are more or less likely to be correlated with a
response to the reduction in the tax penalty rate. Figure 3a plots the early withdrawal
propensity for four age groups. The left panel shows a hump-shaped pattern where the 20–
29 year-olds and 50-59 year-olds have a lower propensity than the two middle-aged groups.
However, in the post-reform years, the propensity in the youngest age group increased
to match the middle-aged ones. This implies that the very youngest could be responding
substantially to the tax penalty rate reduction. Note, however, that all age groups increased
their early withdrawal propensity after 2013. Figure 3b divides individuals in three groups
that reflect their educational attainment. The group labelled Low has primary schooling
only. The Middle group has secondary schooling or vocational training, while the High
group has a college, university or PhD degree. In the pre-2013 years the Low and Middle
groups are almost identical with an early withdrawal propensity of about 1.5 percent, while
that of the High group is well below 1 percent. After 2013 in the right-most panel, the
propensities increase for the Low and Middle groups to about 2–2.5 percent, while the
High group increases to little more than 1 percent. This suggests that the reduction in tax
penalties affects the behavior of individuals with relatively low educational attainment. In
Figure 3c, savers are grouped according to their socio-economic classification—that is, their
labor market status. Comparing the left and right panels, all groups increase their early
withdrawal propensity. However, the unemployed and students seem to respond relatively
more than the remaining ones. Finally, Figure 3d split the sample by marital status—
single, married, divorced and widow. Before the policy change, divorced individuals seemed
to stand out by having a higher early withdrawal propensity. After implementation of the
2013 tax reform, all groups have increased their propensities, but the singles and divorced
seem to have responded the most. Going forward, the personal characteristics presented in
this section will be used as control variables in regressions that aim to quantify the 2013
reform effects on the early withdrawal propensity. Later we will use details about the timing
of, e.g., job loss and divorce to show how life events interact with early withdrawal behavior.
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Figure 4: Early Withdrawal Propensity and Liquidity Indicators
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Note: Figure 4a divides the sample in ten equally sized bins (deciles) and plots the mean early withdrawal
propensities within each bin for four time periods. Figure 4b divides the sample in disposable income
deciles and plot the mean early withdrawal propensities within each bin for the same four time periods.
According to the literature, early withdrawal propensities are predicted to be larger
for consumers who suffer from liquidity constraints (Amromin and Smith, 2003). Danish
administrative records provide individual wealth and income information, which we use to
test this prediction. First, we construct ten equally sized bins (deciles) of liquid wealth
and income. Then we calculate the mean early withdrawal propensity within each bin.
Figures 4a and 4b plot early withdrawal propensities across liquid wealth and income deciles,
respectively. Both Figures split the propensity in four time periods; the pre-reform period
(2000–2012), the first year after the tax penalty rate reduction (2013), the two subsequent
years in which the tax penalty rate remained extraordinarily low (2014–2015) and the year
in which the rate was set to its new permanent level (2016). It is clear to see that withdrawal
propensities stand out in 2013. Savers in the lowest decile of liquid wealth increases their
withdrawal propensity from about 2 to 6 percent—a factor three—while the top decile do not
change at all when comparing the pre-reform years to 2013. In 2014–2016 the propensities
in the bottom decile tend to adjust downwards to the pre-reform level but is still about twice
as large as for the pre-reform years. For all time periods illustrated in the Figure there is a
monotonically and negative correlation between liquid wealth (measured by the beginning
of the year) and withdrawal propensities (end of year). We test this finding more formally
in an empirical model in the following section. For comparison, Amromin and Smith (2003)
use US tax return data to show that the lowest quantile of financial wealth has an average
early withdrawal propensity of 6.6 percent, which declines monotonically to 1 percent for
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the top quantile—a pattern consistent with ours.7 For the income deciles in Figure 4b, the
negative correlation to withdrawal propensities is less prevailing and stand out only for 2013.
This indicates that income might be a less useful instrument to sort liquidity constrained
savers from the unconstrained ones.
The statistics draw the picture that early withdrawals are more likely to be undertaken
by young and middle-aged consumers with relatively low educational attainment and who
might be unemployed or divorced. Moreover, they hold little liquid financial wealth and is
placed in the lower part of the income distribution. A range of studies suggest that overall
savings rates within this group of people depend highly on savings in tax-deferred retirement
accounts (Bernheim, 2002; Engen et al., 1996; Gale, 1998; Poterba et al., 1998b). These
are the same types of savers that we find is more likely to withdraw pension assets early,
which leads to the question how early withdrawals affect retirement income of this group.
We return to this question in section 7.
5 Empirical Model
The empirical model tests whether the observed increase in early withdrawal propensity
for the treatment group at the time of tax penalty reduction was statistically significant
relative to the change in propensity for the control group. The identifying assumption relies
on common pre-trends in propensities between the two groups. In order to test this, we
regress the early withdrawal indicator in the following specification
Ei,t = α + β1Ωi + β2Treati + β3t Ωt × Treati +Xi + εi,t, (1)
where the dependent variable, Ei,t, takes the value 1 for individual i if he cashed out pension
assets in year t, otherwise zero. Treati takes the value 1 for individuals in the treatment
group and zero for the those in the control group. This dummy is interacted with year
dummies, Ωt, such that the coefficients in the vector β3t capture differences in propensities
between the treated and non-treated savers in each year t. Idiosyncratic errors are con-
tained in εi,t and Xi is the vector of individual control variables. Figure 5a is a plot of
the β3t -coefficient vector, showing that, for all years prior to implementation of the reform,
propensities between the treatment and control group are not statistically different at the
5-percent level. In 2013, the propensity increases for the treated savers by about 1.1 percent-
age points relative to the non-treated ones. The treatment effect reduced gradually towards
zero in the following years. The takeaway from this Figure is that the assumption of parallel
pre-trends is not violated. Even when we look specifically at those who ex ante had little
access to liquid wealth versus those in the high end of the liquid wealth distribution the
7The measure of financial wealth is imputed in Amromin and Smith (2003) by grossing up individual
capital income and cross-country average dividend and interest rates. This measure serves only as a proxy
for the true financial wealth at the individual level.
123
Figure 5: Estimated Early Withdrawal Propensities by Years
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Note: Figure 5a plots the β3t -coefficient in equation (1), illustrating the difference in early withdrawal
propensities across years between the treatment and control groups. Vertical bars indicate the 5-percent
significance level. Figure 5b is a similar illustration but divides the sample in high and low liquid wealth.
The former includes the top three deciles and the latter includes the bottom three deciles. The liquid
wealth deciles covers stocks, bonds and cash in bank accounts in 2011.
common pre-trends persist. Figure 5b plots the treatment effect for the top and bottom
three deciles in high and low liquid wealth groups, respectively. The low liquid wealth group
increased the propensity to early withdraw pension assets significantly more than the high
liquid wealth group consistent with the non-parametric evidence in Figure 4a. We proceed
to identify the reform effect in the following specification
Ei,t = α + β1Postt + β2Treati + β3Postt × Treati +Xi + Ωt + εi,t, (2)
where a post-reform indicator takes the value 1 for the years 2013–2016, otherwise zero. Ωi is
included to control for year fixed effects, but the coefficient of interest is β3, the difference-
in-differences estimator. This interaction between Postt and Treati identifies the reform
effect on early withdrawal propensities assuming that the treatment and control groups
are comparable groups—an assumption we could not reject in Figure 5a. Table 3 presents
the coefficient of interest, β3, from equation (2). Column one shows the regression that
includes year fixed effects only. In column two, controls and age fixed effects are added,
while columns three and four include municipal fixed effects and individual fixed effects,
respectively. Municipal fixed effects set out to capture potential differences in the reform
response across local labor and housing markets. There are 98 municipalities in Denmark
and considerable differences in unemployment rates, house prices and population densities
across the country. By including municipal fixed effect we ensure that such differences are not
driving the measured treatment effect. Individual fixed effects might, for instance, capture
time-invariant individual characteristics and deep parameter savings preferences. This, e.g.,
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individual tastes for saving, which are unobservable and considered to be constant for adults
throughout their lives. All columns present an estimated average treatment effect over all
post-reform years of 0.5 percentage points. Columns 5–8 present the interaction parameter
from an identical regression to equation (2) but here, the dependent variable is the tax
penalty rate, corresponding to the illustration in Figure 1a. The average decline in tax
penalties for the treatment group relative to the control group for all post-reform years is
4.5 percentage points in the baseline specification. Adding all controls, the average change
in tax penalty is -3.6 percentage points. Relative to the pre-reform years, this corresponds
to an 3.6/60 = 6 percent reduction in the tax penalty rate for the sample considered.
These estimates allow us to calculate a semi-elasticity. The propensity to withdraw pension
assets early increased, on average, by 0.1 percentage points when the tax penalty rate was
reduced by one percent. The result is slightly lower but consistent with, e.g., Chang (1996)
who estimates an increase in rollover rates of 0.2–0.4 percentage points when tax penalty
rates increase by one percent, using an US 1986 tax reform but under different econometric
assumptions. Here, an increased rollover rate—the rate of which savers roll over withdrawals
to other savings accounts—compares to a decrease in the early withdrawal rate.
Table 3: Regression Table
Early Withdrawal Propensity Tax Penalty Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ - -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.)
Post × Treat 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Age FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Individual FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 9666029 9666029 9666029 9666029 128595 128595 128595 128595
R2 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.488 0.498 0.500 0.440
Notes: The Table present coefficients from equation (2), where columns 1–4 is estimated with the early
withdrawal propensity as dependent variable, while columns 5–8 are estimated using the tax penalty
rate as dependent variable. The Postt coefficients are omitted because year fixed effects are included in
all columns. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The treatment effect is robust to the inclusion of a range of controls. To further test the
robustness of our empirical model, Table 4 presents the interaction coefficient of equation
(2) estimated on various subsamples. Column one shows that the treatment effect remains
unchanged if we exclude individuals in the control group who cash out amounts larger than
DKK 140,000. By doing this, we show that the treatment effect is likely not to be affected
by the fact that the treatment group cashes out smaller amounts, on average, than the
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control group (see Figure 2a). Changes to non-retirement savings are calculated as year-on-
year changes in stock measures. This implies that the first differences include both annual
price changes and quantitative changes in the accounts made actively by the owner. We are
interested in the latter channel only. In order to control for the fact that the price-channel
does not drive our findings, we exclude savers with stocks or bonds in their liquid asset
portfolio in 2011—the year before the reform was announced. The estimated treatment
effect do not change, which implies that the response is not driven by price fluctuations in
the financial markets. The treatment effect on renters is similar to homeowners according to
column three. Here, all homeowners have been removed from the sample but the estimate
is unchanged. This implies that the decision to withdraw was likely not to be connected to
he housing market. Columns four and five divide the sample into younger and older savers,
splitting at age 35. The estimated response is similar for the two subsamples, implying that
the overall treatment effect is not driven solely by the very young, as suggested in Figure 3a.
The full sample includes individuals who contributed voluntarily to pension accounts in the
pre-reform years. Savers who saved only in occupational pension schemes are not included.
This restriction aims to ensure that the savers included in the sample were in fact eligible
to withdraw pension assets prior to retirement age upon payment of the tax penalty. It is
possible that some of the individuals in our sample were not eligible to withdraw pension
assets prior to retirement age even if they were willing to pay the tax penalty. Their pension
assets could be lawfully bound in the pension fund and hence, completely inaccessible to
the owner until he retires. We use a new data source which holds information on buyback
eligibility in 2014 only. Ideally, we would want to have information on eligibility for the
years prior to and in the reform year. This information is not available. However, using
the 2014-information in eligibility allows us to keep savers in they wither had a buy back
clause in their retirement accounts by the end of that particular year or withdrew pension
wealth in 2013–2014. Column six shows that the treatment effect remain almost unchanged
by doing this. In column seven, a non-linear model is used to estimate the difference in
differences specification. The marginal treatment effect in a probit model is exactly as that
of the baseline linear model. For that reason, we proceed using the linear model because the
linear model is simpler to apply in the following section, in which we examine heterogeneous
treatment effects across different individual characteristics.
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Table 4: Robustness Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Common No stocks
support and bonds Renters Age<35 Age>35 Eligible Probit
Post × Treat 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 9642491 5688604 2401693 1322985 8343044 2745411 9666029
R2 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.004
Notes: The Table present coefficients from equation (2) with the early withdrawal propensity
as dependent variable. Each column represents a robustness check, in which the equation
is regressed on a subsample. Column one excludes withdrawals from the control group that
were larger than DKK 140,000. Column two excludes individuals with non-zero values of
stock and bonds in their financial portfolio in 2011. Column three excludes savers who owned
their own home in 2011. Column four and five divide the sample at age 35. Column six
includes savers only with non-zero pension assets eligible for early withdrawal in 2014 if they
did not withdraw assets prior to that year. This provides a subsample of savers who could
have cashed out pension wealth in 2013 but refrained from doing so. Column seven show
marginal effects of a probit regression using the specification in equation (2). Standard errors
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
6 Heterogeneous Withdrawal Propensities
Studies have found that early pension assets withdrawal is more likely when certain life
events occur. Based on US income-tax data, Amromin and Smith (2003) find that an
involuntary job loss produces a 4 percent increased probability of withdrawing pension
assets early. This figure is 8 percent for divorce and 9 percent for home purchases. In
this section, we show similar patterns in the Danish administrative records, regarding job
loss and divorce, while home purchases do not seem to interact significantly with early
withdrawal decisions. Moreover, we extend the analysis of Amromin and Smith (2003) by
testing whether consumers that are affected by such life events have a higher propensity
to cash out pension assets after the reduction in the tax penalty rate. This would imply
that the reduction in tax penalties allow consumers to smooth consumption and cope with
such adverse life events. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to combine plausibly
exogenous variation in the tax penalty rate and administrative information about adverse
shocks. First, we do a univariate analysis on how early withdrawal propensities interact
with life events before and after the tax penalty rate reduction. Later, we formally test the
interactions in a regression model.
Using individual employment information, we define a job loss indicator, Job Lossi,t,
that takes the value 1 for individual i, who was recorded as employed at the beginning of
year t but experienced at least six months unemployment during year t, otherwise zero.
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Figure 6: Early Withdrawal Propensities
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Note: Figures 6a–6d illustrate the early withdrawal propensity, measured by the dummy, Ei,t, across a set
of shock indicators. All figures are divided in left and right panels, dividing the sample in pre-2013 and
post-2013 period. The illustrations cover the treatment group only. Job Loss indicate that the individual
was employed by the beginning of the year and unemployed by the end of year. Liquidity Constraints
indicate that the individual had liquid assets available corresponding to one month’s disposable income,
measured by the beginning of the year. Home Purchase indicate whether individuals had non-zero housing
wealth by the end of year and no housing wealth at the beginning of that same year. Divorce captures if
individuals are married at the beginning of the year and divorced by the end of the year.
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Figure 6a presents the early withdrawal propensity for savers who lose their job, indicated
by a Yes or No. The Figure is split into two panels. The left-most panel includes only
pre-reform years, i.e. 2000-2012, while the right-most panel covers 2013–2016, in which the
tax penalty rate was reduced. The Figures include only individuals from the treatment
group, who are all expected to be affected by the policy change. The group not affected
by job loss increased the probability of cashing out from about 1 percent before 2013 to a
little under 2 percent after 2013. Between the two time periods, the job loss-group increased
the propensity from less than 3 percent to about 5.5 percent. The substantial increase in
probability for the job loss-group indicates that this group exploits the tax penalty reduction.
On average, we expect them to be more liquidity constrained than people who do not lose
their job. To test directly how liquidity constraints might interact with the policy change,
we define an indicator, Liq. Con.i,t, that takes the value 1 for savers who had liquid assets
at the beginning of the year that corresponded to less than one month’s disposable income.
Otherwise, the indicator takes the value zero. This might not be the perfect allocation of
constrained and unconstrained consumers (See e.g. Jappelli, 1990) but it is sufficient for our
purpose that those labelled liquidity constrained are more likely to face constraints compared
to the unconstrained group. Figure 6b shows that for the unconstrained consumers, early
withdrawal propensities are just below 1 percent before the reform and just above 1 percent
after implementation of the tax penalty reduction. For the liquidity constrained consumers,
the propensity increases from about 2 to little under 3 percent. Not only are propensities for
the constrained ones at a higher level, but the propensity also seem to increase for this group
specifically as the tax penalty declines. Figures 6c shows early withdrawal propensities for
individuals who buy a new home compared to those who do not.8 The propensities are
almost identical for these two groups at about 1 percent. After implementation of the
2013 reform, the propensities seem to increase to about 2 percent whereas the group of
home buyers increased their propensity marginally more then the non-buyers. Overall, the
tax penalty reduction did not seem to affect withdrawal behavior at the timing of home
purchases. Figure 6d show early withdrawal propensities for individuals who are recorded
as married at the beginning of the year and divorced at the end of that same year. Savers in
the divorce group increased their propensities to cash out from about 2 to 5 percent, while
propensities of the non-divorce group increased marginally from little above 1 percent to
little below 2 percent for the two time periods.
The next step is to incorporate the life event information presented above into a regres-
sion specification that allows us to test whether our findings are statistically significant.
8The home purchase indicator is crude as it captures only first time buyers who is recorded to have no
housing wealth at the beginning of the year and non-zero housing wealth at the end of the year. Also, we
do not observe when the credit assessment of the home buyer takes place, which might correlate with the
decision to withdraw pension assets early.
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The following model departs from equation (2) and adds four additional terms.
Ei,t = α + β1Postt + β2Treati + β3Postt × Treati + β4Si,t + β5Postt × Si,t
+ β6Treati × Si,t + β7Postt × Treati × Si,t +Xi + εi,t, (3)
where Si,t is one of the four predefined indicators, either JobLoss, Liq.Con., BuyHouse or
Divorce. We estimate the model with each of the four indicators included separately, and
run a full specification in which all indicators are included simultaneously. Si,t is interacted
with Postt to filter out changes in propensities across the pre-reform and post-reform years
for individuals characterized by that particular life event. Similarly, Si,t is interacted with
Treati to control for differences between the treatment and control groups. The triple
interaction term, Postt×Treati×Si,t, captures the additional response in early withdrawal
propensities for the treated savers who are characterized by the life events in Si,t when the tax
penalty rate is reduced in 2013. Appendix Table 7 presents all coefficients in the model, while
Table 5 presents the coefficients of interest from equation (3). The average treatment effect
is estimated to be 0.4–0.6 percentage points, consistent with that of Table 3. However, four
additional effects are presented in Table 5. Column one shows that the liquidity constrained
savers increased their early withdrawal propensity by an additional 0.5 percentage points
compared to the unconstrained savers. Similarly, those in the treatment group suffering
from a job loss increased their early withdrawal propensity by an additional 1.3 percentage
points. This is an important empirical finding as it links the tax policy response to the
timing of a job loss. This finding implies that the price of liquidity in pension accounts
matters for consumers who lose their job. Upon the job loss this group is more likely to
buy back pension assets if the price of doing so is reduced. Column three shows that early
withdrawal propensities increase for house buyers by an additional 0.1 percentage points for
when the tax penalty rate is reduced. The estimate is, however, not statistically significant.
Individuals who undergo divorce respond to the tax reform by an additional 1.2 percentage
points in column four. Column five includes all the four indicators, simultaneously. Almost
all coefficients remain unchanged in this specification. Reassuringly, the pattern emerging
from the empirical model verifies the nonparametric evidence in Figures 6a—6d.
The estimated treatment effects in Table 5 can be translated into semi-elasticities by
dividing the percentage point change by the estimated 6 percent decline in the tax penalty
rate caused by the tax reform. We show in Appendix Table 8 that the tax rate change
is not statistically different to the job loss and divorce groups compared to the average
effect presented in Table 3. Thus, consumers who lose their job increase their early with-
drawal propensity by (.006 + .013)/(−.06) = 0.3 percentage points for each one percent
decrease in the tax penalty rate. For the divorce-group this figure is almost identical,
(.006 + .012)/(−.06) = 0.3 percentage points for each on percent decrease in the penalty
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Reform Effects on Early Withdrawal Propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × Treat 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post × Treat × Liq. Con. 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Treat × Job Loss 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Post × Treat × Buy House 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Post × Treat × Divorce 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9609187 9609187 9609187 9609187 9609187
R2 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005
Notes: The Table present coefficients from equation (3) with the early withdrawal
propensity as dependent variable. The triple interaction terms are interactions of
the difference-in-differences estimator and each of the shock measures. See notes
for Figures 6a–6d for explanations on the shocks. Coefficients of the full model
are presented in Appendix Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
131
rate. For the group of savers who are characterized as being liquidity constrained the re-
sponse to the reform is (.004 + .05)/(−.06) = 0.2 percentage points for a one percent tax
penalty rate reduction. All together, the estimated treatment effects are about 2–3 times
larger for the liquidity constrained consumers and those experiencing adverse demographic
or labor market shocks.
7 Effects on Overall Savings when Early Withdrawing
This section exploits variation in the timing of early withdrawals in the panel data to identify
how much is withdrawn from tax-deferred retirement accounts conditional on cashing out.
Moreover, we examine how early withdrawals that take place simultaneously as a job loss
might affect subsequent savings rate differentially depending on whether or not the saver is
liquidity constrained or not.
7.1 Intensive margin response
In order to measure how much income increases upon early withdrawing and whether this
increase was spent immediately or saved in non-retirement accounts we design an event
study. Here, we compare behavior of savers who withdraw pension assets early in year t
to savers who cash out pension assets in year t + 3. The idea is to quantify the effects of
the withdrawals on other savings components and consumption relative to the change in
these same outcomes in the absence of the early withdrawal. By comparing these estimated
effects to similar calculations in the pre-reform period we obtain a gauge on whether the tax
penalty reduction affected the size of the withdrawals and how the withdrawals were spent.
The first step is to identify withdrawn amounts and how large they are relative to
individual disposable income. We do this in the following regression
∆Yi,t = α + β1Postt + β2E1 + β3Postt × E1 + εi,t, (4)
where the change in disposable income, ∆Yi,t, is regressed on our reform indicator, an
indicator that takes the value 1 for individuals who withdraw pension savings early in 2013
and 0 for individuals who cash out in 2016 and the interaction of the two. Disposable
income is defined as income after taxes and interest payments. Pension contributions are
excluded but early withdrawals measured after tax penalties are included in the variable.
The idiosyncratic error is εi,t. The interaction term captures the effect on income when
cashing out in 2013 relative to the counterfactual group, those who cashed out three years
later. β3 is therefore the coefficient of interest. In order to interpret β3 as the effect of the
early withdrawal on income changes, we need to assess whether the control group serves as a
valid counterfactual. The estimated changes to disposable income for the 2013-withdrawal
group and 2016-withdrawal group are plotted in Figure 7a. The Figure includes savers
from the treatment group only and the plots are provided with standard errors in vertical
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bars, testing for whether the trends in income changes are significantly different between
the two groups.9 Clearly, disposable income increases substantially in the withdrawal year
relative to the counterfactual. In the year after the withdrawal, the disposable income decline
substantially, reflecting that we consider annual changes in the graph. It is compelling to see
that the 2016-withdrawal group had pre-trends similar to the 2013-withdrawal group. For
this reason, we attribute the quantified differences in 2013 to be related to the withdrawals
and not some third factor. Similar plots showing common pre-trends in all financial savings
accounts can be found in Appendix Figures 11 and 12 for the treatment and control groups,
respectively. Figure 7b summarizes the estimated effects of event studies in 2005, 2007,
2009, 2011 and 2013. In 2013, the bar representing the treatment group corresponds to
the illustrated response in Figure 7a for that same year showing an increase in disposable
income of 14.3 percentage points. Clearly, the estimated effect of the early withdrawal in
2013 on disposable income was significantly larger than in preceding years, in which early
withdrawals increased disposable income of about 9.8 percentage points on average. For the
control group, the estimated effects of early withdrawals on disposable income do not change
significantly across years. For 2013, the point estimate is 9.5 percentage points. The average
of the preceding years shown in Figure 7b is 10.1 percentage points. Using the 2013-estimates
within each group relative to each of their pre-2013 averages we estimate that the 2013 tax
penalty reduction increased the size of early withdrawals of (14.3/9.8)/(9.5/10.1)− 1 = 55
percent.
The next step is to quantify how the money was spent or saved in non-retirement savings
accounts. To define a consumption measure we follow the approach in Leth-Petersen and
Browning (2003) by subtracting pension contributions and changes in non-retirement wealth
from individual disposable income, Ci,t = Yi,t − Pi,t − ∆Wi,t. The imputed consumption
measure has the caveat that price changes in stock and bonds, capital gains and losses
are interpreted as actual saving and dissaving decisions by the owners. However, as shown
in Table 4 column two, our main results do not change when removing individuals with
stocks or bonds in their financial portfolio. The consumption measure is, therefore, less
problematic to interpret in our specific setup.
9The error bars are calculated using a regression model similar to equation (1)
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Figure 7: The Effect of Early Withdrawals on Disposable Income
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Note: Figure 7a show the year-on-year change in disposable income for the treatment and control groups,
respectively, measured as share of two year lagged disposable income. Each dot represent the mean
within the specified calendar year for two groups. One withdraw pension assets early in 2013, while
the other cashes out in 2016. The latter is used as counterfactual to quantify the change caused by the
early withdrawal. The red dotted line represent marks the timing of the 2013-withdrawal. Vertical bars
represent 5-percent significance levels estimated in a linear regression. Figure 7b summarizes estimated
effects of event studies carried out in 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2013, for both the treatment and control
groups.
Table 6: The Effect of Early Withdrawals on the Individual Financial Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Income
(ex. Pension) ∆Pension ∆Assets ∆Debt ∆Mortgage ∆Consumption
Post× EventT2013 0.143∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.021)
Post× EventC2013 0.095∗∗∗ -0.006 0.055∗ -0.001 -0.069 -0.071
(0.002) (0.005) (0.031) (0.039) (0.051) (0.078)
Notes: The Table presents coefficients from equation (4) with various outcomes as dependent vari-
ables. Column one uses disposable income (including early withdrawals measured after taxes) as
dependent variable. Column two uses total pension contributions as dependent variable. Columns
three-five use financial assets, debt and mortgage, respectively, as left-hand side variables. Column six
uses imputed consumption as dependent variable. All these variables are in first differences. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6 presents the 2013-withdrawal effects on all savings components and consumption.
The top row presents the effects of withdrawals in the treatment group, while the bottom row
presents estimates from the control group. For the treatment group, the 2013-withdrawal
lead to a 14.3 percentage point increase in disposable income relative to the counterfactual.
Pension contributions were reduced marginally by 0.4 percentage points. Liquid assets were
increased by 3 percentage points, debt was reduced by 4.4 percentage points and mortgages
134
were increased by 2.5 percentage points. Changes to the imputed consumption measure are
increased by 4.8 percentage points. All estimates are statistical significant at the 5 percent-
level. The substitution patterns indicate that 4.8/14.3 = 34 percent of the withdrawals were
spent immediately, while (3− (−4.4)− 2.5) = 34 percent were rolled over to non-retirement
savings accounts or used to repay debt. The estimated coefficients account for 2/3 of the
withdrawn amount. However, the standard errors on the imputed consumption are large—
about 2 percentage points. Therefore, within the 5-percent confidence band, the spending
estimate could be 4.8 + (2.1 ∗ 1.96) = 8.9 percentage points. This corresponds to a pass-
through effect from early withdrawals to consumption of 8.9/14, 3 = 62 percent. Hence,
together with changes in savings and debt, this accounts fully for the increase in disposable
income caused by the withdrawal. In the bottom row, the substitution effects of the control
group is much less clear. This group consists of fewer individuals and hence, the estimated
standard errors are larger compared to that of the treatment group. Nonetheless, we find
a 9.5 percentage point increase in disposable income. At the 10 percent significance level
liquid assets tend to increase by 5.5 percentage points, accounting for 5.5/9.5 = 58 percent
of the withdrawals. The estimated coefficients does not, however, draw a clear picture of
the substitution pattern of the control group.
7.2 Savings Rate after Job Loss and Early Withdrawals
If pre-retirement withdrawals are used for consumption smoothing when temporary, adverse
shocks occur, we would expect to see savings rates rebound shortly after the timing of cashing
out. To test this prediction, two comparable groups are defined out of the treated savers.
One group who lose their job and cash out retirement savings, labelled Job Loss, and a
group who cash out retirement savings without a job loss, labelled No Job Loss. Figure
8a plots the mean of pension contributions, including both voluntary and occupational
contributions, for both groups indexed at two years before the timing of the early withdrawal.
Individuals included in the illustration are restricted to be liquidity constrained at the
beginning of time 0. Also, the Figure covers the pre-reform period only and all individuals
are restricted to being included at least one year after the timing of an early withdrawal.
Pension contributions decline substantially—about 50 percent—when the pre-retirement
withdrawal takes place in the same year as a job loss. This is not surprising as pension
contributions are closely connected to the total compensation when employed. When the
employment ends the pension contributions are likely also to end. The more interesting part
of the Figure is to observe how average contributions develop in the years following a job loss
and early withdrawal. Pension contributions increase after few years but the job loss-group
never catches up with the no-job loss group—at least not for the six following years. The
pattern is similar if we consider contribution rates, where contributions are measured as a
share of total earnings, rather than contribution levels (see Appendix Figures 13a).
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Figure 8: Pension Contributions at Timing of Early Withdrawal (Liquidity Constrained)
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Note: Figure 8a plot pension contributions in DKK across time, where time 0 represent the timing of an
early withdrawal. The Figure includes treatment group savers only who cash out pension assets during
2000–2012. The savers are divided in two groups. One group lose their job in the same year as the
early withdrawal, while the other group does not change labor market status. Pension contributions are
indexed to time -2, two years prior to the withdrawal. Figure 8b is similar but here, those who are still
unemployed in year 2 have been removed from the sample.
We do not know the the characteristics of the employment shock, e.g., whether it is
short or long-term. However, by removing individuals who are still unemployed at time 2,
the overall pattern remain unchanged. This is depicted in Figure 8b. This implies that it
is not permanent employment shocks that explain how pension savings rates remain lower
for the group that early withdraw pension assets simultaneously as experiencing a job loss.
Another explanation for this pattern is that the job loss-group takes the opportunity to
rebalance their financial portfolio and cash out pension assets for this purpose. Savings
in non-retirement accounts do increase immediately as the job loss and early withdrawal
take place (see Appendix Figure 13b), however, the job loss and no-job loss groups did not
change non-retirement account savings rate differentially. This implies that the decline in
pension contributions that we observe in Figure 8a is not counteracted by increased savings
in non retirement accounts or increased debt repayments. The conclusion is that the overall
savings rates decline when cashing out pension assets at the time of a job loss.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines who might benefit from a buy-back clause in retirement pension
schemes. The clause entails that the owner of the pension account can withdraw assets early
upon payment of a tax penalty. Using plausibly exogenous variation in the tax penalty rate
caused by a Danish 2013 pension tax reform, we measure the response on both the extensive
and intensive margins. Also, we assess the post-withdrawal effects on savings rates.
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The empirical evidence point to that the propensity to withdraw pension assets early
increases on average by 0.1 percentage points for one percent reduction in the tax penalty
rate. The effect is three times larger for individuals who are affected by a job loss or divorce
within the same year as the withdrawal. This is consistent with the idea that pension assets
are used to mitigate effects of adverse life events and allow liquidity constrained savers to
smooth shocks. Conditional on withdrawing pension assets early we find that withdrawals
increase significantly when the tax penalty rate is reduced.
Two key features of this paper cause the empirical evidence to stand out from the existing
literature. First, we exploit variation in the tax rates that are levied on pre-retirement
withdrawals. The two existing retirement schemes in the Danish pension system were subject
to the same tax penalty rates until 2013. After this point, the tax rate on the one scheme
was reduced by 17 percent, while the tax rate remained unchanged for the other scheme. We
design a quasi-experiment to quantify the response in early withdrawal propensities as the
tax reform was implemented. The setup is compelling because we define a counterfactual
with common pre-trends in withdrawal propensities as the group of savers who were likely to
be affected by the policy change. The second key feature is that we use Danish administrative
records to estimate heterogenous treatment effects across a range of personal characteristics.
In particular, we exploit information about the timing of job loss and divorce to show that
such shocks interact with the decision to engage in early withdrawal behavior when the costs
of doing so decline. The findings imply that those affected by adverse shocks or liquidity
constraints seem to utilize the tax reform to obtain access to needed liquidity.
Our results are consistent with the idea that people finance their spending with the
least costly sources first and turn to early withdrawals only when access to liquid wealth is
limited. Further, those who cash out from retirement accounts around a job loss continue
with lower savings rates for at least 6 years after the withdrawal. Together, this implies
that people who engage in early withdrawals are less well prepared for retirement. The
tax penalty rate is effective to refrain these individuals from cashing out early and thereby
increase their overall savings and retirement income.
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A Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure 9: Subsample of strictly lump-sum or annuity savers
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Note: The Figures divide the sample in two groups. One who saved in lump-sum pension schemes only
during 1999–2012 and another who saved in annuity pension schemes only. Figure 9a shows the tax
penalty rate for the two groups and 9b shows the propensity to withdraw pension assets early. The red
dotted line represent the time of implementation of the tax penalty reduction.
Figure 10: Early Withdrawal Propensity (%) Split in Small and Large Withdrawals
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Note: The Figures shows the propensity to withdraw pension assets early within each calendar year.
Withdrawals are divided in two groups. One that includes withdrawals below DKK 5,000 (US $ 800)
and one that includes withdrawals larger than this threshold. The DKK 5,000-threshold represents the
value at which pension funds are likely to cash out the balance to the owner automatically. The paper
considers withdrawals only when they exceed this limit.
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Figure 11: Effects of Early Withdrawals on Non-retirement Accounts (Treatment)
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(e) Consumption
Note: The Figures present first differences to the change in savings and consumption components for the
treatment group. They have all been normalized using 2011-values of disposable income. See notes in
7a.
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Figure 12: Effects of Early Withdrawals on Non-retirement Accounts (Control)
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(d) Pensions
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(e) Disposable Income
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Note: The Figures present first differences to the change in savings and consumption components for the
control group. They have all been normalized using 2011-values of disposable income. See notes in 7a.
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Figure 13: Savings at Timing of Early Withdrawal and Job Loss (Liquidity Constrained)
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(b) Savings in Non-retirement Accounts
Note: Figure 13a shows the pension contribution rate—that is the share of pension contributions relative
to total compensation—indexed to 2 years prior to an early withdrawal. Figure 13b shows the first
difference in changes to non-retirement wealth savings, including bank deposits, stocks, bonds and credit.
This measure is normalized by disposable income 2 years prior to an early withdrawal. See notes in 8a.
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Table 7: Heterogeneous Reform Effects on Early Withdrawal Propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Treat 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post × Treat 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liq. Con. 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Post × Liq. Con. 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Treat × Liq. Con. 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Post × Treat × Liq. Con. 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Job Loss 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Job Loss 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Treat × Job Loss 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Treat × Job Loss 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Buy House 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Buy House 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Treat × Buy House -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Treat × Buy House 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Divorce 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Divorce 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Treat × Divorce 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Treat × Divorce 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9609187 9609187 9609187 9609187 9609187
R2 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005
Standard errors in parentheses. See notes in Table 5.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Reform Effects on Tax Penalty Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Treat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post × Treat -0.043∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Liq. Con. 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Post × Liq. Con. 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Treat × Liq. Con. -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Treat × Liq. Con. -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Job Loss 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Post × Job Loss 0.007∗ 0.007
(0.004) (0.004)
Treat × Job Loss 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Post × Treat × Job Loss -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Buy House -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Buy House -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Treat × Buy House -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Post × Treat × Buy House 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Divorce 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Post × Divorce 0.006∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Treat × Divorce 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Post × Treat × Divorce -0.005 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 128279 128279 128279 128279 128279
R2 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492
Standard errors in parentheses. See notes in Table 5.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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